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Meeting SECPMA_28_1110, 11th October 2016

10:00 – 15:30

Gemserv, 8 Fenchurch Place, London, EC3M 4AJ

SMKI PMA Minutes

Attendees:

Category	SMKI PMA Members
SMKI PMA Chair	Darren Calam (SMKI PMA Alternate Chair)
Large Suppliers	Geoff Huckerby
	Fabien Cavenne (Teleconference (Part))
Networks	Sara Neal
Security Sub-Committee (SSC) Representative	Michael Constable
Technical Architecture and Business Architecture Sub-Committee (TABASC) Representative	Julian Hughes

Non-Voting Members:

Category	Attendees
BEIS (Representative)	Daryl Flack
DCC	Andrew Smith
SECAS Representative	James Simmonds
SMKI PMA Secretary (SECAS)	Joe Davenport

Apologies:

Category	Attendees
DCC	Marc Avery
The Authority (Ofgem)	Gwen Cruise
SMKI PMA Chair	Gordon Hextall

1. Minutes of SMKI PMA Meeting 27_1309

The group were informed that apologies had been received from the SMKI PMA Chair Gordon Hextall. The SMKI PMA Chairs alternative Darren Calam hosted the meeting.

There were no comments received, and the minutes were approved as an accurate record of the September 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

2. Actions Outstanding

SECAS provided the SMKI PMA with an update on actions outstanding from previous SMKI PMA meetings. The following section sets out items of discussion held during the October 2016 meeting.

Action Reference	Update
SECPMA 23/01	<p>The DCC provided an update on the future desktop exercise which would be undertaken in relation to a Recovery Event, and confirmed it would be going ahead on December 2016.</p> <p>It was requested that a Data Services Provider (DSP) representative should also be in attendance, and the DCC confirmed an invitation would be extended. The DCC representative advised they would bring a selection of draft Use Cases to the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting. The DCC will also confirm to the group the required timescale for completing the desktop exercise at the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 26/04	<p>The TSP clarified to the DCC that there were effective controls preventing an inactive Device Certification Authority (DCA) being reactivated, and confirmed there was no reactivation option within the Symantec software. The action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 26/07	<p>A process flow diagram was included within the TSP Key Pair Management document, however, it did not demonstrate the associated costs for the destruction of DCAs.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING until further documentation from the 3rd October 2016 meeting has been received.</p>
SECPMA 26/11	<p>The TSP are continuing to investigate the transportation of the backup HSM and will report back to the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 27/04	<p>The DCC confirmed that a report on the costs of having an additional HSM would be delivered to the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 27/09	<p>SECAS confirmed that the Modification Proposal presented at the September 2016 meeting in relation to the expansion of SMKI PMA Membership (and the Alternate clause removal) had been submitted for discussion at the October</p>

Action Reference	Update
	<p>2016 SEC Panel meeting. SECAS noted the proposed timescales for the report and the modifications implementation.</p> <p>If approved, SECAS confirmed it would begin the nomination process for the increased Sub-Committee membership once the Modification Proposal was implemented.</p> <p>The action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 27/12	<p>The DCC confirmed that an OpenSSL Tool was currently being assessed by the TSP as a part of their corrective action plan driven by Root Cause Analysis.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 27/13	<p>The DCC advised the SMKI PMA that an action and corrective action plan, in regards to the Apex Contingency Key issue in User Interface Testing (UIT), was currently being developed.</p> <p>The DCC informed the SMKI PMA to expect the corrective action plan and proposals for resolving the Apex Contingency Key issue in UIT at their November 2016 meeting. It was noted this would also incorporate further alignment with the Recovery testing plans timeframe that has been developed.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 27/14	<p>The DCC advised that the summary of Root Cause Analysis, in relation to Certificate Profiles in UIT, was in progress. The DCC informed the Sub-Committee that the Root Cause Analysis report was due to be presented at the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting, with the test plans following at the SMKI PMA December 2016 meeting.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 27/15	<p>The DCC advised that, in relation to an additional test to include the transition over to an additional CA hierarchy, they would present on the additional test at the December 2016 SMKI PMA meeting. A forward plan would be provided at the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 27/16	<p>SECAS informed the group that this action was covered by agenda item five of the October 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.</p> <p>The action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 27/17	<p>The DCC informed the SMKI PMA that it had reviewed the ways in which Senior Responsible Officers (SRO) and Authorised Responsible Officers (ARO) are currently being notified of their obligations.</p> <p>The Sub-Committee were informed that SMKI Registration Authority Policies and Procedures (RAPP) forms had now been amended to contain an explicit notification to inform the DCC of any changes of an SRO or ARO. It was noted that this information is currently provided by a Nominating Officer (NO),</p>

