

Meeting SECPMA_25_1207, 12th July 2016

12:00 – 15:00

Gemserv, 8 Fenchurch Place, London, EC3M 4AJ

SMKI PMA Minutes

Attendees:

Category	SMKI PMA Members
SMKI PMA Chair	Gordon Hextall
Large Suppliers	Geoff Huckerby
	Fabien Cavenne
Networks	Sara Neal
Technical Sub-Committee (TSC) Representative	Julian Hughes

Non-Voting Members:

Category	Attendees
DECC (Representative)	Daryl Flack (Security)
	Richard Haigh (Regulatory) (Part)
DCC	Marc Avery
	Andrew Smith
SMKI Specialist	Darren Calam
SECAS	James Simmonds
SMKI PMA Secretary	Joana Esgalhado

Apologies:

Category	Attendees
DECC (Representative)	Joe Howard
Ofgem (the Authority)	Nigel Nash
Security Sub-Committee (SSC) Representative	Michael Constable

1. Minutes of SMKI PMA Meeting 24_1406

There were no comments received on the June 2016 SMKI PMA Minutes and the group approved them as written.

2. Actions Outstanding

SECAS provided the SMKI PMA with an update on actions outstanding from previous SMKI PMA meetings. The following section sets out items of discussion held during the July 2016 meeting, specifically:

Action Reference	Update
SECPMA 22/04	<p>The DCC informed the SMKI PMA that costs associated with SMKI Recovery may be revised as part of CR 101 (SMKI Recovery Environment), but noted that for a single Recovery Event (Method 1 – recovery by the affected Subscriber using its Private Key to replace affected Organisation Certificates on Devices), the DSP has quoted £12,000 (plus VAT). The DCC representative informed the group that this was the cost for both building the Recovery Environment, and running the Recovery Event. A SMKI PMA Member asked whether this cost was for a single Incident, or for each File submitted. The DCC representative noted he would confirm and provide an update at a future SMKI PMA meeting. The DCC representative informed the group that in order to use the Apex Recovery Key Environment, the DSP has quoted the cost to build the Recovery Environment (and associated processes required) as £60,000.</p> <p>The DCC representative re-iterated and informed the group that these two costs were rough order of magnitude costs. The SMKI PMA noted that as part of the Operational Acceptance Testing (OAT) undertaken for the Recovery Environment, detailed analysis and assessment would have to be undertaken by the Data Service Provider (DSP). The SMKI PMA requested that the DCC representative review and submit this information at a future SMKI PMA meeting to facilitate discussion and further understand the overall associated costs with running recovery. The SMKI PMA noted this information would be used in conjunction with the desktop recovery exercise, as per SECPMA 23/01.</p>
	<p>ACTION SECPMA 25/01: DCC to confirm whether the cost of running Method 1 for a single Recovery Event is associated on a per Incident basis, or a per File basis.</p>
	<p>This action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 22/05	<p>The DCC representative confirmed to the SMKI PMA that the contract held between the DCC and the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider included the option to assess SEC Parties for compliance against the SMKI Document Set. The SMKI PMA discussed the scoping and processes required as part of what would trigger an assessment, and the ways in which compliance would be assessed by the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider against a pre-defined framework. The SMKI PMA agreed that there was no defined trigger, though if a Major Security Incident was raised, the SMKI PMA may wish to consider the implications and assess whether or not this warranted directing the DCC to instigate an assessment. The DCC</p>

