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SEC Panel Sub-Committee Report

1. Purpose

This paper provides the Panel with an update on recent activities from the Panel Sub-Committees. It highlights the key issues discussed and details specific points the Sub-Committees would like to bring to the Panel's attention. The Panel is requested to note the updates.

2. Operations Group

2.1 Operations Group Meeting Highlights

Communications Hubs Returns

In response to a request from OPSG, at the July meeting the Panel requested that the DCC:

1. urgently host a workshop with its Customers to identify immediate improvements.
2. urgently develop a Communications Hub bulk returns process.

The DCC reported that they have visited User sites and two workshops have been scheduled for September. The DCC report that they are considering how to address User requirements: they have not yet specified how they will meet the requirement for a bulk returns process.

Communications Hubs and Other Exceptions

The DCC noted that in over half of premises where a mesh comms hub had been specified, non-compliant comms hubs have been installed. Should this continue, it will have an adverse impact on the ability of CSP C&S to meet its coverage target.

More generally, the OPSG noted a continuing increase in reported Exceptions of all types and decided to review how these are managed.

Major Power Disruption

The DCC presented on the impact on DCC services of the major power disruption on Friday 9th August. They confirmed that a failure had occurred in the DSP Data Centre resulting in degradation of service. The DCC is investigating several issues to understand how a relatively minor hardware failure had a significant impact on the service. The DCC has also requested that the DSP carry out a full review of resilience in the datacentre.

More generally, the OPSG noted that backup power facilities had worked or not been needed for all the other Service Providers, and that consequently these facilities had proven resilient to the major power failure.

OPSG members noted that a review of traffic on the network generated as a result of the power disruption, and the consequent response and behaviour of the DCC's systems and services was essential. The DCC confirmed that this review was in progress.

Service Performance

OPSG noted that all Code Performance Measures were reported as meeting target levels.

The DCC reported that there had been two Major Incidents resulting in the loss of 500 minutes of I&C time. For the first time the DCC reported on the SMETS1 migrations and operational service, reporting four Category 2 Incidents.

In response to a request from OPSG to review Incidents related to capacity failures of components, the DCC confirmed that an initial investigation had confirmed that there was adequate capacity in place across the DCC services to process predicted volumes. The DCC noted that more detailed modelling and analysis is in progress.

SSI Consultation

The Chair noted that the DCC submission was not compliant with governance requirements. The topic was therefore deferred to the next meeting.

3. Security Sub-Committee and SMKI PMA

3.1 Assurance Status Decisions

The Security Sub-Committee (SSC) set one Assurance status in August 2019. Details can be found in confidential Appendix A.

3.2 Verification Assessments

As part of their wider obligations, the SSC review the outcomes of Verification User Security Assessments. If the SSC believe that a User is non-compliant, or potentially non-compliant, with obligations contained in SEC Sections G3-G6, then they will notify the Panel.

During August 2019, the SSC reviewed three Verification User Security Assessments (VUSAs) in which Compliance Status' were set. Details of the VUSAs can be found in confidential Appendix A.

3.3 Director Letters

The SSC reviewed two VUSA Director's Letters in August 2019 which were approved and can be found in confidential Appendix A.

3.4 Security Self-Assessments

No Security Self-Assessments were reviewed by the SSC in August 2019.

3.5 SSC Highlights

SMETS1

An update was provided on the updated Remediation Plan submitted by the DCC; actions are still outstanding on the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) SMETS1 Service Provider (S1SP).

The DCC are awaiting Competent Independent Organisation (CIO) review comments on the Management Response from their Communications Service Provider (CSP) before issuing the full final report and comments to the SSC.
Issues are being addressed for Middle Operating Capability (MOC) due to ongoing engagement with specialist manufacturers of Devices for MOC, and work being undertaken to bring a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) into SEC governance.

A Final Operating Capability (FOC) PKI Option paper had been updated to clarify the DCC's risk position and to clarify work being undertaken to bring a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) into SEC governance.

