

## Meeting SECPMA\_24\_1406, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2016

**11:30 – 14:00**

**Gemserv, 8 Fenchurch Place, London, EC3M 4AJ**

### **SMKI PMA Minutes**

#### **Attendees:**

Category	SMKI PMA Members
SMKI PMA Chair	Gordon Hextall
Large Supplier	Geoff Huckerby
Large Supplier	Fabien Cavenne (via teleconference)
Small Supplier	Rob Kinson
Networks	Sara Neal
Technical Sub-Committee (TSC) Representative	Julian Hughes
Security Sub-Committee (SSC) Representative	Michael Constable

#### **Non-Voting Members:**

Category	Attendees
DCC	Marc Avery
SMKI Specialist	Darren Calam
Ofgem (the Authority)	Nigel Nash
SECAS	James Simmonds
SMKI PMA Secretary	Joe Davenport

#### **Apologies:**

Category	Attendees
DECC (Representative)	Joe Howard

## 1. Minutes of SMKI PMA Meeting 23\_1005

An amendment was made to Action 23/05 to change the description from the 'DCC Work Off Plan' to 'DCC Remediation Action Plan', aligning terminology with the SEC.

The DCC also highlighted a number of minor typographical errors relating to Agenda item 2. The secretariat agreed to make the changes.

No further suggested changes were raised by SMKI PMA Members, and the May 2016 Draft Minutes would be approved once the necessary amendment were made.

## 2. Actions Outstanding

SECAS provided the SMKI PMA with an update on actions outstanding from previous SMKI PMA meetings, specifically:

**SECPMA 22/04** – The DCC informed SMKI PMA Members that they are still investigating the costs incurred by their Service Providers for invoking the SMKI Recovery Procedures, which are required in order for the DCC to provide an aggregate estimate of cost. The DCC noted this was unlikely to be known for the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting, and confirmed they would provide an update once they have the information required. An update would be provided at a future SMKI PMA meeting.

This action was marked as **ONGOING**.

**SECPMA 22/05** – The DCC had previously been requested to establish whether their contract with the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider includes assessing SEC Parties for compliance against the SMKI Document Set, as set out in SEC Appendix C – SMKI Compliance Policy. The DCC confirmed they were still reviewing their contract with the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider to understand if this assessment of compliance was included, and the associated parameters of any Service Level Agreements (SLAs) in place in relation to the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider undertaking compliance assessment(s). An update would be provided at a future SMKI PMA meeting.

This action was marked as **ONGOING**.

**SECPMA 22/09** – The DCC confirmed discussions were still ongoing in relation to whether the recent implementation of mandatory software upgrades for Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) would require the regeneration of SMKI Private Keys. An update would be provided at a future SMKI PMA meeting.

This action was marked as **ONGOING**.

**SECPMA 23/01** – The DCC confirmed their intention to hold a desktop exercise in relation to the SMKI recovery scenarios, and confirmed that there was no set date for when this desktop exercise would be held. The DCC noted a walkthrough of the Service Design processes had been held at a Smart Metering Design Forum. The SMKI PMA agreed that this SMKI recovery scenarios desktop exercise would need to be held before DCC Release 1.3 (R1.3) and ought to be co-ordinated with the processes in the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance Document once this is agreed post-consultation. The DCC agreed to provide confirmation of this desktop exercise at the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting, noting this desktop exercise would likely fall between August 2016 and September 2016.

This action was marked as **ONGOING**.

**SECPMA 23/02** – SECAS advised the group that the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance Document was released for consultation on 10<sup>th</sup> May 2016, and that the window for responses would close on 14<sup>th</sup> June 2016. SECAS provided a verbal update, noting responses had been received, and confirmed

that SECAS would review feedback prior to the July 2016 SMKI PMA Meeting. SECAS also noted their intention to amend the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance accordingly for submission to the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

The action is now **CLOSED**.

**SECPMA 23/03** – SECAS confirmed that in relation to the Responsible Officer Guidance, the SEC (up to and including SEC version 4.11), and all SEC Subsidiary Documents designated at that point in time, had been reviewed, with all relevant requirements on Senior Responsible Officers (SROs), and Authorised Responsible Officers (AROs), now captured in the guidance document. SECAS also informed the group that the DCC had requested that the submission of forecasts be incorporated within this guidance – this has subsequently been incorporated, with the guidance document now available on the SEC Website.

This action is now **CLOSED**.

**SECPMA 23/04** – The DCC confirmed their intention of submitting the **Stage 2 Assurance Report** to the SMKI PMA for review and approval at the August 2016 SMKI PMA Meeting. SECAS confirmed this would be added to the August 2016 SMKI PMA Agenda.

