

# CPA Security Characteristic

## Smart Metering Communications Hub

Version 1.5

## Important

Products certified against this Security Characteristic have their aligned product and Build Standard recertification periods defined in the Smart Energy Code, Section F2 - 'Expiry of CPA Certificates'<sup>1</sup>

## About this document

This document describes the features, testing and deployment requirements necessary to meet CPA certification for Smart Metering Communications Hub security products. It is intended for vendors, system architects, developers, evaluation and technical staff operating within the security arena.

- Section 1 is suitable for all readers. It outlines the purpose of the security product and defines the scope of the Security Characteristic.
- Section 2 and Section 3 describe the specific mitigations required to prevent or hinder attacks for this product type. Some technical knowledge is assumed.
- For more information about CPA certification, refer to the CPA Policies and Procedures<sup>2</sup>.

## Document history

The CPA Scheme Owner (the SEC Security Sub-Committee (SSC)) may review, amend, update, replace or issue new Scheme Documents as may be required from time to time.

| Version | Date      | Notes                                                                                                                                         |
|---------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.0     | July 2014 | Initial version based on cross-industry working group input.                                                                                  |
| 1.1     | June 2015 | Updated to align with Technical Specs (GBCS, CHTS and SMETS) released 28 November 2014.                                                       |
| 1.2     | Nov 2015  | Updated to align with Technical Specs (GBCS, CHTS and SMETS) released 18 November 2015.                                                       |
| 1.3     | July 2017 | Updated to align with Technical Specs (GBCS, CHTS and SMETS) released 16 September 2016.                                                      |
| 1.4     | Nov 2021  | Updated with new SC Maps based on revised threat analysis, industry workshops, and NCSC review. Released 15 November 2021.                    |
| 1.5     | Feb 2026  | Updated to include mitigations required for Communication Hubs with Virtual WAN capability and to update references to NCSC Scheme ownership. |
|         |           |                                                                                                                                               |
|         |           |                                                                                                                                               |
|         |           |                                                                                                                                               |

This document is derived from the following SC Maps:

| SC Map               | Map Version |
|----------------------|-------------|
| SmM CH SC            | 2.2         |
| SmM Crypt SC Library | 2.0         |

<sup>1</sup> <https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/document-download-centre/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/commercial-product-assurance-cpa/>

| SC Map                | Map Version |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| SmM Device SC Library | 2.5         |

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This document is authorised by: the SSC Chair

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# 1 Overview

## 1.1 Introduction

This document is a CPA Security Characteristic. It describes requirements for assured Smart Metering Communications Hub products for evaluation and certification under the Commercial Product Assurance (CPA) scheme.

## 1.2 Product description

The Communications Hub is a hybrid device which includes two logically separate functions, the Communications Hub Function (CHF) and the Gas Proxy Function (GPF). The CHF manages communications between devices within the premises and acts as a 'bridge' between the Smart Metering Home Area Network (HAN) and the Smart Metering Wide Area Network (WAN). The GPF operates as a proxy device for the Gas Smart Metering Equipment (GSME), in order to accurately and securely record and transmit, where appropriate, information about gas usage in a smart metered property.

The key security concerns relating to the Communications Hub are:

- Protect Personal Data (received by GPF from GSME) from unauthorised access:
  - HAN Only messages sent by GSME to the GPF, including those that may contain Personal Data, are encrypted using ZigBee. Similarly, HAN Only messages sent from the GPF to other in-home devices (e.g. In-Home Display) that may contain Personal Data will also be ZigBee encrypted.
  - Ensure Personal Data sent in Remote Party Messages over the WAN (via the CHF) is encrypted (see Appendix C).
- Availability – the CHF is a single point of failure for communications into consumer premises and must be protected against Denial of Service attacks or compromise of the device 'allow-list'.
- Provision of accurate time source – the CHF is used to regularly synchronise the time for ESME and GSME, which augments message validation checks and execution of future dated action on those devices.

## 1.3 Typical use cases

The product is used within GB Smart Metering, and will be installed in domestic premises and smaller non-domestic consumer premises.

## 1.4 Expected operating environment

As part of GB Smart Metering, the Communications Hub is to be deployed at consumer premises along with other equipment. The GSME and Electricity Smart Metering Equipment (ESME) communicate through a HAN with the Communications Hub. The Communications Hub also provides communications between the HAN and a WAN, the latter connecting the Communications Hub to the Energy Supplier (in the majority of cases via a centralised Communications Broker, the DCC, which will also establish connections with network operators and authorised third parties).

The equipment to be deployed at consumer premises will consist of the Communications Hub, GSME (if the consumer has a gas supply), ESME, an In-Home Display (IHD) and, optionally, a Prepayment Interface Device (PPMID). Consumer Access Devices (CADs) may also be available. One or more Auxiliary Load Control Switch (ALCS) may also be installed, either within the ESME or as separate devices with their own HAN interface (HCALCS). One or more Auxiliary Proportional Controller (APC) may also be installed, either within the ESME or as a Standalone APC (SAPC).

