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<b>Action:</b>	<b>For Information</b>

## SEC Panel Sub-Committee Report

### 1. Purpose

This paper provides the Panel with an update on recent activities from the Panel Sub-Committees. It highlights the key issues discussed and details specific points the Sub-Committees would like to bring to the Panel's attention.

### 2. Operations Group

#### 2.1 DCC reporting

The Operations Group (OPSG) considered and noted the following DCC reports at their meeting on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2018:

Report	Delivery per SEC	Content	Observations
Performance Measurement Report (December 17)	On Time (SEC H13.4 – Monthly 25 working days following end of month)	All code measures reported on target.  All DSP (with 1 exception) and CSP measures reported on target or “no data.”	DSP exception due to December 17 BCDR test.
DCC Responsible Communications Hub Returns Report (Q4 2017)	On Time (SEC F9.15 – Quarterly)	No Communication Hubs reported as returned during period.	None
DCC Network Enhancement Report (Network Enhancement Plans – NEP Q4 2017)	On Time (SEC F7.21 “within a reasonable period of time following each quarter that ends prior to 1 January 2021”	Volumes of NEPs reported as 1.3% of total premises in CSP Central and Southern region.	None

Registration Data Provider (RDP) Incident Report (December 2017 & January 2018)	On Time (SEC Appendix AG 2.5.10 – Monthly - timing not specified)	INC000000153793 Declared as Severity 4 (5-day resolution). Not Resolved in line with Incident Management Policy.	Report does not detail what the incident was. How it was resolved etc, provides minimum details per the SEC.
Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Variance Report – December 2017 and January 2018)	On Time (SEC L8.9 – 10 <sup>TH</sup> Working day following month end)	Actual CSR equate to 48% of total forecast volume.	None
Service Request (SR) Variance Reporting (December 2017 & January 2018)	On Time (SEC H3.24 – 10 <sup>th</sup> working day of month).	Actual SR sent equate to 1% of forecast volume	60% of actual SR vol. attributable to a single SR.

## 2.2 OPSG Highlights

### *Production Proving*

At the February 2018 OPSG meeting, the DCC presented an overview of the Production Proving Options Analysis and Recommendation consultation now in progress, outlining the rationale and the main options that have been identified.

OPSG members noted that the current assurance regime could be strengthened to increase confidence that the impact of any unidentified deficiencies on live operation would be minimised. OPSG members also noted that two highlighted options (Pre-production environment and post go-live production proving) provided different assurance and were not mutually exclusive.

The DCC believe the pre-production environment option will be significantly more expensive than the production proving option, however, the production proving option only applies after a release has already gone into live operation, whereas the pre-production environment provides increased assurance before new functionality reaches the live environment.

OPSG members noted the need for transparency on costs for the adopted option. The OPSG requested that the DCC consider the industry-wide perspective when assessing the costs and benefits of the identified options, specifically the benefits (including reputational) across all Users, of avoiding a serious fault in the enduring operational DCC service after transition is complete.

### *Ready to Scale*

The DCC provided an overview of the aims and objectives of the Ready to Scale project. DCC provided further information on cost allocation and incremental costs that have been a long running issue for the OPSG. The DCC has an action to clarify split of costs between Production Proving and wider Ready to Scale (Technical Operations) initiatives.

### *Major Incident*

The DCC updated OPSG Members on the Major Incident in the Communication Service Provider North (CSPN) region on the 16<sup>th</sup> February, noting this was an issue with mobile backhaul capability impacting the CSPN service.

### ***Business Continuity Disaster Recovery***

The OPSG noted the execution of the scheduled BCDR test which has now been carried out successfully in accordance with the SEC requirements.

The OPSG noted that the possibility of conducting an unannounced BCDR test had been raised at the IMF. Members noted that the added realism of such a test would have some attractions. However, the OPSG view was that that approach would bring considerable risks of disruption, which would outweigh the possible benefits. Therefore, the OPSG did not support executing an unannounced BCDR test.

## **3. Security Sub Committee and SMKI PMA**

The Security Sub Committee met on the 14<sup>th</sup> February 2018 and the 28<sup>th</sup> February and the SMKI PMA met on the 20<sup>th</sup> February 2018; the highlights include:

### **3.1 Assurance Status Decisions**

The SEC Panel has delegated responsibility to the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) in relation to setting assurance statuses for SEC Parties that are undertaking their initial Full User Security Assessment.

During February 2018 the SSC set three assurance statuses. Details can be found in the confidential attachment A.

### **3.2 Verification Assessments**

As part of their wider obligations, the SSC review the outcomes of Verification Assessments. If the SSC believe that a User is non-compliant, or potentially non-compliant, with obligations contained in G3-G6 of the SEC then they notify the Panel.

During February the SSC reviewed one Verification Assessment. Details can be found in the confidential attachment A.

