


# **DCC Major Incident Summary Report**

(Produced in accordance with Section H9 of the SEC)

Date of Incident	25/02/2021	
DCC Incident Reference Number	INC00000697994	
DCC Problem Reference Number	PBI00000122516	
Service Impacted	CSP North Region	
Date/ Time Incident reported	25/02/2021 12:47 (Outage start time)	
Date/ Time Incident resolved	25/02/2021 13:50 (Outage restoration time)	
Time taken to restore Service(s) (Hours)	1 Hour 3 Minutes	
Resolution within SLA (Y/N) [SEC 9.14(b)]	Yes	



# **Nature of the Major Incident / Short Description**



At 12:47 CSP North identified that there was a significant degradation in Service Request success rate Northbound to the DSP. CSP North raised a Category 2 ticket at 13:05 which was escalated into DCC Major Incident Management (DCCMIM) at 13:30.

At 13:45 an initial Major Incident bridge was setup with CSP North Major Incident Management and their technical SME's to understand their investigations and impact to Service Users. On that call it was confirmed there was a total loss of service for all CSP North traffic, Northbound to the DSP. DCCMIM requested this ticket was escalated to a Category 1 immediately. CSP North confirmed they could see that there was zero successful traffic being processed Northbound to the DSP and they were investigating this failure. All Southbound traffic from the Service Users/Consumers was successful.

Investigations carried out by CSP North confirmed that there were no errors or network interruptions within their ecosystem which would have caused the traffic to stop processing. They could see the traffic leaving their systems with no successful responses back from the DSP. Investigations were also carried out by the DSP in parallel, but they could not see any issues that would be causing this total loss of service.

Whilst on the Major Incident Management bridge it was confirmed that full traffic was restored at 13:50 with no manual intervention.

This impacted all Northbound Service Requests to the DSP across the CSP North Region between 12:47 and 13:50. SMETS2 Install and Commission was impacted for the duration of the incident.

DCCTOC have confirmed that 164 Install and Commissions were impacted by this incident and the number of Service Requests impacted by this outage was a total of -21,771.

On the 26/02/2021 there was a series of technical Root Cause Analysis (RCA) calls hosted by DCCMIM as the incident was in a restored state but there was no indication of what caused this and what was done to fix it.

Both CSP North and DSP technical resources carried out in-depth analysis of their respective firewall logs captured during this failure and at 11:57 DSP confirmed that this looked to have been related to a



Certificate Revocation List (CRL) that had expired at 12:02, was replaced at 12:25 but failed to fully activate until 13:50.

Investigations into the CRL activation delay are ongoing and will be tracked under the DCC Problem Ticket.

## Region / Location impacted

North Region – SMETS2 Only.

#### Summary of impact / Likely future impact of the Major incident

All SMETS2 Service Requests Northbound to the DSP failed from 13:00 until 13:50.

Install and Commission activity was unavailable for 50 minutes during the outage but recommenced upon service restoration.

#### **Immediate Mitigation:**

- No CRL's are expected to expire in the next 20 days.
- DSP to investigate enhanced reporting on CRL expiry dates in advance.

#### **Long Term Mitigation:**

• Automatic CRL update process is already being tested in non-production environment and following successful testing will be deployed into Production.

#### Resolving actions taken

Initially it was thought that service was restored with no manual intervention but following in-depth analysis on the morning of the 26/02/2021 it was identified this was a Certificate Revocation List expiry which experienced a delay in activating when it was replaced at 12:25.

### Root Cause, if known

Initial root cause investigations have identified a DSP Certificate Revocation List expired at 12:02 which was replaced at 12:25 and failed to activate until 13:50. Further root cause investigations to take place by DCC Problem Management team.

CSP North have opened a high priority Problem Investigation to determine the root cause. This will be transferred to DSP and tracked via the DCC Problem Management ticket PBI000000122516



# **Table of linked incidents**

Incident	Linked incident	Nature of link
INC000000697994	INC00000698049	Related
	INC00000698051	Related
	INC00000698115	Related
	INC00000698118	Related
	INC00000698121	Related
	INC000000698148	Related
	PBI000000122516	Related