During installation and maintenance, a Hand Held Terminal (HHT) may be used to download messages, as specified in reference [d], from the Supplier to a device via the Communications Hub. This would be transparent to the device.

Overarching security obligations on energy suppliers and the DCC can be found in the Smart Energy Code (see reference [g]).

The Business Interactions section of the End to End Technical Architecture document (reference [i]) provides further context on the expected operating environment. Figure 1 below illustrates the local operating environment.




Figure 1: Local operating environment of Communications Hub

## 1.5 Variants

Some Communications Hubs support a virtual WAN capability that establishes an additional Zigbee tunnel on the HAN (see [d, 10.1 & 10.2]) and that enables the CH to interact with a HAN-connected Virtual WAN Device (VWD) in order to use the connection to that VWD as the WAN interface, as described in [d, 10.9]. The CPA security requirements for these Communications Hubs are grouped into the 'VW capability' variant. Support for this variant is optional, but if the Communications Hub includes virtual WAN capability then it must include the mitigations for that variant in the scope of its certification (this will also extend the scope of the WAN interface in other mitigations to include consideration of both potential WAN interfaces).

It is noted that a CH that does not support virtual WAN capability might be a 4G CH or any other type of CH: any such CHs is referred to here as a “non-VWCH”.

Mitigations applicable only to variants are marked in section 3 with a variant tag “(<variant name> ONLY)” in the name of the mitigation – e.g. “DEV.1.5.M502: (VW capability ONLY) VWD joining”.

## 1.6 Compatibility

There are no compatibility requirements.

## 1.7 Conformance

The Communications Hub should be interoperable with the Communications Broker and other Smart Metering Equipment deployed in the consumer premises. Interoperability is achieved through the following requirements; those which require external certification are treated as dependency requirements for CPA certification, and must be demonstrated before CPA certification can be achieved.

| Requirement                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Standard                                        | External Certification                                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Declaration of intended conformance with a relevant version of CHTS.                                                                                                                                                                                            | Reference [e]                                   | N/A – No external certification required for CPA compliance. |
| Declaration of intended conformance with a relevant version of the Great Britain Companion Specifications (GBCS).                                                                                                                                               | Reference [d]                                   | N/A – No external certification required for CPA compliance. |
| The Communications Hub shall be certified by the ZigBee Alliance as compliant with the ZigBee requirements identified in the relevant version of SMETS 2 and associated version of GBCS, as set out in the Technical Specification Applicability Tables (TSAT). | Reference [e]<br>Reference [d]<br>Reference [h] | ZigBee                                                       |
| The Communications Hub shall be interoperable with DCC systems such that the DCC need not make any adjustments to its systems in order to establish Communications Links with the Communications Hub via its WAN Interface.                                     | Reference [d]<br>Reference [k]<br>Reference [l] | N/A – No external certification required.                    |
| The Communications Hub must be interoperable with the cryptographic protocols used to secure end-to-end messages from authorised Service Users.                                                                                                                 | Reference [d]                                   | CAVP or CPA <sup>3</sup> .                                   |

## 1.8 High level functional components

The following diagram illustrates the various high level functional components within this product that relate to specific mitigations listed in Section 3. These are used to structure the Security Characteristic, and to give context to each mitigation. For a full specification of the detailed functional requirements of the Communications Hub, see reference [e].

<sup>3</sup> When algorithm certification is included under CPA then it will be assessed as part of the evaluation of the meter: there is no separate CPA evaluation implied.




Figure 2: Functional components of a Smart Metering Communications Hub

The functional components in Figure 2 are described as follows.

- **Physical Protection.** A physical border, known as the ‘tamper-protection boundary’, surrounds the device and is capable of detecting physical access through its Secure Perimeter that could compromise confidentiality and/or data integrity of Personal Data, consumption data, security credentials, random number generator, cryptographic algorithms, or firmware. On detection of such access the device is capable of recording the event and sending an alert where reasonably practicable. This relates to the physical aspect of the Secure Perimeter described in reference [e, 4.3].
- **Firmware Protection.** The Smart Metering Equipment is capable of verifying the integrity and authenticity of its firmware as described in reference [d, 11] and reference [e, 4.4.6].
- **CHF.** Communications Hub Function, functionality specific to the operation of the Communications Hub as a bridge between the WAN and the HAN.