Action Reference	Update
	<p>however, the SMKI PMA deemed this to be inappropriate, and informed the DCC that this should instead be directed by an employee of their organisation.</p> <p>A SMKI PMA Member also noted it is currently possible to revoke AROs, and has been undertaken in the past, however, no confirmation is ever received that the revocation has been completed and accepted by the DCC.</p> <p>The DCC were requested to return to the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting with proposals of how the revocation of AROs and SROs will be addressed. The DCC also advised that a list of SROs, AROs and NOs could be created and uploaded to the SharePoint site of each SEC Party which could be accessed by SROs. The DCC confirmed to investigate this process as a way of ensuring contact information for each SEC Party remained up-to-date.</p> <p>The action was marked as ONGOING.</p>

ACTION SECPMA 28/01: Scenarios for the December 2016 Recovery Event desktop exercise will be drawn up and provided at the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting by the DCC. The time required to execute these Use Cases will also be assessed by SECAS and the SMKI PMA Chair.

ACTION SECPMA 28/02: SECAS will add the dates and plan for the Desktop Exercise to the SMKI PMA Activity Planner.

ACTION SECPMA 28/03: In relation to liability in the event of a recovery event involving Communication Hubs, the DCC agreed to discuss this further with their internal legal team to understand cases and instances where the CSP do, and do not pay.

ACTION SECPMA 28/04: Minutes, actions and any other relevant documentation from the 3rd October 2016 workshop will be circulated to SMKI PMA members in order to close actions **SECPMA 26/03** to **SECPMA 26/07**.

ACTION SECPMA 28/05: In relation to the 3rd October 2016 workshop, SECAS will approach CESG to determine if the outcomes of the meeting are appropriate, and fit within the original scope for delivery of the SMKI Service with particular respect to the DCAs.

ACTION SECPMA 28/06: A report based on the cost of having an offshore HSM will be provided at the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

ACTION SECPMA 28/07: SECAS will add the progress of the **SECMP0022¹** to the SMKI PMA Activity Planner.

ACTION SECPMA 28/08: In relation to the Apex Contingency Key in UIT, the DCC/TSP will present its Root Cause Analysis, Risk Mitigation, Action Plan and any other associated work to the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

3. Stage 2 Assurance Report

This item is covered in further detail in the confidential minutes (SECPMA_28_1110 – Confidential Minutes)

¹ SECMP0022 – Expanding SMKI PMA member and removing Alternate restrictions

4. SMKI Recovery Key Guidance – Supporting Confidential Processes Document

This item is covered in further detail in the confidential minutes (SECPMA_28_1110 – Confidential Minutes)

5. Emergency Suspension of SMKI Services

This item is covered in further detail in the confidential minutes (SECPMA_28_1110 – Confidential Minutes)

6. SMKI Organisation Certificate – DUIS Query

SECAS informed the SMKI PMA of a query raised to the Code Administrator from a Distribution Network Operator (DNO) in relation to SMKI Organisation Certificates, and the ways in which a SMKI Organisation Certificate (Digital Signing) used for the purpose of signing DUIS XML only, may inadvertently be placed in a Network Trust Anchor Cell by a Supplier, potentially breaching the SEC due to a DCC User Interface Specification (DUIS) clause.