The action was marked as **ONGOING**.

**SECPMA 23/05** – The DCC provided a verbal update on the **Stage 1 Assurance Report** and DCC Remediation Action Plan as part of Agenda item 4 (*SECPMA\_24\_1406\_CONF04*).

The action was marked **CLOSED**.

**SECPMA 23/06** – The SMKI PMA were advised that the SMKI Specialist was providing support to the Security Sub-Committee (SSC), undertaking and reviewing the ways in which SECAS handle and store sensitive information and data as part of its services to the SSC. The SMKI PMA agreed that a similar approach should be implemented by SECAS for the SMKI PMA. SECAS agreed to liaise with the SMKI Specialist post-meeting, and provide an information paper setting out the ways in which it shall handle and manage information (and data) moving forwards.

The action was marked **CLOSED** and has been superseded by SECPMA 24/01.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/01:** SECAS and the SMKI Specialist to collaborate on a paper for the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting, outlining the specific classifications and ways in which information and data shall be handled.

**SECPMA 23/07** – SECAS confirmed a reminder email was issued to all SEC Parties informing them of the SMKI PMA nominations window. A further update on the SMKI PMA nominations is provided as part of the Activity Planner (*Agenda Item - SECPMA\_24\_1406\_10*) update of these Minutes.

This action is now **CLOSED**.

**SECPMA 23/08** – The DCC advised that, at present, they do not have resource available to produce a DCC SMKI Delivery Plan on SMKI related milestone progress in the format that was provided prior to SMKI Live Certificates becoming available from 9th March 2016. The DCC confirmed that they shall review, and where applicable, improve, their monthly reporting, with the intention of future resource being available.

The SMKI PMA Chair noted that it would be helpful to the SMKI PMA, when assessing the level of risk during rollout, to have operational information about the numbers of certificates provided e.g. for devices, split between Communication Hubs and Devices, and for organisations, split by region if possible. The DCC advised, however, that as the SMKI Registration Authority (RA) they do not have

as the same visibility as their Data Service Provider (DSP) but are currently holding conversations to see if they can obtain this information.

This action is now **CLOSED**.

### 3. SMKI PMA Work Package July – September 2016

The SMKI PMA were presented with the draft SMKI PMA Work package for the second quarter of the 2016 financial year, specifically, from July to September 2016. As per the report presented in March 2016, the draft work package shows the associated resource requirements for the SECAS core team and project resource. It is provided for to the SMKI PMA for review before recommendation to the SEC Board.

SMKI PMA Members requested visibility of SECAS resource utilised in the previous quarter, in order to better understand whether the forecast set out within the July – September 2016 SMKI PMA Work Package was appropriate. SECAS agreed to provide further clarity of this as a post-meeting action.

**Post Meeting Update:** *SMKI PMA members were informed that actual utilisation of resources for the previous quarter would not be available until the end of June 2016, however, this would be made available at the soonest instance.*

SMKI PMA **APPROVED** the Draft SMKI PMA Work Package, subject to receiving sight and clarity of SECAS (and SMKI Specialist) resource utilised in the previous quarter.

### 4. tScheme Stage 1 Assurance Report and Remediation Action Plan

The DCC advised that, following previous communications with the SMKI PMA Chair, a final DCC-produced report on the Stage 1 Assurance Report was undergoing final approval, and would be circulated to SMKI PMA Members after the June 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

This DCC-produced report on the Stage 1 Assurance Report shall contain the executive summary from the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider, details of any non-conformities observed, and what was being undertaken by the DCC to correct said non-conformities.

The SMKI PMA Chair and DCC Representative proposed that SMKI PMA Members were given a week following receipt of said report to review the document.

The group then reviewed the obligations of Appendix C, as set out in SECPMA\_24\_1406\_08. SECAS brought to the SMKI PMA's attention clause 4.7 (d) of Appendix C, which states that, after approval of the Stage 1 Assurance Report, the DCC are required to provide a report (redacted only for the purpose of security) to all SEC Parties.

A number of SMKI PMA Members noted their concern over the distribution of said report, specifically, an un-redacted version of the report, which may contain commercial information. The DCC confirmed they would investigate this matter further, and provide an update to SECAS post-June 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

The SMKI PMA **AGREED** to review this report within a week of it being circulated, and **AGREED** that if no comments were raised, the Stage 1 Assurance Report would be **APPROVED**.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/02:** The DCC will provide SECAS with an un-redacted Stage 1 Assurance report based on LRQAs assessment.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/03:** The DCC will provide an additional version of the report which will contain the DCC Remediation Action Plan. This report will be released on 14<sup>th</sup> June 2016 and distributed to SMKI PMA members for comment and subsequently will be distributed to SEC Parties as per SEC Section Appendix C 4.7 (d). SECAS will determine the best method for distributing the report to SEC Parties.