- **GPF.** Gas Proxy Function, functionality specific to the operation of the Communications Hub as a proxy device for the GSME.
- **Interface Protection.** Operational interfaces on the Smart Metering Equipment comply with security requirements in reference [e, 4.5] and prevent use of any non-operational interfaces. The device includes a HAN interface using ZigBee protocols enabling communications with other devices on the HAN. ZigBee Inter-PAN can also be enabled to allow an authorised HHT to connect for the installation and maintenance of Smart Metering Equipment. The device also includes a WAN interface to enable secure communications with the WAN Provider. Any additional non-operational interfaces should be considered by evaluators in the context of both CHF and GPF if they do not apply specifically to either.
- **Message Protection.** Messages received by the Smart Metering Equipment are validated to verify they comply with End-to-End security requirements in reference [d, 4]. These ensure aspects such as protection against replay or unauthorised modification. In addition, the ZigBee protocols include cryptographic measures that protect messages between devices on the HAN. Messages are protected while they are buffered waiting to be delivered to the WAN, and while they are buffered waiting to be delivered to the GSME. The clock in the device provides a time source against which ESME and GSME can synchronise their clocks, and is used to validate some messages that require additional certificate path validation, as well as to ensure that future-dated commands are executed at the correct time. See Appendix C for more details.
- **Sensitive Data Protection.** Personal Data is protected against unauthorised access. Keys that are used by cryptographic mechanisms to maintain various aspects of the Communications Hub security are protected against unauthorised access. Data within the device is held in a data store that is capable of retaining information at all times, including on loss of power, as described in reference [e, 4.6].
- **Logging.** A logging infrastructure is provided that records Sensitive Events in the Security Log and causes alerts to be sent in certain situations. Entries cannot be modified or deleted from the Security Log (other than through the normal overwriting of the oldest events by newer events as described in reference [e, 4.6.3]) and the log is expected to be regularly read by an authorised Remote Party before unread entries have been overwritten. The clock in the device enables timestamps to be included in the logs.
- **Virtual Wan.** (VW capability ONLY) Some Communications Hubs are capable of operating using a Virtual WAN Communications Link in Virtual WAN Mode. This is based on establishing an additional Zigbee tunnel on the HAN (see [d, 10.1 & 10.2]) that enables the CH to interact with a HAN-connected Virtual WAN Device (VWD) in order to use the connection to that VWD as the WAN interface, as described in [d, 10.9].

## 1.9 Future enhancements

The SSC welcome feedback and suggestions on possible enhancements to this Security Characteristic.

## 2 Security Characteristic Format

### 2.1 Requirement categories

All CPA Security Characteristics contain a list of mitigations that describe the specific measures required to prevent or hinder attacks. The mitigations are grouped into three requirement categories; design, verification and deployment, and appear in section 3 of this document in that order.

- **Development mitigations** (indicated by the **DEV** prefix) are measures integrated into the development of the product during its implementation. Development mitigations are checked by an evaluation team during a CPA evaluation.
- **Verification mitigations** (indicated by the **VER** prefix) are specific measures that an evaluator must test (or observe) during a CPA evaluation.
- **Deployment mitigations** (indicated by the **DEP** prefix) are specific measures that describe the deployment and operational control of the product. These are used by system administrators and users to ensure the product is securely deployed and used in practice, and form the basis of the Security Operating Procedures which are produced as part of the CPA evaluation.

Within each of the above categories, the mitigations are further grouped into the functional areas to which they relate (as outlined in Figure 2). The functional area for a designated group of mitigations is prefixed by double chevron characters ('>>'). For example, mitigations within a section that begins:

Development>>Management

- concern **Development** mitigations relating to the Management functional area of the product.

**Note:** Mitigations that apply to the **whole** product (rather than a functional area within it) are listed at the start of each section. These sections do **not** contain double chevron characters.

Terminology used in this Security Characteristic is based on definitions and descriptions in [P&P1].

Within this document the phrase 'device design information' means any information the product vendor provides that proves the implementation of the device is consistent with both its requirements and the contents of this Security Characteristic. This includes (but is not limited to) artefacts produced during product development (e.g., high level design, detailed design, test plans, test results, etc.), information about the development tools used and how they have been configured (for example, compiler settings) and details of any relevant external certifications (e.g., NIST, Common Criteria, etc.).

### 2.2 Understanding mitigations

Each of the mitigations listed in Section 3 of this document contain the following elements:

- The name of the mitigation. This will include a mitigation prefix (**DEV**, **VER** or **DEP**) and a unique reference number.
- A description of the threat (or threats) that the mitigation is designed to prevent or hinder. Threats are formatted in *italic text*.
- The explicit requirement (or group of requirements) that *must* be carried out. Requirements for foundation grade are formatted in **green text**.

In addition, certain mitigations may also contain additional explanatory text to clarify each of the foundation requirements, as illustrated in the following diagram.




Figure 3: Components of a typical mitigation

## 3 Requirements

This section lists the Development, Verification and Deployment mitigations for the Smart Metering Communications Hub Security Characteristic. For a summary of the changed mitigations in this version, please refer to Appendix D.

### 3.1 Development mitigations

#### **DEV.M42: Heap hardening**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error in the Communications Hub*

At Foundation Grade the product **should** use the memory management provided by the operating system. Products should not implement their own heap.

