

MP107 ‘SMETS1 Validation of SRV 6.15.1’

Annex A

Business requirement – version 0.2

About this document

This document contains the business requirements that support the Proposers solution for this Modification. It sets out the requirements along with any assumptions and considerations. The DCC use this information to provide an assessment of the requirements that help shape the complete solution.

1. Business requirements

This section contains the functional business requirements. Based on these requirements a full solution will be developed.

Business Requirements	
Ref.	Requirement
1	Network Operators must be able to change their Certificates that have been incorrectly placed on SMETS1 Devices that are not in their region

2. Considerations and assumptions

This section contains the considerations and assumptions for each business requirement.

2.1 Requirement 1: Network Operators must be able to change their Certificates that have been incorrectly placed on SMETS1 Devices that are not in their region

Critical Commands sent to Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications 1 (SMETS1) Devices are validated against the Registration Data Provider (RDP) data and Device Certificates. Due to this, if a device is updated with Certificates for the incorrect Network Operator, that Network Operator cannot use Service Request Variant (SRV) 6.15.1 'Update Security Credentials (KRP) to correct those Certificates.

Validation of either Critical Commands (or possibly just SR 6.15.1) must be changed to allow incorrect Certificates to be updated on SMETS1 Devices in such scenarios.

3. Solution options

This section outlines potential options for this modification's solution. It sets out the rationale for the potential variants and any further information that can be provided to help assess this change.

3.1 General

The DCC and its Service Providers are requested to assess the requirements and devise a solution, whilst considering the Proposers suggestion below.

The Proposer suggests a possibility of removing the RDP data validation in order to allow a DCC User to update an incorrect Certificate on a SMETS1 Device where they are not the owner of the MPAN. This would mean that the validation of Critical Commands on a SMETS1 Device would act in a similar fashion to validation of SMETS2 Devices.