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Operations Group Meeting 93

24 April 2023, 12:20 – 16:00

Teleconference

OPSG_93_2404 – Final Minutes

Attendees:

Meeting attendees are recorded in Appendix A to the minutes.

1. Previous Meeting Minutes

The Chair invited Operations Group (OPSG) members to comment on the Draft Minutes from OPSG 91. The **OPSG APPROVED** the minutes from OPSG 91 as final.

2. Actions Outstanding

SECAS presented the actions outstanding.

Action Ref.	Action	Date Raised	Last Target Date	Revised Target Date	Owner
OPSG 88/01	The DCC to schedule the remaining workshops to review the business processes.	14/02/2023	28/04/2023	TBC	DCC

The OPSG noted that although there have been two prepayment workshops, DCC will need to schedule additional workshops to analyse the performance of the other business process indicators in priority order. **Status: Open.**

The OPSG agreed to close the following actions with no further comments: OPSG 90/09.

The OPSG **NOTED** the update.

3. SEC Panel Reports – March 2023

Registration Data Provider (RDP) Incidents

SECAS presented the RDP Incidents for March 2023, SECAS reported that there were six new Incidents opened in March 2023. The OPSG highlighted that this was a lower number than generally experienced previously. 19 Incidents had been resolved within the month.

The DCC clarified how RDP Incidents will be processed and resolved under the arrangements in place since Faster Switching was implemented, SEC and REC responsibilities were also identified. The DCC noted it also has a cross code working group to review any boundary related issues, for example, any changes to the SEC or REC interfaces.

The OPSG:

- **NOTED** the SEC Panel Reports.
- **AGREED** that actions OPSG 78/02¹ and OPSG 82/01² be closed.
- **AGREED** with the summary of DCC reporting (Annex 1) noting that the report reflected the service experienced by Users.

4. Performance Measurement Report (PMR) – February 2023

SECAS presented its review of the PMR for February 2023 and noted the associated responses to queries provided by the DCC.

SECAS reported that CPM1 '*Percentage of On-Demand Service Responses delivered within the applicable Target Resolution Time*' had achieved the target service level at 99.02%, however SMETS1 Service Provider (S1SP) DXC PM1.1 '*Percentage S1SP Countersigned Service Request Times within relevant Target Response Time (TRT)*' continues to fail to reach the minimum service level as it achieved 93.63%. The OPSG members requested that the DCC confirm what additional actions are being taken to achieve the target service level and when this may be met. The OPSG also noted that S1SP DXC PM1.1 should be added to the non-compliance list for further investigation.

The OPSG noted that Communication Service Provider North (CSPN) PM2 '*Percentage of Category 1 Firmware Payloads completed within the relevant TRT*' achieved the minimum service level at 98.43%. SECAS highlighted that this performance measure has achieved an average of 98.4% for the past five months. The OPSG requested that the DCC now provide a post project review of the work to date to achieve minimum service levels and in particular a view of what additional steps may be taken to achieve the target service level.

SECAS reported that CPM3 '*Percentage of Alerts delivered within the applicable Target Response Time*' was below the target service level at 98.44% this was due to:

- a) DXC PM1.5 S1SP SMETS1 '*Alert Response Times within relevant Target Response Time*' being below minimum service level at 95.40%.
- b) CSPN PM3.2 '*Percentage Category 3 Alerts delivered to the DCC WAN Gateway Interface within the relevant Target Response Time*' being below minimum service level at 95.32%.

The OPSG members requested that the DCC confirm what additional actions are being taken to achieve the target service level for DXC PM1.5.

¹ OPSG 78/02: The DCC to provide more clarity on how RDP/CSS Incidents will be reported in future.

² OPSG 82/01: The DCC to provide an architecture and a process diagram to illustrate how RDP incidents will be resolved in the future and the boundary of responsibilities between the REC and SEC.

The OPSG noted that there had been five Major Incidents (Category 1 and 2) in February 2023. SECAS highlighted that there are a number of occasions where configuration issues had been identified as root causes of Incidents.

ACTION OPSG 93/01: The DCC to confirm what steps are being taken for SP1SP DXC PM1.1 and PM1.5 to achieve the target service level.

ACTION OPSG 93/02: SECAS to confirm whether SP1SP DXC PM1.1 should be added to the non-compliance list (given that it has not achieved the target service level over an extended period of time) and update if required.

ACTION OPSG 93/03: The DCC to provide a post project review of the work to date to achieve minimum service level for CSP N PM2 and in particular a view of what additional steps may be taken to achieve the target service level.

The OPSG **NOTED** the presentation.

5. Business Processes Indicator Performance Summary Report – February 2023

SECAS presented the report for February 2023.