#### **DEV.M43: Stack protection**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error in the Communications Hub*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** be compiled with support for stack protection including all libraries, where the tool chain supports it.

If more recent versions of the tool chain support it for the target platform then they should be used in preference to a legacy tool chain.

#### **DEV.M321: Data Execution Prevention**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error in the Communications Hub*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** support Data Execution Prevention (DEP) when enabled on its hosting platform and must not opt out of DEP.

If the product is to be specifically deployed on a platform that does not support either Software DEP or Hardware-enforced DEP, there is no requirement for DEP compatibility.

#### **DEV.M340: Address Space Layout Randomisation**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error in the Communications Hub*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** be compiled with full support for ASLR, including all libraries used.

If the product is to be specifically deployed on an operating system that does not support ASLR, there is no requirement for ASLR compatibility.

Note: ASLR may be disabled for specific aspects of the product, provided there is justification of why this is required.

**DEV.M846: Secure failure recovery**

*This mitigation is required to counter disruption of a device by electromagnetic interference*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to employ measures to ensure secure restart of the device after failure.**

The device shall implement measures both to detect conditions that lead to failure and to recover automatically from such failures to a normal operating state by, as a minimum, executing the normal power-up sequence. This shall include ensuring that the state of the device leading up to the failure shall not compromise sensitive or security-critical data (e.g. the device shall prevent compromises arising from the memory state at the time of failure).

The recovery action shall also include verification of the integrity of the current firmware.

If any diagnostic information is preserved from failures then this shall not contain unencrypted sensitive data (or data that can be used to gain unauthorised access to sensitive data).

Design information shall describe the failure-related risks identified by the developer and the corresponding device behaviour implemented to deal with the corresponding failure cases in order to show that security is not compromised in such situations. Security activity in this context includes, as a minimum, those defined in the glossary entry for Failure-related activity.

The device design information shall include:

- a description of how the device provides reliable recovery from any foreseeable errors, the process for recovery (and its impact on normal operational processing, such as recording consumption data and receiving messages) and any error conditions in which it will no longer operate.
- a description of the power-up process, the self-tests that take place automatically (without requiring operator intervention) during this process, and the results of encountering an error or failure at any point in this process. The evaluator shall confirm that, after installation, the power-up process does not allow the device to be launched into any mode other than the normal operating mode (e.g. no access is granted to diagnostic or recovery functions, including engineering menus, other than those permitted via the interfaces in [b]).

## DEV.M926: Protected software environment

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to implement software protection measures as part of the design process.**

The device design information shall describe the process environment in the device in order to allow the evaluator to identify any defensive or robustness mechanisms provided by the platform or OS.

The developer shall provide evidence to demonstrate device firmware compliance with MISRA rules for C (or equivalent for the target language), by application of an appropriately configured static analysis tool. Where the target language is C, MISRA 2012 or later must be used (and, where supported by the static analysis tool, include the additional rules introduced in MISRA:C 2012 Amendment 1). Where the target language is not C, the developer shall demonstrate equivalence by mapping each rule onto the equivalent criterion for the target language, accompanied by the method of demonstrating that the criterion has been met.

The developer shall provide a rationale for how the device firmware protects against stack and heap corruption. Stack protection is typically expected to be provided via a compiler option that uses canaries to protect against a function's return address being overwritten. Whether or not such a compiler option is used, the stack protection implementation needs to comply with the "Stack Protection Expectations" appendix in this document

The developer shall demonstrate that they review all device firmware against a checklist of security flaws, including known vulnerabilities, in other versions of the product or its components (e.g. where 3rd party software/hardware is used), and known vulnerabilities in similar devices. The developer shall describe the coding standards and other quality checks made on 3rd party components and the rationale for why these achieve an equivalent level of quality to the developer's own processes. Note: Aspects of this requirement should be covered by the developer's ongoing Build Standard compliance obligations.

## DEV.M936: Function Separation

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error in the Communications Hub*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to protect resources used by CHF and GPF from unauthorised access.**

The protection must ensure there is no unauthorised access to either Function's assets from the other Function or any other functionality on the Communications Hub.

This must include protecting access to the firmware (loaded and any firmware image waiting to be loaded).

To clarify, the following GPF assets must not be accessible from the CHF or other Communications Hub functionality, except through authorised channels:

- Operational Data, including Personal Data stored by the GPF.

Similarly, the following CHF assets must not be accessible from the GPF or other Communications Hub functionality, except through authorised channels:

- Configuration Data, including the CHF Device Log;
- Communications Buffers used in the CHF for GSME messages and WAN messages.

As firmware updates are managed by the Communications hub, the developer needs to explain the measures its product takes to mitigate against a compromised Communications hub from modifying firmware in a manner which can affect GPF functionality and/or assets. It is likely that developer test evidence will also be required to demonstrate the effectiveness of the separation mechanism, illustrating a situation in which a potential breach of separation is trapped.