	<p>representative agreed to discuss this assessment process with the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider, and agreed to provide an update at a future SMKI PMA meeting.</p> <p>ACTION SECPMA 25/02: DCC to discuss the assessment framework and ways in which the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider will assess compliance against the SMKI Document Set.</p> <p>This action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 22/09	<p>The DCC confirmed the latest upgrade to BT's hardware Security Modules (HSMs) does not impact compliance and thus, there is no need for the Key Custodians to reconvene.</p> <p>This action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 23/01	<p>As noted in the SECPMA 22/04 update of these Minutes, the DCC informed the SMKI PMA that an update on a future desktop exercise and further work on the Recovery Scenarios would be provided at a future SMKI PMA meeting, with an update to be provided at the August 2016 meeting.</p> <p>This action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 23/04	<p>The DCC confirmed the Stage 2 Assurance Report was still in final development and review, and that an update, as well as the Stage 2 Assurance Report, would be provided and submitted at the August 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.</p> <p>This action was marked as ONGOING.</p>
SECPMA 24/01	<p>This update on the SMKI PMA Information and Data Management is provided under agenda item 6.</p> <p>This action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 24/06	<p>The DCC informed the SMKI PMA that the scheduling of additional SMKI and Repository Testing (SRT) parts would be determined and set out following the DCC's consultation on its request for contingency in relation to Release 1.3., and the proposed Release 1.3.1. The SMKI PMA noted that the DCC should provide an update on how the SRT Approach Document will be updated following the consultation outcome, and whether the DCC would be required to re-submit the amended SRT Approach Document for review and approval. The DCC representative confirmed that, once the outcome of the DCC's consultation was known, the DCC would review, amend, and resubmit the SRT Approach Document to the SMKI PMA.</p> <p>This action as marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 24/09	<p>SECAS informed the SMKI PMA that the presentation of a SMKI PMA Risk Register had been put on hold. This was due to SECAS waiting for the risk assessment project undertaken as part of SMDG Post DCC Live risk analysis to complete, and for the SMKI PMA to be made aware of any (and all) risks it may be required to manage. SECAS informed the group that it would liaise with DECC to understand the status of this project, with an</p>

	update (and SMKI PMA Risk Register) being presented at the August 2016 SMKI PMA meeting. A SMKI PMA Member noted that for consistency and clarity purposes, the SMKI PMA Risk Register should utilise a similar process of risk assessment and management used by the Security Sub-Committee (SSC).
	ACTION SECPMA 25/03: SECAS to review the SSC Risk Register, and ensure alignment for the SMKI PMA Risk Register.
	This action was marked as CLOSED .
SECPMA 24/11	<p>The DCC representative informed the group that industry Key Custodians would not be involved in Systems Integration Testing (SIT) and User Interface Testing (UIT) of the Recovery Environment.</p> <p>The SMKI PMA discussed the liability arrangements around a SMKI Event, and the DECC Representative noted that SEC Section L sets out the policy intent of how Liability in the event of a Compromise (or suspected Compromise) is discharged.</p> <p>This action was marked as CLOSED.</p>
SECPMA 24/12	<p>The DCC confirmed that Key Custodians will not be required to act in September 2016 (as discussed at a previous SMKI PMA meeting) but rather in February 2017, when the Recovery Environment will now be available (subject to the DCC's consultation on Release 1.3. contingency being utilised). The DCC Representative informed the SMKI PMA of their intention to contact Key Custodians between July 2016 and September in order to confirm if they are still content in remaining as a Key Custodian.</p> <p>The DCC representative confirmed an update would be provided at the September 2016 SMKI PMA meeting following the completion of this timeframe.</p> <p>This action was marked as CLOSED.</p>

3. SMKI PMA Terms of Reference Update

SECAS presented the SMKI PMA with the amended Terms of Reference (ToR). The group were informed that the ToR had been aligned with SEC version 4.12., and now included a provision that would allow the SMKI PMA to convene within a 24-hour notice following the SMKI PMA Chair (or their Alternate) seeking a meeting in exceptional circumstances.