The Sub-Committee discussed the options available in this instance whereby the wrong SMKI Organisation Certificate was placed in a Network Trust Anchor Cell. It was agreed that introducing a naming convention within the `ID-at-CommonName` field of the Certificate would also be a sensible approach moving forward. It was noted that as this was classified as a critical message the DCC did not have the capability to block the message and it would always pass. Due to this it may have an impact on DNOs.

The SMKI PMA also considered whether to raise this issue with the Technical Specification Issues Resolution Subgroup (TSIRS) in the short term to recommend Suppliers go to their DNO in order to be informed of the correct SMKI Organisation Certificate for said DNO. The SMKI PMA noted their concern of introducing further obligations in the Code, as these may be negatively received by the industry.

It was agreed that the Code Administrator seek clarity from the Authority as to whether Suppliers placing the incorrect DNO SMKI Organisation Certificate on a Device was deemed a material breach of the Code, and whether the DNO could replace the SMKI Organisation Certificate on the Device with the correct SMKI Organisation Certificate.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the query raised; and,
- **AGREED** that the Code Administrator pursue this further with the Authority for clarity.

ACTION SECPMA 28/16: The DCC will confirm that they are not able to block or reject the incorrect digital signing of DUIS as this is deemed a critical command, of which all must be accepted.

ACTION SECPMA 28/17: SECAS to approach the Authority to determine whether a Supplier placing the wrong SMKI Organisation Certificate in a Network Trust Anchor Cell is classified as a material breach of the SEC, and whether it was possible for a DNO to replace this Certificate.

ACTION SECPMA 28/18: the ENA and Suppliers to investigate the naming convention suggested as part of the solution to the DUIS Query and how this would be utilised in the working environment.

ACTION SECPMA 28/19: SECAS to hold a meeting with the originator of the query to confirm the outcome of the meeting and advise of the next steps prior to a solution being socialised to industry.

7. SMKI PMA Meeting dates 2017 - 2018

The Sub-Committee discussed two possible options for when the SMKI PMA would meet in 2017. SECAS advised changing the meeting schedule would reduce conflicts with other SEC Panel Sub-Committee meetings. The SMKI PMA agreed to move their meetings from the second Tuesday of each month, to the third Tuesday of each month, as this was deemed beneficial for SMKI PMA members.

The SMKI PMA:

- **AGREED** their monthly meeting dates for January 2017 – December 2017.

ACTION SECPMA 28/20: SECAS will update the members pack and redistribute this to members to reflect the new 2017 timetable and advise of the new additional teleconference facility.

8. SMKI Operational Update

The DCC provided a SMKI operations update for September and October 2016. It informed the Sub-Committee that Organisation Certificates had now been issued to two Large Suppliers. The SMKI PMA noted that Suppliers who were implementing an adapter solution may not request Organisation Certificates until testing reaches finalisation.

The DCC confirmed it would include the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) data for Device Certificates in the SMKI Operational report for the November 2016 meeting, and that the UIT Apex Recovery Key issue does not affect the live service.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the SMKI Operational update.

ACTION SECPMA 28/21: The DCC will include CSR forecast information as part of the SMKI Operational update provided at the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

9. SMKI PMA Risk Register

SECAS presented the Sub-Committee with an update on the SMKI PMA Risk Register. Four new risks had been added, and SECAS requested that feedback continues to be provided each month to evolve the SMKI PMA Risk Register and ensure it remained fit for purpose.

Queries were raised on the convening of the SMKI PMA within 24 hours, specifically in emergency situations, as it had originally been discussed that this was a transitional obligation. Due to the closure of the Transitional Policy Management Authority Group (TPMAG), this transitional obligation had been absorbed into the SMKI PMA ToR and may need to be changed.