## DEV.1 - Development >> CHF

### DEV.1.1 - Development >> CHF >> Interface Protection

#### DEV.1.1.M44: Data validation on untrusted input

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an additional interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to validate all inputs before attempting to process them.**

For example, malformed and random inputs must not cause insecure behaviour.

In normal operation, when a message specified in [d] is delivered via any interface, data validation, as specified by [d] for the type of message in question, must be applied.

When a message not specified in [d] is delivered via any interface (in particular on the additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'), data validation, as specified by the manufacturer for the type of message in question, must be applied. Where the device is capable of processing messages not specified in [d] the manufacturer must demonstrate the measures in place to ensure these cannot be used to undermine device security.

#### DEV.1.1.M273: General resource management

*This mitigation is required to counter flooding the device with messages from the HAN*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to protect against instability when processing incoming network traffic.**

The developer shall provide a rationale to show that large amounts of incoming network traffic do not cause the device to crash or suffer a general failure resulting in loss of functionality (apart from temporarily losing external communications).

#### DEV.1.1.M847: Minimise interfaces

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an additional interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to ensure that only necessary protocols and services are available on the device.**

The developer shall provide a list of all types of interface ('operational', 'non-operational', and 'additional') present on the device. Where a device provides additional functionality, beyond that required to meet the functional requirements detailed in [b], [d] and [e], via additional protocols and services, the developer shall provide details of the functionality with an associated analysis that clearly indicates where security impacting functionality can occur. Where such additional functionality is present and has the potential to be security impacting, its unauthorised use shall be protected against using security mechanisms at least as strong as those in [d] that protect against unauthorised use of critical commands, using the same RBAC model. As a guide, "security impacting functionality" here is that functionality that would have the same material impact as a GBCS "critical command" (e.g. with the SME.C.C categorisation).



### **DEV.1.1.M873: Disable non-operational logical and physical interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to prevent unauthorised access to all physical and logical interfaces that are not required for normal operation.**

If the device has interfaces other than those supporting normal operation (and that are therefore not governed by the RBAC mechanism), then design information shall explain how these interfaces are either:

- a) disabled for normal operation, or
- b) cannot be used to undermine device security - developer provided rationale required.

It must not be possible to re-enable any disabled interfaces outside the tamper-protection boundary without first breaching the tamper-protection boundary and physically modifying the device in a way that would be detectable via subsequent inspection within the tamper-protection boundary.

Interfaces within the tamper-protection boundary must ensure that their use requires physical modification that would be visible to subsequent inspection within the tamper-protection boundary. This does not apply to bespoke or complex physical connectors although the developer provided rationale must include any such interfaces that are easily accessible.

Device design information shall specify any roles and associated interfaces that are supported in any stage of the device lifecycle (e.g. before installation or after decommissioning). The device design information shall include a complete definition of the logical and physical interfaces (such that the information could be used to create a test tool that will exercise all parts of the interface, with an ability to define expected results for any communication).

### **DEV.1.1.M947: Mutual authentication on the WAN**

*This mitigation is required to counter connection to CHF with an incorrect WAN*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to mutually authenticate with the WAN Provider prior to communications with Remote Parties.**

Mutual authentication shall be successfully completed between the CHF and the WAN Service Provider before any communications with Remote Parties. The WAN Service Provider will issue security credentials to enable this to take place.

The CHF shall only establish and maintain a Communications Link via its WAN Interface with the Wide Area Network Provider for the premises in which it is installed and shall not be capable of establishing a Communications Link via its WAN Interface with any other entity.

### **DEV.1.1.M949: Secure Inter-PAN connection**

*This mitigation is required to counter sending commands on an unauthorised Inter-PAN connection*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to only enable ZigBee Inter-PAN temporarily on power-up and only allow authorised connections.**

The communications hub shall only enable Inter-PAN joining after power-up for a short period, defined in [e, 4.4.7], to enable an authorised HHT to establish a secure connection as specified in [d, 10.5] for installation or maintenance. (When (but only when) Virtual WAN capability is supported by the communications hub then the use of Inter-PAN shall include the Inter-PAN joining of a VWD as an HHT, as described in [d, 10.9].)

### **DEV.1.1.M950: Protect configuration**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to ensure that operational configuration changes cannot be made without using operational interfaces.**

Design information shall describe how the device prevents unauthorised changes to the configuration data. In particular it shall describe how configuration data is protected from unauthorised changes via any additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'.



## DEV.1.2 - Development >> CHF >> Logging

### DEV.1.2.M940: Security alerts

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** send alerts for security-related events and error conditions.

The device shall send the alerts identified in [d, 16] to the recipients specified in [d, 16].

### DEV.1.2.M941: Security logging

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** ensure Sensitive Events, security failures and other security events are recorded in the Security Log.

The device shall record entries in the Security Log as identified in [d, 16]. Where the entry relates to a command, the command and outcome details shall be recorded in the entry. All entries shall include the UTC date and time of the event.