In light of discussions held by the group as part of Agenda Item 6 (SECPMA_25_1207_06 - *SMKI PMA Information and Data Management*), SECAS agreed to further review and expand the SMKI PMA ToR to capture data and information asset classifications, in line with the SSC's ToR. The SMKI PMA also noted that this new requirement should explicitly mention that such extraordinary meeting(s) could only take place during Monday to Friday working hours. SECAS agreed to investigate the process, procurement, and platform in which this extraordinary meeting may be hosted, and provide an update at the August 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

SECAS informed the SMKI PMA that the ToR would be amended post-meeting to incorporate points of clarification and expansion discussed at the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting. The amended ToR will be circulated to SMKI PMA Members for comment prior to SECAS submitting the amended ToR to SA 16 Steering Group for comment and the SEC Panel for approval.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the contents of this paper; and
- **AGREED** to recommend the SMKI PMA ToR to the SA16 Steering Group (SA 16 SG) (following SECAS further amending in light of discussions held) for comment, prior to seeking SECAS submitting the amended SMKI PMA ToR to the SEC Panel for approval.

ACTION 25/04: SECAS to investigate the process, procurement, and platform in which an extraordinary meeting would be held.

ACTION 25/05: SECAS to review the SSC ToR, and align the SMKI PMA ToR and circulate an updated version of the SMKI PMA ToR to SMKI PMA Members for comment.

ACTION 25/06: SECAS to incorporate any comments from SMKI PMA members and submit the amended SMKI PMA ToR to the SA16 SG for comment prior to seeking Panel approval.

4. SMKI Recovery Procedure – Clarification

The SMKI Specialist provided an update to the SMKI PMA concluding a previously ongoing Transitional Policy Management Authority Group (TPMAG) action. This action was in relation to the Smart Metering Inventory (SMI) Statuses relating to a Recovery Event being triggered, and the associated SMI Statuses that may be set.

The SMKI Specialist noted that the SMI Status of a Compromised (or suspected of being Compromised) Device would have its SMI Status set to 'Recovery', and, if successful, the DCC would return the status to either 'Recovered', or its previous SMI Status before 'Recovery' was set. The group discussed whether it was the responsibility of the DCC or the Compromised (or suspected of being Compromised) Supplier to restore this SMI Status, and the SMKI PMA confirmed it was the role of the DCC (as set out in Appendix L – SMKI Recovery Procedure). The SMKI Specialist and DCC representative agreed to clarify this item of discussion post-meeting.

ACTION SECPMA 25/07: SMKI Specialist to discuss and confirm with the DCC the responsible party for setting SMI Statuses following a Recovery Event.

5. SMKI Recovery Key Guidance Consultation Update and Next Steps

SECAS submitted the re-drafted SMKI Recovery Key Guidance to the SMKI PMA, alongside a proposed consultation timetable for the group to agree. SECAS noted that following the comments received and the amendments made to the document, a further consultation was required due to the nature of the changes made.

The SMKI PMA Chair thanked the DECC Regulatory Representative for his contribution to re-drafting and amending the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance. The DECC representative informed the group of the re-draft, and the changes made, as well as informing SECAS of a number of corrections required to be made to the document following the document being circulated as part of the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting documentation.

The DECC Regulatory Representative also expressed the view that the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance document, and wider SEC Governance meeting documentation, should not include the Gemserv brand on each document. SECAS and the SMKI PMA Chair confirmed that this is the branding across all meeting documentation. It was agreed that the branding would be removed prior to the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance being reissued for consultation.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the contents of this paper; and
- **AGREED** that SECAS publish version 1.1 of the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance for consultation in accordance with SEC Section L10.13.

ACTION SECPMA 25/08: SECAS to publish the SMKI Recovery Key Guidance for consultation, as agreed by the SMKI PMA.

6. SMKI PMA Information and Data Management

SECAS provided the SMKI PMA with a **CONFIDENTIAL** paper (SECPMA_25_1207_06) outlining the information handling requirements associated with data asset exchanges between SEC signatories, the DCC, the SEC Panel, the Secretary of State (SoS), the Authority, and any other necessary parties. Discussion on this item has been included within the non-confidential minutes for transparency.

