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SMKI PMA Meeting 45

Meeting SECPMA_45_1704, 17th April 2018

10:00 – 14:00, Gemserv Office, 8 Fenchurch Place, London, EC3M 4AJ

Final Minutes

Attendees:

Category	SMKI PMA Members
SMKI PMA Chair	Gordon Hextall (Teleconference)
SMKI Specialist	Darren Calam (Alternate Chair)
Large Suppliers	Fabien Cavenne
	Graham Eida
Technical Architecture and Business Architecture Sub-Committee (TABASC) Representative	Julian Hughes
Electricity Networks	Paul Fitzgerald
Gas Networks	Sara Neal

Non-Voting Members:

Category	Attendees
DCC	Paul Wilson
	Frederick Wamala
	Richard Hilton (Part)
	James Henton (Part)
	Kayode Oluwatayo (Part)
	Paul Allen (Part)
BEIS	Daryl Flack
SECAS	Nick Blake
	Moses Akinniranye

Apologies:

Category	Attendees
SECAS	Martina Cervenakova
Large Supplier	Chris Lanigan
BEIS	Joe Howard
Ofgem	Michael Walls

1. Introductions & Apologies

The SMKI PMA Alternate Chair welcomed the attendees to the April 2018 meeting, noting apologies and the running order of the agenda.

2. Draft Minutes of SMKI PMA Meeting 44_2003

The Draft Minutes from the March 2018 SMKI PMA meeting were **AGREED** as written.

3. Actions Outstanding

SECAS, the Alternate SMKI PMA Chair and the DCC provided the Sub-Committee with an update on several actions outstanding from previous SMKI PMA meetings. The following table sets out key items of discussion held during the April 2018 SMKI PMA meeting, specifically:

Action Reference	Update
SECPMA 37/06	<p>SECAS and the SMKI Specialist (with DCC support) to review the effectiveness of several SMKI SEC Documents.</p> <p><i>The SMKI PMA were informed that the change request had been raised with BT. The DCC informed that they were still waiting for a response from BT.</i></p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 39/02	<p>The DCC with the help of the SMKI PMA and the SSC to re-examine the proposals being made for use of SMKI for SMETS1 in more detail.</p> <p><i>An update on the action was discussed under agenda item 7.</i></p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 40/02	<p>The DCC to undertake detailed planning for all the parties involved in the Production Proving process including logistics and scripts and to return to the next SMKI PMA meeting with greater detail.</p> <p><i>An update on the action was discussed under agenda item 5.</i></p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 43/02	<p>The DCC to share proposed changes on the use of SMKI to SEC Section L and SEC Appendix B with the SMKI PMA.</p> <p><i>Consultation links were provided to SMKI PMA members after the meeting, and it is expected that members review and provide comments by the 26th April 2018.</i></p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>

4. **SMKI Repository Testing (SRT) Part 4 Completion – Update (RED)**

A confidential item on the SRT Part 4 Completion was discussed, and details of this can be found in the confidential minutes.

5. **Demonstrating SMKI Recovery in the Production Environment**

The DCC informed the SMKI PMA that they were currently in discussion with a User to participate in test recovery in the production environment. The DCC confirmed that more planning on details and logistics was needed but the SMKI **NOTED** the update provided by the DCC.

6. **SMKI Certificates with Leading Zeros**

SECAS provided a paper outlining proposed DCC remediation actions to address a SMKI-related Severity 2 incident. The incident relates to SMKI Certificates having leading zeros in the signature 'blob' of the SMKI Certificate that subsequently fails validation when latest versions of Java are installed.

The DCC informed SMKI PMA members that the Symantec software used since SMKI go-live has added extra zeros to the signature blob. Symantec have since implemented a remediation for the future by trimming the leading zeros on signature element of the SMKI Certificate which allows the certificate to pass the validation process through the latest versions of Java.

The DCC confirmed that around 4% (<23,000) of current SMKI Certificates in issue that already contain leading zeros would fail validation by the latest versions of Java. To remediate the problem for these Devices, the DCC propose to replace the existing SMKI Certificates (that currently contain leading zeros) in the SMKI Repository with updated SMKI Certificates without the leading zeros.