(For clarity it is noted that this requirement does not imply that all commands must be logged, only that relevant details must be included in all cases where a log entry is made).

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** prevent modification or deletion of entries in the Security Log.

The device shall not allow entries in the Security Log to be modified, nor deleted other than by the normal overwriting action of the circular log buffer.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** provide capacity for at least 100 entries in the Security Log.

If the developer is logging events in the Security Log beyond those identified in [d, 16], they shall provide a rationale that the size of the Security Log is sufficient for normal operation, to reduce the risk of entries being overwritten before they have been retrieved.

## DEV.1.3 - Development >> CHF >> Message Protection

### DEV.1.3.M134: State raw entropy requirements

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to a weak Entropy Source*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** have clearly defined entropy requirements for all operational random number generation.

Device design information shall specify all cryptographic keys employed by the device (including any that are not required for normal operation), and their method of generation or installation.

The developer must state how much raw entropy is required from the product's entropy source (for example, which is used to reseed the PRNG), based on analysis of all security-related random numbers used in the device, including any generated keys. It shall be at least 128 bits as required by the elliptic curve-based asymmetric mechanisms using the P-256 curve, assuming no other security features of the device have significant entropy requirements.

### **DEV.1.3.M140: Smooth output of Entropy Source with approved PRNG**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to insufficient raw entropy reaching the PRNG*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to ensure that all random data used originate from a PRNG that is seeded by an approved entropy source.**

The device design information shall include a description of how the output from all Entropy Sources and their associated PRNG can generate sufficient entropy for all keys and random numbers used in the product's regular operation including, where applicable, demonstrations of conformance to relevant standards such as the NIST SP800-90 series.

Note: The PRNG implementation may be based on standards other than the NIST SP800-90 series if it is believed they provide an equivalent level of security; if so, the rationale for this will need to have been agreed with the CPA Authority beforehand.

Device design information shall also describe how the entropy in PRNG's state will persist for any power-loss / device restart scenarios.

For more details about which key pairs need to be generated by the product, see [d, 4].

### **DEV.1.3.M141: Reseed PRNG as required**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to insufficient raw entropy reaching the PRNG*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to follow an approved reseeding methodology.**

For instance, if a SP 800-90 series compliant DRBG is being used, the product must implement the reseed mechanism recommended by the relevant SP 800-90 series document.

Reseeds of the PRNG should be performed at least once a month or immediately prior to generating a new random number (e.g. as part of generating a new key), provided, in the latter case, this does not significantly impact on the time taken to generate the random number.

### **DEV.1.3.M290: Employ an approved Entropy Source**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to a weak Entropy Source*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to generate random bits using an Entropy Source whose entropy generation capability is understood.**

The developer must provide a detailed description of the Entropy Source used, giving evidence that it can generate sufficient entropy for each use of random numbers in the device, including an estimate of entropy per bit. The Entropy Source should be implemented according to guidance in relevant standards such as the NIST SP800-90 series.

If a hardware noise source is used, then the manufacturer's name, the part numbers and details of how this source is integrated into the product must be supplied. If a software Entropy Source is employed, the API calls used must be provided. Where appropriate, details must be given of how the outputs of multiple Entropy Sources are combined.

The device design information shall include an analysis of each noise source used for generating cryptographic keys, detailing the amount of entropy believed to be obtained from this source. This analysis should be supported by relevant datasheets, API specifications and results from the developer testing, as appropriate.

Where devices or functions are used that are not dedicated noise sources (for instance, A-D converters), analysis will additionally need to demonstrate that the improvised device or function will reliably provide a stated level of entropy for the operational environments the product may be deployed in. Factors that should be considered vary on the type of improvised noise source but could for instance involve (a) differences in temperature and humidity between the test lab and operational environment, (b) how predictable any input sampled by the improvised device might be in practice.

Important: Entropy measurements are performed on the raw data sampled, i.e. before any subsequent processing of that data that could result in the sampled data being scrambled in a manner that distorts the measured entropy.

**DEV.1.3.M349: Sanitise temporary variables**

*This mitigation is required to counter reading non-sanitised sensitive data from memory*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** sanitise temporary variables containing sensitive information as soon as no longer required.

The sensitive information shall include private and secret keys, and the Shared Secret for key agreement. This applies to both volatile and non-volatile memory.

Sanitising a variable must consist of at least one complete overwrite.

**DEV.1.3.M853: Prevent unauthorised changes to future-dated actions**

*This mitigation is required to counter future-dated actions not being carried out at the specified time*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised addition, modification or removal of a future action*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** carry out relevant future-dated actions at the time specified.

The device design information will describe why a future-dated command will execute at the future time, according to [d, 9], regardless of other events that the device is expected to encounter that could conceivably impact when a future-dated action may occur (such as the device rebooting or a clock change taking place).