The SMKI PMA discussed the different models of information asset classifications, and it was noted that the SMKI PMA does not currently have a classification model in place. It was proposed that the SMKI PMA adopts a similar model to that of the SSC, which labels their information assets as RED, AMBER, GREEN, and WHITE, and that such classification models be included in the SMKI PMA ToR (as recorded within Section 3 of these Minutes).

The SMKI PMA agreed the proposed classification methodology, and suggested the definition of “need to know” in regards to the AMBER label should also be included in the SMKI PMA ToR.

The SMKI PMA also agreed that the current platform utilised by the SSC be adopted for the handling of AMBER and RED classified documentation, and requested that SECAS confirm whether their current contract – initially procured to accommodate SSC’s information exchanges – allows the SMKI PMA to use the platform as well. SECAS confirmed to investigate this further, and provide an update at the August 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** the contents of this paper;
- **AGREED** the proposed information assets classification models; and
- **AGREED** that the current platform used by the SSC be investigated by SECAS as a method for accommodating to the SMKI PMA’s information data exchange.

ACTION SECPMA 25/09: SECAS to investigate and confirm whether the current platform, and current contract in place for the SSC, is available and suitable for the SMKI PMA.

7. Stage 2 Assurance Report Update

The DCC presented an update on their progress through the Stage 2 Assurance Report in advance to providing the report at the August 2016 SMKI PMA.

The DCC informed the group that 15 minor non-compliances had been identified by the Independent SMKI Assurance Service Provider as part of the DCC’s Stage 2 Assurance assessment, and that the DCC had identified a number of remedies and processes to resolve these minor non-compliances. The group discussed these 15 minor non-compliances identified, and noted that further information was required. The DCC representative highlighted one non-compliance related to the various Certification Practice Statements (CPS’) not being available in the SMKI Repository but noted that the SEC prevents this.

The DCC undertook to bring a paper to the next SMKI PMA meeting to suggest a means of overcoming the non-compliance, such as the publication of a link in the Repository saying the CPS was available on request. SECAS agreed to review the SEC to confirm that this was acceptable with the intention of providing an update at the August 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the presentation and update provided by the DCC.

ACTION SECPMA 25/10: DCC to provide a paper to the next SMKI PMA meeting to overcome the non-compliance relating to publishing the CPS.

ACTION SECPMA 25/11: SECAS to review the SEC and assess whether it is acceptable to publish a link to the CPS in the SMKI Repository.

8. SMKI Operational Update

The DCC representative provided an operational update in relation to SMKI Services. The SMKI PMA discussed and noted that further refinement in how the DCC present this update would occur as further functionality of the DCC's Live Systems become operational.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the verbal update provided by the DCC.

9. SMKI Compliance Policy – Requirements and Obligations

The SMKI PMA were presented with the updated requirements and obligations information paper of SEC Appendix C (SMKI Compliance Policy). These requirements and obligations were previously presented at the June 2016 SMKI PMA meeting, and SECAS had updated said paper to include a column that set out the current status of obligations which had been met, as well as highlighting obligations still yet to be fulfilled.

SECAS noted that the current status of the table set out within the paper reflects the current stage of SMKI Services. SECAS noted that as the Smart Metering Implementation Programme (SMIP) continues to progress, SECAS would investigate the possibility of developing similar status update information papers in relation to SEC Section L, and the SEC Appendices associated with the SMKI Document Set.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the contents of this paper.

10. SMKI Activity Planner

SECAS provided the SMKI PMA with an updated activity planner outlining the activities expected over the next three months, and informed the group that the activity planner had been updated to include progress reviews associated with the review of additional SRT stages.

The SMKI PMA noted that this paper would be revised to capture the outcomes of the DCC's consultation on its contingency request for DCC Release 1.3 and 1.3.1, as well as the presentation of the SMKI PMA Risk Register (as captured in Section 2 of these Minutes).

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the contents of this paper.

11. Modifications Status Report

The monthly Modification Status Report was provided to the SMKI PMA to update them of the status and progress of Modification Proposals going through the SEC Section D 'Modification Process'.

