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Operations Group Meeting 29xxx

28 February 2020, 12:30 – 14:30

Gemserv, 8 Fenchurch Place, London, EC3M 4AJ

OPSG_29xxx_2802 – Draft Minutes

Attendees:

Category	Operation Group Members
Operations Group Chair	Dave Warner (Teleconference)
Network Party	Gemma Slaney (Teleconference)
	Matt Alexander (Teleconference)
Large Supplier	Zoe Marklew (Teleconference)
	Paul Clark
	Ed Webber (Teleconference)
	Gareth Sherratt (Alternate for Nassar Zeb) (Teleconference)
	Rochelle Harrison (Teleconference)
Small Supplier	Simon Dowse (Teleconference)
	Kate Barnes (Teleconference)
	Heidi Wilbor (Teleconference)
Other SEC Party	Richard Phillips (Teleconference)

Representing	Name
DCC	Paul Weatherly
	Natasha Sinnett
	Darren Robbins (Teleconference)
	Christopher Thompson
	Penny Brown (Teleconference)
	Rob Munroe (Teleconference)
SECAS	Tim Hall
	Veronica Asantewaa (Meeting Secretary)
TAG	Robin Healey (Teleconference)
BEIS	Natasha Free (Teleconference)

1. Introduction

The Chair welcomed Operations Group (OPSG) members to the extraordinary meeting held to consider whether the SMETS1 Middle Operating Capability (MOC) Morrisons Data Services (MDS) Device Model Combination (DMC) should be added onto the Eligible Products Combination List (EPCL).

The OPSG noted that the DCC was requesting approval to migrate a total of 98,218 active and 43,154 dormant MDS Elster installations.

2. Component Readiness

The DCC noted it has a signed letter from the Chair of the Board of Directors of Smart DCC Ltd confirming that they support the DCC's statement of readiness to migrate MDS Devices.

Changes to the DCC System

Migration Control Centre (MCC): The OPSG Chair asked the DCC about its migration strategy. The DCC noted that after the OPSG approved its increase of migration volumes of more than 2000 installations per day, it had successfully migrated 10,000 installations in a day. The DCC was now ready to migrate larger volumes and would present its pacing strategy at OPSG_30.

The DCC noted that the functionality for MOC migration "Harvey Balls" for all components were complete meaning that they were built, tested, deployed and ready for live operation. No further comments were made by OPSG members on the assessment of readiness for changes to the DCC System.

ACTION OPSG 29xxx/01: The DCC to present its migration pacing strategy at the OPSG_30 meeting. *[Post meeting note: This has been completed. Action closed]*

3. Residual Risks

The OPSG considered the residual risks that DCC had identified in its preparations for MOC, and in its assessment of readiness against the LSC. [The DCC has retained the numbering from the Final Operating Capability (FOC) LSC submission which has left gaps in the numbering from risks which have been fully mitigated].

3. Lack of end-end capacity testing: The DCC explained that this is a low residual risk as MDS is a small cohort. The Testing Advisory Group (TAG) Chair noted that this will be reviewed as part of Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and there is nothing that can be done to limit the risk; however, the risk is manageable. The OPSG **AGREED** that the risk was acceptable.

4. Capacity testing only carried out on DUIS 3 interface: The DCC explained that it has completed all migrations on the DCC User Interface Specification (DUIS) 3 interface and confirmed that there has been no detrimental impact on DUIS 1 and DUIS 2. The DCC therefore proposed to remove this as a risk. The OPSG members **AGREED** that this can be removed as a residual risk.

5. Negative testing not complete: The DCC proposed that this risk is accepted and removed as it has a low impact, particularly whilst the volume of migrations is low. The TAG Chair said that this must be approved by TAG members before it is removed as a residual risk, but however the TAG Chair did not feel the risk will prevent a recommendation being made as the impact is low. The OPSG **AGREED** that the risk was acceptable.

8. Migration of Active meters could impact consumers: The DCC noted that it has recommendation of the risk that the failure of migrations could impact Users and end consumers however the risk is low. The OPSG Chair questioned the 0.1% failure rate and the DCC explained that it has had only one instance of a meter becoming unrecoverable, this being the issue with the Itron master key which it under investigation. The OPSG **AGREED** that the risk was acceptable.

9. Temporary use of IPSEC: The DCC noted that there is a temporary risk of service outage until the solution is complete with the implementation of MPLS fixed links in June 2020. The DCC explained that the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) lifted the caveats in the solution and any service outage will last six seconds. The OPSG **AGREED** that the risk was acceptable.

10. Auxiliary Load capability: The DCC proposed that this risk be accepted as a solution will be implemented in Core Release 1.1. A Large Supplier (LS) member raised concerns that the Core Release 1.1 to manage the Auxiliary Load issue will need to be documented, also it will need confirmation that this fix will be implemented within six weeks of go-live. The DCC explained that it is trying to lower the risk by splitting the Smart Meter System Operator (SMSO) and Registration Data Provider (RDP) data in to five categories to aid the identification of installations at risk. The DCC is also working with its stakeholder teams to inform Users of what is happening. The DCC noted that the date for Core Release 1.1 is 29 April and it will be implemented within seven weeks not six as mentioned in the report. However, it was noted that the date may change as it will be implemented with the June 2020 Release on 6 May. A LS member was also concerned that the migrations may slip.