### **3.3 Security Status**

The SSC reviewed two Security incidents in February 2018. The Security Incident and Vulnerability form were provided to SSC Members to review, and the SECAS Security Expert confirmed that the Vulnerabilities reported were not material enough to initiate the Smart Metering Incident Response Team (SMIRT). The SSC are monitoring the resolution of those incidents.

### **3.4 SSC Highlights**

#### ***DCC SOC2 Assessment***

The DCC provided the SSC with a presentation confirming that their SOC2 Assessment had now been completed and that they were waiting for the final outputs of the assessment to be circulated for review. The SSC have requested to review the DCC Remediation plan at an SSC meeting in March 2018.

#### ***DCC Production Proving***

The DCC briefed the SSC on its proposed Production Proving environment, detailing the outline solution design and mitigating controls.

The SSC were also provided with an overview of the risk assessment of the Production Proving solution and discussed the controls in place to ensure that the risks to the DCC Total System are mitigated effectively. The SSC have provided the DCC with feedback to the risk assessment.

#### ***Event of Default***

The SSC discussed the process of an Event of Default in relation to a User Verification Assessment and identified potential improvements and how these could be implemented.

### **3.5 SMKI PMA Highlights**

#### ***SMKI PMA on SMETS1 Architecture***

SMKI PMA have been reviewing the proposed use of SMKI in the SMETS1 Architecture. The DCC provided the SMKI PMA with a written response which was discussed during the February 2018 meeting and the SMKI PMA agreed that the DCC would need to conduct further risk analysis of the assumptions made on specific controls identified to mitigate risks identified by the DCC e.g. SMETS1 specific User.

#### ***SMKI Repository Testing Part 3b***

During the February meeting, The DCC provided SMKI PMA with an update regarding the SMKI Repository Testing (SRT) Part 3b, confirmed the testing was successful and the SRT Part 3b is already in production. The SMKI PMA agreed that the completion of SRT Part 3b could not be signed off as complete until both CSPs have conducted SMKI101 testing. The DCC confirmed that a further update would be brought to the next SMKI PMA meeting.

## **4. TABASC**

### **4.1 TABASC Highlights**

#### ***TABASC BAD and TAD***

The TABASC are undertaking the review of the necessary updates to the Business Architecture Document (BAD) and the Technical Architecture Document (TAD) to capture the changes being implemented as part of Release 2. Updated versions of the documents are expected to be issued in March 2018 for review.

#### ***TABASC and Sub-Committee Roles in Transitional Releases***

At the January 2018 meeting the TABASC agreed approaches to ensure that its Risk Register is complete for the current live arrangements and enduring releases. Further consideration was given in relation to the TABASC role in transitional releases (specifically, Release 2.0 and the SMETS1 Services release). However, the TABASC agreed to not undertake any additional activities on the two transitional releases beyond identifying and making the necessary changes to the TAD and BAD. This is on the basis that all governance activities have an appropriate transitional body to support it, which provides the same support and advice that enduring bodies would provide, without duplicating activities. Consideration is also required from Panel on whether it should seek confirmation from BEIS on what the Panel and its Sub-Committees should expect to be provided following a transitional release going live and moving forward under enduring governance (see paper discussions are highlighted in SECP\_54\_0903\_04).

### ***TABASC Effectiveness Review Survey***

SEC Sections F1.4(e) - (f) set out the requirements for the TABASC (where directed by the Panel) to review the effectiveness of the end to end Technical Architecture, Business Architecture and the HAN requirements.

The effectiveness review is initially being informed by a survey that was developed in mid-2017. Originally the survey was scheduled to be issued in November 2017, however due to the limited number of SMETS2 metering installations the TABASC took the decision to postpone issuing the survey to the end of March 2018, where it was anticipated to have an increase in volumes installed.

Last month, the TABASC agreed to share the survey to the Operations Group for feedback. In response to feedback received, the TABASC agreed to add a question to the survey in relation to seeking views on the User's experience with data quality when utilising the DCC services or processes. In addition, the TABASC agreed to initially issue the survey at the end of April 2018 with a subsequent re-issue of the survey later in the year when the volume of SMETS2 metering system installs are anticipated to have increased.

### ***Feed in Tariffs***

The TABASC have been kept up to date on the Ofgem led Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) licensing scheme working to assess whether there are any Technical and/or Business Architectural impacts. The TABASC were informed at its February 2018 meeting of the proposed solution in relation to the interaction of FIT and the smart meter roll out. At this time, it was concluded that the TABASC does not need to undertake any consequential activities with the Technical and/or Business Architectures.

## **5. Recommendations**

The Panel is requested to **NOTE** the content of this paper.

**Adam Lattimore**

**SECAS Team**

**2<sup>nd</sup> March 2018**

Attachments:

Appendix A – Security Assurance Status Updates (Red – Confidential)