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Paper Reference:	**TABASC_67_0107_10**
Action:	**For Discussion**

MP107 DCC Impact Assessment

1. Purpose

MP107 'SMETS1 Validation of SRV 6.15.1' is currently undergoing the Refinement Process. The Data Communications Company (DCC) has completed its Impact Assessment. We seek the Technical Architecture and Business Architecture Sub-Committee (TABASC) input on the following questions before we present the final Modification Report to the Change Sub-Committee (CSC):

- Has the DCC's response materially changed since the Preliminary Assessment? If it has, is this a beneficial or detrimental change?
- Does the draft legal text fully and accurately deliver the technical solution?

This paper provides a high-level summary of the key points. The DCC Impact Assessment can be found in Appendix A, the legal text in Appendix B and the business requirements in Appendix C.

2. Summary of the proposal

What is the issue?

To send a Critical Command to a Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specification (SMETS) 1 Device, the User must be the owner of the relevant Certificate on the Device and the owner of the Device in the Registered Data Provider (RDP) data. The Certificates are held by proxy (not on the Device) by the SMETS1 Service Provider (S1SP). The Data Service Provider (DSP) and S1SP will perform the additional validation against the RDP data when a Critical Command is sent to a SMETS1 Device.

If an incorrect Network Operator certificate is placed on SMETS1 Device in error, no Network Operator can send any Critical Service Request (SR) including SRV 6.15.1 to that SMETS1 Device. This means, any attempt to replace the incorrect certificate by issuing SRV 6.151.1 will be rejected.

In the equivalent situation on SMETS2 Devices, the issue can be overcome by the Network Operator that has certificates on the Device sending an SRV 6.15.1. This means that the "wrong" Network Operator can place the correct Network Operator's certificates on the SMETS2 Device.

This is not possible for SMETS1 because Registration Data Provider (RDP) checks are required for all SRs, including Critical SRs.

What is the Proposed Solution?

The solution is to remove the DSP RDP check for SRV 6.15.1 targeted at SMETS1 Devices specifically where it targets Network Operator certificates.

Network Operator benefits

The benefit of delivering this change is Network Operator would be able to place correct Network Operator certificate on SMETS1 Devices where there is an incorrect certificate. This would result in routing of SMETS1 alerts to the correct Network Operator and business process related to certificate update process on SMETS1 Devices would be same as SMETS2.

3. DCC Impact Assessment

The DCC has now completed its Impact Assessment of the Proposed Solution. Its response can be found in Appendix A.

This modification will impact the DCC and Network Operator Parties. The DCC have advised the cost to implement MP107 will be £208,873 which comprise of £147,191 in Design, Build and Pre-Integration Testing (PIT) costs, and £61,681 in estimated release costs (SIT, UIT, TTO and System Integration). The timescale to complete the implementation of MP107 is six months. If approved MP107 will be targeted for the November 2022 SEC Release.

It is worth noting if requirement 2 is to be is approved to be implemented, there will be a further charge of £30,157.

DCC implementation costs

Breakdown of DCC costs			
	Design, Build & Pre-Integration Testing (PIT)	**Post-PIT**	**Total**
Phase Total for Requirement 1 (core solution)	£147,191	£61,681	**£208,873**
Phase Total for Requirement 2 (optional data upload activity by DCC for S1SP 1 and S1SP 2)	£25,700	£4,457	£30,157

The explicit breakdown per phase can be found in the DCC Impact Assessment Appendix A.

4. Implementation approach

This modification is targeted for November 2022 SEC Release. This is considering the lead time of six-month to implement these changes including SIT and UIT.

5. TABASC input on the Impact Assessment

We seek the TABASC's views on the following questions to feed into the Modification Report before we present the report to the CSC:

- Has the DCC's response materially changed since the Preliminary Assessment? If it has, is this a beneficial or detrimental change?
- Does the updated draft legal text fully and accurately deliver the technical solution?

6. Next steps

The Working Group are also reviewing the Impact Assessment on 7 July 2021, respectively. Following this, we will present the final Modification Report to the CSC on 27 July before the Change Board votes.

Timetable	
Event/Action	**Date**
Working Group feedback	7 Jul 2021
CSC considers the final Modification Report	27 Jul 2021
Modification Report Consultation	28 Jul 2021 – 16 Aug 2021
Change Board vote	25 Aug 2021

7. Recommendations

The TABASC is requested to **PROVIDE** views and comments on the questions set out in this paper.

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SECAS Team

24 June 2021

Attachment

- **Appendix A:** MP107 DCC Impact Assessment
- **Appendix B:** MP107 legal text
- **Appendix C:** MP107 business requirements