The OPSG Chair reiterated the comments from members noting that the DCC will need to be clear on the operational process for identifying installation with Auxiliary Loads from the beginning. The risk will need to be reassessed if the release is not implemented by 6 May. The DCC noted that it is taking into account the mitigation to the risk and pacing strategy and if there are any delays, it will manage this as a high priority, and has a plan in place to meet the upcoming deadline. The OPSG **AGREED** that the risk was acceptable.

SECAS proposed the addition of the following two further Residual Risks:

12. Telefonica non-compliance with ITIL: Whilst the LSC document stated that Telefonica was not compliant with the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) (as required by the SEC) it is in fact compliant with ITIL. They further explained that the non-compliance with the SEC was limited achievement of Target Resolution Times for Incidents (which also applied to Vodafone in IOC). It was understood that BEIS would be directing SEC amendments to address this issue. The Chair requested that the DCC confirm that Telefonica is compliant with ITIL. The OPSG **AGREED** that the risk was acceptable subject to completion of the Action. *[Post Meeting Note: this Action was discharged following the meeting and the caveat removed from this risk when presented to Panel].*

13. Alerts: The OPSG noted that Alerts are a major issue in SMETS2. The DCC stated that it has observed an average of 2.3 Alerts per day per installation with a total of 180,000 Alerts per day for SMETS1. This is not considered significant when compared with the 50 million per day currently being experienced on SMETS2. The DCC is closely monitoring the level of Alerts and this forms part of the daily 'Go/No Go' decision prior to starting the migrations each day. The OPSG **AGREED** that the risk was acceptable, given the continuous monitoring put in place by DCC.

ACTION OPSG 29xxx/02: The DCC to confirm that Telefonica are compliant with ITIL. *[Post meeting note: Completed 5 March: Action closed]*

4. Live Service Criteria (LSC) Review

The OPSG considered each of the LSCs within its scope, taking account the DCC submission and earlier discussions at the meeting. The OPSG reached a view on whether it accepted the DCC statement of readiness for each LSC, taking account of the remaining actions to be completed. This view was summarised in a RAG status.

LSC 1: SMETS1 Migration Services ready including early migration support for relevant Device Model Combinations

The OPSG **AGREED** to accept the readiness statement provided by the DCC.

The OPSG agreed that the status for this LSC was **GREEN**.

LSC 2: Service Operations capability ready

The DCC stated that CSP C&S is compliant with the ITIL however the OPSG were concerned that as Communication Service Provider Central & South (CSP C&S) were unable to achieve the Target Resolution Time for Incidents on numerous occasions, this may not be the case. It was noted that the same issue existed with Vodafone during IOC, which was resolved through the SMETS1 SEC amendments. The DCC are working with BEIS make similar SEC amendments to address this issue.

The OPSG **AGREED** to accept the readiness statement subject to the provisions of Residual Risk 12 above. *[Post Meeting Note: the provisions have been discharged].*

The OPSG agreed that the status for this LSC was **GREEN**.

LSC 3: SMETS1 Service and Migration can operate at the requisite volumes to support migration and operation of the relevant DMC and operating capability, in parallel with all SMETS2 activity

The OPSG **AGREED** to accept the readiness statement provided by the DCC for this LSC, subject to the provisions of Residual Risk 13 above.

The OPSG agreed that the status for this LSC was **GREEN**.

LSC 6: Pre-existing services remain stable for SMETS2 and SMETS1 prior to operating capabilities

The OPSG expressed concern that January had been the worst month for Category 1 and 2 Incidents since the DCC Service began. The DCC acknowledged this and stated that the situation had improved in February with 3 service-impacting Incidents, none of which had been caused by SMETS1. The OPSG Chair noted that this could not be considered a stable service.

The OPSG **AGREED** that the status for this LSC was **AMBER**. (The view of the OPSG is that this Amber status should not affect the recommendation to go live).

LSC 7: Any lessons learnt from prior operating capabilities are incorporated into live process

No comments were made.

The OPSG **AGREED** to accept the readiness statement provided by the DCC for this LSC.

Managed by

The OPSG agreed that the status for this LSC was **GREEN**.

LSC 8: No detrimental impact to consumers experience expected

OPSG members expressed concern that consumers with Auxiliary Load circuits could be adversely impacted (as expressed under the Residual Risk 10 in agenda item 3).

The OPSG **AGREED** that the status for this LSC was **AMBER**.

LSC 9: Assurance of required Business Continuity/Disaster Recovery

The OPSG accepted the DCC's statement of readiness subject to the publication of a revised Business Continuity Disaster Recovery (BCDR) plan including MDS and Telefonica.

[Post meeting note: The DCC has clarified that Telefonica cannot meet the SEC requirement for BCDR (similar to Vodafone at IOC). It is understood that this will be addressed by BEIS directing an amendment to the SEC].

The OPSG **AGREED** that the status for this LSC was **AMBER**.

ACTION OPSG 29xxx/03: The DCC publish the revised BCDR plan to include MDS and Telefonica.

5. Report to SEC Panel

The OPSG **AGREED** that the views and conclusions recorded in Section 4 above should be reported to the SEC Panel with the recommendation that the EPCL is updated subject to the conditions on LSCs 2, 3 and 9.

SECAS noted that the reports from TAG and the OPSG would be consolidated into a single report to the SEC Panel.