SECAS reported that success rates for SMETS1 firmware activations, tariff updates and Install and Commission had decreased. The OPSG noted that the reasons behind this decrease in performance needed to be further investigated by the DCC. The DCC noted that action OPSG 91/03³ is in place to investigate this further and the DCC will return in June with a further update.

The OPSG **NOTED** the update.

6. Business Processes Indicator Performance Plan

The DCC presented the Performance Processes Indicator Performance Plan.

The DCC reported that there has been an increase in the overall success rate of prepayment and update Home Area Network (HAN) business processes.

The DCC reported that there were four Major Incidents in March 2023, which impacted the prepayment performance in FOC by 7%.

The DCC reported that there had been a decrease in performance of Device Commissioning for all SMETS2 cohorts due to two Users. The DCC noted that root cause for this was an internal issue within the Users' infrastructures which they are trying to resolve. The DCC noted that this is not a long-term issue and will continue to engage with these Users.

The OPSG **NOTED** the update.

7. Major Incident Review

SECAS presented the Review Report for Incidents INC000000983383, INC000000984542, INC000000988420 and INC000000988955.

³ OPSG 91/03: The DCC to return to the OPSG reporting meeting with a timeline for the consideration of the impact of traffic volumes on various processes.

7.1. **INC000000983383**

The Incident occurred on Wednesday 22 February 2023 and impacted all SMETS1 and SMETS2 On Demand Service Requests (SRVs) in the Data Service Provider (DSP). The OPSG questioned the root cause of the Incident. The OPSG highlighted that it was caused by the maintenance activity and a lack of response from CSP Central and South (C&S) which in turn caused a build-up of SRV records in the database. The DCC noted that during the Incident the scheduled reads were sent at midnight as per normal however the responses were not received from CSP C&S. As the DSP retains a copy of SRVs until a response is received, the result of this was a build-up of SRVs in the database, and eventually, the database becoming full. The DCC noted that steps to mitigate future occurrences will include ensuring that scheduled reads will no longer be sent during a maintenance activity.

The OPSG questioned why there was no response from CSP C&S, the DCC noted that a Problem record had been raised to investigate this.

The OPSG questioned whether the post maintenance change checks were sufficient, as all services had a Green RAG status despite the Volt Database being in a read only mode. The DCC noted that since the Incident occurred the alerting mechanism threshold changed so that it is escalated at 60% instead of 80% to resolve an issue. The Volt Database will also form part of the post maintenance check going forward.

An OPSG member highlighted that Incident INC000000984039 (a Category 2 Incident) which occurred on the same day, could not be raised as it was related to Incident INC000000983383. The OPSG noted poor communications from the Service Centre. The DCC noted that Incident INC000000984039 was not related to Incident INC000000983383 and should have been raised as a separate Incident. The OPSG noted that details of Incident INC000000984039 should be included to the report. The OPSG requested that the DCC revise the root cause to include what triggered the Incident, for OPSG review ex-committee.

7.2. **INC000000984542**

The Incident occurred on Thursday 23 February 2023 and impacted all SMETS1 IOC Service Requests, including prepayment. This Incident took 19 hours and 10 mins to resolve, which was outside SLA.

The root cause for this incident was a configuration issue and the OPSG questioned whether this Incident could occur again. The DCC noted that mitigation included having roll back configuration details documented in the run book: this will prevent similar Incidents from reoccurring.

The OPSG highlighted that this Incident was not included in the February 2023 PMR. The DCC noted that this Incident was closed in March and therefore will be included in the March 2023 PMR.

7.3. **INC000000988420**

The Incident occurred on Sunday 5 March 2023 and impacted all SMETS1 SRVs in FOC S1SP.

The OPSG noted that DCC recently changed the BCDR scheduling strategy to allow for failover and failback to be executed in one day, with the intent of reducing overall outage times. The OPSG questioned whether there was sufficient time for reliable failover and failback testing. The DCC noted that it is still conducting a review of this BCDR strategy, in the light of these failover events. The OPSG requested that the DCC should present the conclusion of this review and the lessons learnt at a future meeting.

7.4. **INC000000988955**

The Incident occurred on Tuesday 7 March 2023 and impacted all SMETS2 SRVs at the DSP.

An OPSG member highlighted that there were several E20 and E21 errors from CSP N in the morning of the Incident and therefore questioned why the incident started at 11:58; they noted that they had also raised Incident INC000000989145. The OPSG also queried whether this Incident was related to the recent Technical Refresh. The DCC noted that it would investigate and report back ex-committee.

ACTION OPSG 93/04: The DCC to provide the conclusions on the implications for BCDR scheduling (whereby the failover/failback testing occurs in one day).