A query was also raised on the definition of working days and working hours within Risk 4. SECAS confirmed they would review this risk.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the Risk Register Update for October 2016.

ACTION SECPMA 28/22: SECAS will confirm the standing of the SMKI PMA within the 24 hours and at what point this would change to 48 hours when in the enduring world.

ACTION SECPMA 28/23: SECAS will review the use of working days and hours and adjust Risk 4 accordingly.

10. SMKI PMA Activity Planner

SECAS provided the SMKI PMA with an updated activity planner outlining the activities expected over the next three months. Additional activities will now be included as the SMKI PMA and Smart Metering Implementation Programme (SMIP) enters into 2017.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the Activity Planner for October 2016.

ACTION SECPMA 28/24: SECAS will incorporate the future SMKI Independent Assurance Scheme Assessments, Membership renewal, the proposed December 2016 desktop exercise, and SMIRF processes in the activity planner for the next meeting of the SMKI PMA.

ACTION SECPMA 28/25: SECAS to contact BEIS to confirm the timetable of the SMIRF and 'Hopper' exercise.

11. Modifications Status Report

SECAS informed the SMKI PMA that the Modification Proposal for increasing the SMKI PMA membership, and removing the restrictions on Alternates from the same company, had been submitted to the SEC Panel for consideration at their October 2016 meeting.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the Modifications Status update for October 2016.

12. DCC Update

The DCC confirmed that Release 1.2 (R1.2) was on schedule to Go Live on the 31st October 2016, and that an update on this progress and live operations would be provided at the November 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

The Chair raised the matter of SMKI and Repository Testing (SRT), and that DCC were required to provide formal notification of the completion of work-off items. This had been agreed at the joint SMKI PMA and Testing Advisory Group (TAG) meeting in March 2016. The DCC advised they would liaise internally and provide this to the SMKI PMA, TAG and SEC Panel prior to Go Live on the 31st October 2016.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the DCC update for October 2016.

ACTION SECPMA 28/26: The DCC will provide formal written notification that the work-off elements of SRT have now completed and deliver this to the SMKI PMA prior to R1.2 Go Live.

13. DCCKI PMA Functions Update

The DCC presented the SMKI PMA with information on their DCC Key Infrastructure (DCCKI) work-off items, and noted good progress had been made on these since September 2016.

The SMKI PMA Chair identified the need for accreditation of DCCKI Services, and that it appeared this had not yet been undertaken by an independent UKAS Auditor². The DCC queried this, noting their belief they are under an obligation to undertake the UKAS audit within 12 months of the DCCKI

² SEC Appendix S, 8.1, a

Service going 'Live'. The Chair noted that an independent audit related to the DCC's Information Service Management Systems (ISMS) and ISO27001 certification, in relation to DCCKI, should have been undertaken by this stage and incorporated as part of DCC's ISMS.

The Chair questioned the worst case scenario if there was a delay to an independent audit of the DCCKI Systems. The DCC noted that if DCCKI is not fundamentally fit for purpose, it would need to be started again with all associated Certificates reissued. The DCC noted that this risk had only been captured within the DCCs internal risk registers, and not socialised formally to industry. The SMKI PMA agreed that this risk should be raised with the SEC Panel.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the DCCKI PMA Functions update for October 2016.

ACTION SECPMA 28/27: SECAS to submit risk to the SEC Panel in relation to DCCKI Services not yet undergoing a UKAS independent Audit as per the SEC obligation.

ACTION SECPMA 28/28: The DCC will circulate all minutes and meeting documentation from previous DCCKI PMA Function meetings to the SMKI PMA after the October 2016 SMKI PMA Meeting.

14. BEIS Update

The Sub-Committee were advised that there was no further update from BEIS for October 2016.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** there was no further BEIS update for October 2016.

15. Any Other Business (A.O.B)

The Chair noted that there was no further business and closed the 28th SMKI PMA meeting.

Next Meeting

The next meeting will be held on **8th November 2016**.