SECAS informed the group that, since the June 2016 meeting, one new Modification Proposal (SECMP00018) had entered the Refinement stage of the Modification Process.

The SMKI PMA noted the content of the proposal and agreed it had no impact on their duties. The group agreed they would like to keep track of their input to Modification Proposals, and that this should be recorded in future Modification Status Reports for ease of discussion. SECAS agreed to provide this feedback to the SECAS Modifications Team.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the content of the Modifications Update.

ACTION SECPMA 24/12: SECAS to provide feedback to the SECAS Modifications Team, and register the SMKI PMA's interest in each Modification Proposal under the monthly Modification Status Report.

12. DCC Update

The DCC informed the SMKI PMA that, following the DCC's consultation on its contingency request in relation to DCC Release 1.3, a proposal to defer several SMKI-related Change Requests (CRs) would be submitted (for release as part of the DCC's proposed Release 1.3.1).

The SMKI PMA discussed the DCC's risk assessment to said CR's being deferred, and confirmed that the DCC should also raise this to the Transitional Security Expert Group (TSEG) for further discussion and assessment of the security implications. The four SMKI-related CR's discussed were:

- CR097 – Device Certificate Eligibility Checks: change to the solution to accommodate SEC L3.7 which requires eligibility to be checked before issuing device certificates;
- CR101a – SMKI Recovery Environment: provide an environment to securely generate and store credentials to support the SMKI Recovery Procedure.
- CR110a – DCC Reporting Architecture: post-commissioning obligations (the CR110a Fragment to store the success or failure of GBCS messages which is required for retrospective PCO Reporting will need to be delivered in R1.3); and
- CR118 – Certificate Mapping Check: validating and recording the Recovery certificate, and recording all other certificates in anchor slots on devices.

The group queried the individual risk and impact projections presented by the DCC for each CR, and confirmed that they could not assess in further detail the CR's listed above due to risk descriptions being too vague, and the detailed Impact Assessments (IAs) undertaken by the DCC not being presented.

The DCC agreed to update the risk descriptions and the likely impact and likelihood assumptions for each CR prior to the DCC submitting the CR's to TSEG for the meeting on 20th July 2016.

The SMKI PMA:

- **NOTED** this presentation; and
- **DISCUSSED** the content of the CRs presented and **AGREED** that the DCC present their views at the next TSEG after the CRs are updated to take account of SMKI PMA Member's comments.

ACTION SECPMA 25/13: DCC to update the risk descriptions including the likely impact and likelihood assumptions, and circulate them to the SMKI PMA, prior to submitting to TSEG to take account of SMKI PMA comments.

13. DCCKI PMA Functions Update

The DCC informed the SMKI PMA of their continued focus on DSP Services as part of their final preparations prior to DCC Key Infrastructure (DCCKI) Services going live. The DCC undertook to provide a full report to the next SMKI PMA meeting.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the DCCKI PMA Functions update for July 2016.

14. DECC Update

DECC informed the SMKI PMA that a consultation on the date of designation for the SEC subsidiary documents required in preparation for DCC Live would be published on 18th July 2016.

The SMKI PMA **NOTED** the DECC update for July 2016.

15. Any Other Business

The SMKI PMA discussed their meeting schedule and agreed to a 10am start for future meetings (following the closure of the Transitional Policy Management Authority Group (TPMAG)). The group noted as TPMAG no longer stands, the TPMAG Minutes presented at the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting should be circulated for consideration to TPMAG Members, and, following their input, be concluded as final.

SECAS agreed to circulate the TPMAG Minutes to TPMAG Members following the July 2016 SMKI PMA meeting.

There was no further business was raised and the Chair closed the meeting.

ACTION SECPMA 25/14: SECAS to circulate latest TPMAG minutes to former TPMAG members for input and to write them as final.

16. Next Meeting

The next meeting will be held on **9th August 2016**.