Following a joint Security Sub-Committee (SSC) and Working Group meeting on 26 February 2019 to discuss the results of the Gemserv Ltd Risk Assessment, it was concluded that the proposed solution would not be viable due to the security implications of removing the 60-minute time-out restriction during Communication Hub power-up. We are now working with the Proposer to summarise the difficulties into a single problem statement and examine the issues via a new Draft Proposal.
What is the issue?
As a main Pre-Payment Meter Supplier, Utlita’s customer base tends to be mainly in populous areas which usually have good signals; the risk of unpredictable or poor WAN must be considered higher in less populous areas. This is especially critical for prepayment customers, since configuration Commands affect supply of energy to their homes. It is not viable to wait for an uncertain period for Wide Area Network (WAN) quality to increase sufficiently, before their supply issues are addressed. SMETS1 solutions to address this problem have been developed and refined over 15 years, but the Proposer indicates that there are no current SMETS2 solutions, other than sending an engineer with a Hand-Held Terminal (HHT) to the Consumer’s Premises.
What is the solution?
This modification seeks to offer the option for Prepayment Meter Interface Devices (PPMIDs) to be able to pass fully formed Great Britain Companion Specification (GBCS) Remote Party Commands onto the Home Area Network (HAN). It is expected that the Commands would usually be routed from the Supplier to the PPMID via Wi-Fi connectivity.
Who is impacted?
Other SEC Parties
SECMP0037/SECMP0038 February 2019 Working Group meeting summary
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