The SMKI PMA discussed whether the DSP (*at the request of the DCC*) had the authority to alter information in the SMKI Repository as this is not specifically stated in the SEC. It was acknowledged that the SEC does require the DCC to maintain SMKI Certificates in the SMKI Repository "to facilitate the installation at premises of Devices that are capable of being commissioned". Some SMKI PMA members raised concerns that the DCC has the authority to alter, replace or delete material in the SMKI Repository. SMKI PMA decided further consideration would be needed to decide whether stronger governance processes were required to be able to provide controls for the DCC in making such changes, and whether this change would come via a modification to the SEC. .

The SMKI PMA asked the DCC if they were able to provide the number of installed Devices that have affected SMKI Certificates on them and how many are in storage or production. The DCC agreed to

investigate and come back to a future meeting. The DCC were also asked to come back with analysis on the root cause of the problem to ensure it doesn't recur or occur elsewhere.

The DCC informed the SMKI PMA that they were not presenting this item for approval, but for information purposes. The DCC categorically believe they need to update the SMKI Repository and that their interpretation of the SEC requirements entitles them to do this.

The SMKI PMA acknowledged that the DCC did not come for an approval to allow them to delete things in the SMKI Repository, but **NOTED** the background and remediation plans for the issue. The SMKI PMA further **AGREED** that the current Section L governance arrangements for DCC access to the SMKI Repository may need to be reviewed and discussed further. They may, as a result, need to be amended.

Action SECPMA 45/02 – The DCC to investigate how many Devices have SMKI certificates on them, providing a breakdown of which Devices have been installed, how many are in storage, and how many are in the manufacturing process with affected SMKI Certificates on them.

Action SECPMA 45/03 – The DCC to come back to the next PMA with analysis on whether the business benefits for DCC modifying SMKI Repository outweighing the security and governance risks.

Action SECPMA 45/04 – The DCC will come back to a future SMKI PMA with root cause analysis to understand and identify the cause of the SMKI Certificate Severity 2 issue with Java.

7. Reuse of SMKI for SMETS1 (RED)

A confidential item on the re-use of SMKI for SMETS1 was discussed, and details of this can be found in the confidential minutes.

8. Key Custodians Update

The DCC informed the SMKI PMA about their need to call for nominations for Key Custodians. The SMKI PMA were informed of two new applications that were being reviewed, but also highlighted that more applicants would be welcomed.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the update provided by the DCC.

9. Standing Agenda Items

The following sub-sections of this agenda item provide an update on the monthly activities that are reported to the SMKI PMA by the DCC, SECAS and BEIS:

9.1 SMKI Operational Update

The DCC confirmed that there was still ongoing SRT Part 3bwork ongoing (the SMKI 101 testing by Telefonica) and that the DCC would give us an update on the plan for this testing to conclude. The

DCC also confirmed that through the DCC, via the eyes of the SMKI RA role, there are a number of Suppliers active, contacting the DCC and this is being noted via the Security Sub-Committee Full User Security Assessments.

The DCC also informed members that there is an operational change for the TSP to undertake Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BCDR) activities in May 2018. The TSP will back up to a secondary Datacentre and run on that Datacentre for a period to thoroughly test the BCDR and failover arrangements. As part of this exercise, the TSP will also undertake testing and they will be patching systems. SMKI PMA requested that the DCC provide Device commissioning reports to the next meeting.

Action SECPMA 45/08: The DCC to provide Device commissioning reports to the next meeting

9.2 DCC Update

The DCC confirmed there were no further updates.

9.3 DCCKI PMA Functions Update

The DCC confirmed they will chase internally to ensure the DCCKI PMA minutes are available as soon as possible.

9.4 BEIS Update

BEIS informed the SMKI PMA of the consultation that had been released on Enrolment of SMETS1 meter cohorts with the DCC and Maximising interoperability for SMETS1 meters. BEIS shared the links with SMKI PMA members.

10. Any Other Business (AOB)

There was no other business and the SMKI PMA Chair closed the meeting.

Next meeting: 15th May 2018