When the device clock is updated it shall neither miss nor repeat actions previously stored for future action nor miss calendar-based events.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** ensure that only authentic messages can cause a future-dated command to be added.

The device shall ensure that a future-dated message can only be added by receipt of a message from a source that is authorised to send that message type.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** ensure that only authentic messages can cause a future-dated command to be deleted, replaced or modified.

The device shall ensure that a future-dated message can only be modified, replaced or cancelled by receipt of another message of the same type from a source that is authorised to send that message type, or on change of control of the device.

**DEV.1.3.M855: Receiver replay check**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and replay of messages*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** check that messages are not actioned more than once.

The device shall protect against replayed messages causing the same action to be carried out more than once.

The mechanism for protection against replay is defined in [d, 4.3]. Only certain messages require the protection, as specified in the Use Cases in [d, 19], summarised in [d, Table 20]. However, a different anti-replay mechanism is used for Security Credential commands as defined in [d, 13], and for Pre-Payment Top-Ups as defined in [d, 14].

**DEV.1.3.M887: Encrypt sensitive data in messages prior to transmission**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception of messages on WAN*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** protect the confidentiality of sensitive data in commands, responses and alerts.

Any command or response data that is sensitive shall be encrypted for the whole of its path to or from the device. Data to be encrypted is specified in [d, 19.3]. The encryption shall be as specified in [d, 8].

### **DEV.1.3.M911: Self-test of RNG**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to a weak RNG*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to carry out self-testing of RNG output.**

The developer shall provide a description of the self-testing performed by the random number generator and why they consider the implemented tests are adequate.

For clarity, the self-tests are expected to be applied to the output of the Entropy Source (checking the final RNG output shall be covered by Evaluation/Cryptocheck of the PRNG, under the VER requirements in this Security Characteristic).

Note: Where a NIST SP800-90 series compliant PRNG is used by the product, the self-tests required by these standards are expected to be implemented.

### **DEV.1.3.M913: Command, response and alert integrity protection**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and modification of commands, responses or alerts*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to protect authenticity of security credentials.**

The device shall not allow unauthorised replacement or modification of stored security credentials.

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to protect integrity of commands, responses and alerts.**

Critical messages shall be protected by digital signature of the sender; critical and non-critical messages that comply with [d, 4.3.3] shall be protected by MAC using a key shared with the broker. If the MAC or signature on a message is not valid then that message shall be rejected by the recipient without executing the actions requested by the message, and without sending a response. The device shall implement the detailed integrity protection requirements specified in [d, 4.3.3].

Where other commands provide functionality beyond that detailed in [b], [d] and [e], the developers must provide the evaluators with design documentation and a rationale to demonstrate that it doesn't impact the security requirements in this Security Characteristic.

### **DEV.1.3.M914: Demonstrate authenticity of critical responses and alerts**

*This mitigation is required to counter creation of malicious response or alert messages*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to protect the authenticity of critical responses and alerts.**

Critical responses and alerts sent by the device shall be signed by the device under its private signing key, as specified in [d].

**DEV.1.3.M927: Check only valid messages accepted**

*This mitigation is required to counter circumventing message signature protection by entering messages via other interfaces*

*This mitigation is required to counter creation of unauthorised commands*

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of stored data in the device*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** verify that any message received on an additional interface is a valid message for that device from an authentic source that is authorised to perform the operation.

If there is any additional functionality provided in the device beyond that required to meet the functional requirements detailed in [b], [d] and [e], the developers must provide the evaluators with design documentation and a rationale to demonstrate that messages received are validated, authenticated and authorised using mechanism(s) that the evaluators determine to be suitably robust, and that the functionality available does not impact the security requirements in this Security Characteristic. In particular this shall address all additional interfaces identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'.

Any message that fails a validity check shall be discarded without execution.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** verify that any message received on an operational interface is a valid message for that device from an authentic source that is authorised to perform the operation.

The device shall not accept messages that do not conform to those defined for the device in the Use Cases listed in [d, 19.3] and shall ensure that all messages are subject to the cryptographic and other validity checks in [d, 6.2.4], [d, 6.3.4].

This requirement includes messages received from a Hand-Held Terminal.

Any message that fails a validity check shall be discarded without execution.

The device shall not provide alternative methods of carrying out operations that avoid the need to establish authorisation.

**DEV.1.3.M930: Protect WAN message buffer**

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of messages buffered on communications hub for WAN*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** protect messages queued for the WAN in the communications hub buffer.

Messages that are queued in the buffer on the communications hub while awaiting delivery to the WAN, must be protected against modification and removal.

Developer design documentation must include details of how messages are overwritten or discarded once the buffer is full (bearing in mind the priorities for messages specified in [e, 4.4.4]), as well as a rationale to justify the size of the buffer and demonstrate that it is sufficient for normal operation.

**DEV.1.3.M931: Protect GSME message buffer**

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of commands buffered on communications hub for GSME*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** protect commands queued for the GSME in the communications hub buffer.