The OPSG:

- **CONSIDERED** the presentation.
- **AGREED** that Review Reports for Incidents INC000000983383 and INC00000098955 should be amended after further investigations and reviewed ex-committee.
- **AGREED** that Review Reports for Incidents INC000000984542 and INC000000988420 can be published to all SEC Parties.

8. Operational Performance Regime (OPR) – SRV8.11 Measurement

The PMRG (Performance Measures Review Group) Chair presented conclusions of that Group's discussions of the use of SRV8.11 as a metric. This was in response to a request from Ofgem for input on whether the performance of SRV8.11 was under control of the DCC.

The DCC presented analysis and operational evidence that the performance of SRV8.11 was impacted by the User choice of orchestration, and therefore not entirely under the control the DCC.

The OPSG's views were:

- (a) The OPSG emphasised the importance of finding a suitable metric for the DCC component of the Install and Commissioning (I&C) process, given that this business process will remain key for the foreseeable future.
- (b) The OPSG emphasised that SRV 8.11 was a key part of the I&C process, albeit that Users employed it in a variety of different orchestrations (and that the design and choice of such orchestrations is at the discretion of Users).
- (c) The OPSG noted the analysis and evidence presented by the DCC, showing that the performance of the SRV 8.11 as currently measured across the DCC infrastructure (i.e, the TRT) was considerably influenced by factors such as User orchestration.
- (d) Consequently, the OPSG agreed that the performance (TRT) achieved for SRV8.11 is not entirely within the control of the DCC, even though TRT is measured only across the DCC infrastructure.

The OPSG also highlighted the limitations of the measurement of the SRV8.11 in relation to the Target Response Times (TRT) methodology, noting the lack of SEC requirements for Users to orchestrate SRVs in the same way will produce diverse results.

Looking to the future, the OPSG, noted possible avenues for investigation:

- (a) Adjusting the value of the SRV8.11 TRT minimum and target times so that they suitably take account of the diversity of orchestrations employed by Users. This would require careful investigation, but the question of DCC control over the SRV8.11 performance remains.
- (b) Filtering the instances of the SRV8.11 included in the measurement of the TRT, so that only those not materially influenced by the User choice of orchestration are included. However, it may be only a small minority of instances may satisfy the filtering process. Work to assess the implementation of an enduring process has not been undertaken.
- (c) Consideration of a measure based on a definition of “Success” rather than TRT.

The OPSG noted support for a measure based on “success”. An OPSG member suggested that a Modification Proposal be raised as a measure “Success” of the Install and Commission process rather than TRT, and indicated they would now consider raising such a mod.

The OPSG noted that these comments will be consolidated in a letter to Ofgem; the draft of this letter will be circulated to OPSG Members for comment before being sent to Ofgem.

The OPSG **NOTED** the presentation.

9. Overview of Performance Measurement Review Group (PMRG) and next steps

The PMRG Chair noted that after the PMRG had reviewed the current performance measurements, it had noted that the measures and methodology do not meet Users needs. The PMRG had therefore requested that the DCC provide a ‘strawman’ proposal as to how to amend the Performance Measures framework for the longer term to make this more reflective of DCC User experiences and needs. The PMRG had requested any Performance Measure proposal be based on the Business Processes as defined by SEC section H13.1A. The OPSG approved that PMRG hold an extraordinary meeting to review the DCC “Strawman” once received.

The OPSG:

- **AGREED** that PMRG will hold an extraordinary meeting to review the strawman” proposal.

10. Any Other Business

10.1. ACB Certificates

The OPSG noted that the DCC plan to for ACB Certificates will be confirmed by the end of May 2023, and will address helpful feedback points received from Industry. The OPSG noted that any Customers/Device Manufacturers wish to discuss further in the interim should contact DCC.

10.2. CH Returns Quarterly Report

The DCC presented enhancements introduced to the CH Returns Quarterly report and noted that some additional reporting including the capture of CSP N manufacturer defects reasons (in reference to

OPSG 29/15⁴). This includes enhancements to Section 7 'Han Whitelist' and the addition of 'Sample Check of CSP Diagnosis'. The DCC requested that OPSG provide any further comments by 9 May 2023.

10.3. SECAS Annual Customer Satisfaction Survey

SECAS noted that the SECAS Annual Customer Satisfaction Survey is due to be held, and SEC Parties are invited to provide consent to be contacted to take part. SECAS requested that Parties complete the [online Consent Form](#) by close of business on Friday 5 May 2023.

Next Main Meeting: 9 May 2023; Next Reporting Meeting: 22 May 2023.

⁴ OPSG 29/15: The DCC to perform an audit of the CSPs CH triage process and provide an update at the next meeting (OPSG_30)