The SMKI PMA were also advised that Stage 2 Assurance activities officially started at the occurrence of the Root Key Ceremony in February 2016. A presentation of findings will be provided at the July 2016 meeting of the SMKI PMA.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/04:** The DCC to present the findings emerging from the Stage 2 Assurance Report at the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

## 5. Additional Testing Update for SMKI & Repository Testing (SRT)

The DCC provided an update on SMKI and Repository Testing (SRT) Part 2b (SRT2b) and Part 3 (SRT3). The reduced scope of SRT2b had completed in early March 2016 in order to commence with the release of live SMKI Certificates. The remaining functionality of SRT2b will be rerun with SRT3 and form part of R1.3. Pre-Integration Testing (PIT) commences on 4<sup>th</sup> July 2016 and will continue to 17<sup>th</sup> August 2016.

SMKI PMA members were presented with the latest weekly SIT report to highlight the outstanding elements of the SMKI Apex Recovery Testing work off plan; protective monitoring and testing with Communication Hubs. Members were concerned with the supplier associated risk of having Communication Hubs that had not been proven capable of successfully completing a Recovery Event. Members also highlighted that the 16 tests that make up the SMKI Apex recovery testing may require re-executing and that there is a need to ensure that Communication Hub testing is complete for R1.2. SMKI PMA members requested visibility of the SRT 3 testing moving forwards as this is not currently covered in the testing progress updates circulated to SEC Parties.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/05:** The DCC will provide further updates on the outstanding SMKI Apex Recovery Testing elements at the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/06:** The DCC to inform the SMKI PMA of the scheduling of SRT testing and determine at what stages SRT exit reports are required, for example whether they are required before R1.2 as well as R1.3.

## 6. DCC April 2016 SMKI Recovery Procedure Consultation Outcome

DECC informed the SMKI PMA that the final version of the SMKI Recovery Procedure had been submitted to the Secretary of State (SoS) on 24<sup>th</sup> May 2016. A DECC legal review had been undertaken which had raised some minor issues, including the need to clarify some definitions, clarify some references and align the document with the main body of the SEC. The intention is now to consult on the date of designation and the changes on 18<sup>th</sup> July 2016.

## 7. SMKI Recovery Key Guidance Consultation Update

SECAS advised that the consultation was due to close at close of business on 14<sup>th</sup> June 2016. Comments had been received from the DCC, DECC, and Suppliers. SECAS would now look to address these comments and present the changes at the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

## 8. SEC Appendix C Requirements

SECAS provided the SMKI PMA with a paper outlining the requirements and obligations of SEC Appendix C (the SMKI Compliance Policy). Members agreed that the paper was useful for highlighting the requirements and suggested an additional column be created in order to provide justification on how the obligations had been met.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/07:** SECAS will add an additional column to the Appendix C requirements table in order to provide justification on how the necessary obligation has been met.

## 9. Post DCC Live Risk Management

DECC provided the SMKI PMA with an update on the management of risks and issues to the Smart Metering Implementation post-DCC Live. The SMKI PMA were reminded the purpose of the work was to ensure proactive management and mitigation of post-DCC Live risks and issues. Identified risks have been categorised into 24 high level risk groups, with proposed accountable bodies for risk mitigation. With the closure of the TPMAG now being considered any risks would transfer to the responsibility of the SMKI PMA.

DECC gave an overview of the issue management tool, the 'Hopper' which would be utilised to identify, evaluate and assign risks. A daily call will be held from the 18<sup>th</sup> August and members will also convene prior to DCC Go Live to understand their role. The daily calls will continue until they are deemed no longer necessary.

SMKI PMA members noted that there should be a SMKI PMA risk register established, following on from points raised at previous meetings. It was advised that a standardised format should be adopted across the enduring groups for how risks are recorded or registered and be able to highlight varying elements and risks in a consistent format.

Members noted, that where requested, a SMKI PMA member may be required to join in the daily calls as a matter of governance. The capability to stand up a SMKI PMA meeting within 24 hours as a response to assigned risks was also questioned and SECAS will establish whether this is covered in the SMKI PMA Terms of Reference (ToR) as well as if risks in general are covered. SMKI PMA Members agreed with the approach and requested further information be provided on how risks are recorded and managed moving forwards.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/08:** SECAS to review SMKI PMA ToR to identify whether risk handling requirements/capabilities are referenced and the possibility of standing up a SMKI PMA meeting within 24 hours.