NIS/CAF Alignment with the SEC/SCF

The SSC Chair provided an update following the SSC meeting on Wednesday 22 May 2019, at which the SSC considered that the SEC and guidance in the Security Controls Framework (SCF) could be equivalent to the NIS / Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) requirements in order to provide an economical approach to assurance for Operators of Essential Service (OES). The SSC approved the SCF and SECAS published to all SEC Parties.

Enduring CH Firmware Release

The DCC provided an update on the ongoing work which will allow the DCC to proactively monitor Comms Hubs firmware upgrades. The DCC presented the approach and scope of the Security Risk Assessment before providing examples of the proposed security controls and mitigated risks.

Post Commissioning Report

An update was provided on the monthly Post Commissioning Report (PCR) which provides information on the number of relevant SMETS2 Devices where the Responsible Supplier or DCC has failed to complete its Post-Commissioning obligations in accordance with SEC Appendix AC 5. The SSC are continuously reviewing the PCR with the help of the DCC, to ensure it provides the clarity needed.

3.6 SMKI PMA Highlights

Disaster Recovery Procedure (DRP) Recovery Feedback

The DCC provided an update on the SMKI Recovery in the Live Environment which took place in July 2019, highlighting the arrangements of the Key Custodians who were in attendance and lessons learned from the exercise. The cost analysis for the Recovery Exercise will be provided to the SMKI PMA on Tuesday, 17 September 2019.

USB OTP DSP Briefing

An update was provided on DCC proposals relating to Administration User Logon – Replacement of USB Tokens. The SMKI PMA noted the issue, proposal and implications, and raised several actions.

SECPMA Standards Guidance Review

An update was provided in regard to the review of Standards and Guidance quoted in the SEC relating to the SMKI Service and the SMKI Document Set. The SMKI PMA Chair highlighted the standards and guidelines that have changed. In addition, some guidelines have been withdrawn and are no longer available.

4. Technical Architecture and Business Architecture Sub-Committee (TABASC) and Testing Advisory Group (TAG)

4.1 TABASC Highlights

DCC Elective Communications Services

The DCC discussed with the TABASC provision of Elective Communication Services (ECS), including the governance and architecture principles and how it might work in practice. Several use cases were discussed to aid the DCC's development of the framework for providing ECS. The TABASC continue to support the development and the DCC will provide an update on the progress at the September TABASC meeting.

CPL Enhancement Project

The TABASC agreed the Central Products List (CPL) Enhancement Project Initiation Document (PID), which highlighted the plan for delivery, the resource allocation and roles and responsibilities. The outcome of the project is to deliver an enhanced CPL process that streamlines the internal management and maintenance processes, to reduce resource utilisation within the SECAS CPL team.

Market-wide Half Hourly Settlements

The TABASC is discussing the ELEXON Market-wide Half Hourly Settlements and the Multiple Supplier meter splitting activities, which may impact the technical architecture. The TABASC is identifying the remit of its involvement in the activities.

4.2 TAG Highlights

SMETS1

The Testing Depth and Breadth document for the IOC Itron Mixed and Active Installations was reviewed but not agreed due to some outstanding actions, along with further queries raised by members. An updated version of this document will be considered by the TAG at an extraordinary meeting on 13 September, along with the IOC Migration Testing Depth, Breadth and Depth document for Honeywell Elster Devices.

November 19 Release

Pre-Integration Testing (PIT) is making progress, with most code changes tested and assured. An additional code release will take place 4 September to address defects found during PIT.
System Integration Testing (SIT) commenced on 1 August and was suspended on 8 August pending the supporting emulator and P&C version being assured for use. This assurance is now complete, and SIT resumed on 20 August.

The DCC presented some proposed changes to the Common Test Scenarios Document (CTSD) to mandate the testing of some Service Requests as part of User Entry Process Testing (UEPT), or additive UEPT for existing Users wishing to use those Service Requests. Whilst the TAG does not have any specific vires in relation to making changes to the CTSD, members were generally supportive of DCC's approach.

5. Recommendations

The Panel is requested to **NOTE** the content of this paper.

Rebecca Jones

SECAS Team

6 September 2019

Attachments:

- **Appendix A:** User Security Assessments – Identified Non-Compliances (**RED**)