## 10. SMKI PMA Activity Planner

SECAS informed the group that Geoff Huckerby had been re-elected into the one Large Supplier representative seat and had been accepted. The Small Supplier seat currently remains vacant and SECAS will undertake the necessary steps to garner Small Supplier engagement, this would also be highlighted to other sub-committees.

It was advised that minutes and papers are only available to SMI PMA members and therefore could be a cause of lack of interaction. It was advised that approaches should be made to the Senior and Authorised Responsible Officers (SRO/ARO) of Small Suppliers as they will be more engaged. It was also highlighted that the Small Supplier seat needed to be filled by a Small Supplier representative and could therefore be extended out to those who are not an actual Small Supplier but with an interest in Small Suppliers in general.



The SMKI PMA were presented with the remaining elements of the Activity Planner and members highlighted this would be a good document to record and monitor the outstanding testing elements of SRT and the risk register review.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/09:** SECAS to review and amend the SMKI PMA Activity Planner to incorporate the testing of SRT elements and the review of the SMKI PMA Risk Register.

## 11. Modifications Update

Four new modifications had been submitted to SECAS and these were highlighted within the report. Currently there are none of concern to the SMKI PMA although they will be informed in the first instance should anything arise in future or be identified via the modification working groups. There was a modification proposal that had a minor impact in relation to EUI-64 identifiers, however, the SMKI PMA agreed that this would be kept under observation until further work is undertaken or the modification is rejected.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the content of the Modifications Update.

## 12. DCC Update

The DCC informed the group that testing was currently underway for 'SMKI 5' which will introduce a number of Change Requests and a work-off plan and will form part of R1.3. Further information in relation to SMKI 5 will be provided at future SMKI PMA meetings.

Members highlighted the recent change to the IKI Certificate Profile and believed this would need to be tracked to ensure its implementation does not require a reissuance of file signing certificates.

Members had previously discussed the possibility of the reconvening of Key Custodians to test the recovery environment in September 2016 as a part of CR101A testing. The SMKI PMA noted that if this is a live test recovery environment then the SMKI PMA will need to be involved to understand the establishment of the Key Material and the testing of the environment. The DCC advised they would bring the test plan to a future SMKI PMA meeting so that members could better understand the approach being taken.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** that there was no further update from the DCC for June 2016.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/10:** The DCC to provide SMKI PMA members with further information on SMKI 5 testing.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/11:** The DCC will confirm whether Key Custodians are required to reconvene to fulfil the 'Generating Recovery Command' step of testing.

**ACTION SECPMA 24/12:** The DCC to identify whether there is a requirement for Key Custodians or the SMKI PMA to attend the testing of the Recovery Environment.

## 13. DCCKI PMA Functions Update

The DCC advised that the DCCKI PMA Function met in May 2016 and discussed the challenge it had faced in its first few weeks of its operation. Actions have now been assigned to ensure any outstanding issues are resolved and clarifications of the internal processes involved were also provided. The DCC had also discussed the enduring governance over the DCCKI live environment and established work to incorporate input from the DSP and to ensure the DCCKI PMA function has witness over the testing and implementation of DCCKI.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** that there was no further update from the DCCKI PMA Function for May 2016.

## 14. DECC Update

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** that there was no further update from DECC for June 2016.

## 15. Any Other Business

The DCC requested a retrospective change of the minutes of the March 2016 TPMAG meeting as a point that had been raised and discussed at this meeting had not been captured within the Minutes. The matter related to an issue raised by the DCC's tScheme auditor whom identified a lack of audit trail around the communication of the emergency SMKI Key Ceremony held prior to going live with SMKI. The amendment made to the final minutes of the March 2016 meeting is as follows:

*A special SMKI ceremony was required on March 8th 2016, as reported at TPMAG on March 8th 2016. The root cause analysis confirmed human error during preparations for the ceremony. Two of the IKI sub Certificate Authorities (CAs) created on 2<sup>nd</sup> March accidentally shared the same key pair, which although not in contravention of IKI Certificate Authority (ICA) Certificate Policy, was deemed as 'not good practice'. The two IKI sub CAs certificates were revoked and the CAs taken out of use and replaced with two new CAs using fresh key material. This set of actions was discussed with the tScheme auditor prior to execution. The SMKI ICA is operated in accordance with good industry practice, is fully compliant with Certificate Policy and subject to tScheme audit which will assess during stage two and report in June 2016.*

There was no further business was raised and the Chair closed the meeting.

## 16. Next Meeting

The next meeting will be held on **12<sup>th</sup> July 2016**.