Commands that are queued in the buffer on the communications hub while awaiting retrieval by the GSME, must be protected against modification and removal.

However, if the GSME fails to retrieve a command within the period defined in [d, 10.3] the CHF may discard the command and inform the GPF which will raise an alert.

Developer design documentation must include details of how messages are overwritten or discarded once the buffer is full as well as a rationale to justify the size of the buffer and demonstrate that it is sufficient for normal operation.

### **DEV.1.3.M932: Use allow-list before routing messages**

*This mitigation is required to counter creation of unauthorised commands, responses or alerts*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to check that messages are from a device on the allow-list or the WAN interface, and to a device on the allow-list or WAN interface.**

Commands, Responses, and Alerts being routed by the communications hub must have come from a Device in the CHF Device Log or from the WAN Interface for delivery to another Device in the CHF Device Log or to the WAN Interface.

### **DEV.1.3.M939: Enable update of security credentials**

*This mitigation is required to counter use of compromised security credentials*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to enable remote update of security credentials.**

The device shall provide the ability to update security credentials, and this shall be subject to the normal message security checks, and shall be confined to authorised roles/sources only.

Update of each security credential shall be atomic (it shall either complete successfully with complete replacement of all parts of the relevant credential or else shall retain the old credential).

## **DEV.1.4 - Development >> CHF >> Sensitive Data Protection**

### **DEV.1.4.M934: Unique security data per device**

*This mitigation is required to counter gaining access to security data in a single device (via either operational or non-operational interfaces)*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to contain no security data that enables compromise of a different device.**

Devices shall not contain data which if compromised would directly enable an attacker to compromise one or more other devices deployed in different premises (such as shared keys that would enable the attacker to masquerade as a different device, or a different core device). This requirement applies to all life-cycle stages of the product, following manufacture, and applies to all the interfaces, including any additional to those defined in [d] and all additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces', both external to and within the product's tamper boundary.

## **DEV.1.5 - Development >> CHF >> Virtual WAN**

### **DEV.1.5.M501: VWD interface limitation**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade a non-VWCH product **is required not to accept any EnableVWD command and not to attempt to establish a Virtual WAN Device tunnel.**

Any CH that does not support virtual WAN capability (and which is not evaluated against the VW capability variant mitigations):

- shall not accept an EnableVWD command on any interface
- shall not establish a tunnel associated with a ProtocolID of 0 (i.e. it shall not establish a tunnel that can be used as a Virtual WAN Communications Link – cf. the description of establishing WAN proxy operation in [GBCS, 10.9.3]).

No evaluator action is required for this mitigation in the case of a VWCH that is being evaluated against the VW capability variant mitigations.

### **DEV.1.5.M502: (VW capability ONLY) VWD joining**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to allow a VWD to join only as an HHT (via Inter-PAN) or as a PPMID or Type 2 Device.**

The VWCH shall only accept an EnableVWD command for a device that has been added to the CHF Device Log as an HHT or as a PPMID or Type 2 Device.

**DEV.1.5.M503: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Mode activation**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to activate Virtual WAN Mode only after receipt of a valid EnableVWD command.**

Virtual WAN Mode is active after a VWCH has received a valid EnableVWD command and has successfully established the tunnel (associated with a ProtocolID of 0) that provides the Virtual WAN Communications Link with the VWD specified in the EnableVWD command. The VWCH shall only operate in Virtual WAN Mode and use the Virtual WAN Communications Link after receiving a valid EnableVWD command. Validation of the EnableVWD command shall include checking that:

- a) The Business Target ID in the command matches the device's Entity Identifier
- b) The Message Code is recognised as correct for the EnableVWD command
- c) The Business Originator ID is the wanProvider
- d) The message payload conforms to the expected structure
- e) The ACB MAC is verified as in [d, 6.2.4.1.2]
- f) The message includes a wanProvider signature that is verified according to [d, 6.3.4]
- g) The Originator Counter demonstrates the conditions for 'Protection Against Replay' as in [d, 6.2.4.2].

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to replace the VWD in use if it receives a subsequent, valid EnableVWD command.**

If a subsequent, valid EnableVWD is received by the VWCH then it shall replace the previous VWD details with the VWD details from the new message: a VWCH shall not support more than one VWD at a time.

The VWCH shall define the rules for handling any current communications in order to achieve a graceful transition to the replacement VWD (e.g. to resolve any partial GBT message sets or image transfers).

**DEV.1.5.M504: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Communications Link activation**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised access to messages exchanged with the VWP*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to activate the Virtual WAN Communications Link only after establishing keys with the Virtual WAN Provider.**

After an EnableVWD command has been received and validated then the VWCH shall accept only key agreement messages over the Virtual WAN Communications Link until the VWCH has established cryptographic keys with the Virtual WAN Provider in accordance with the DLMS CH Profile [I]. All subsequent messages shall use the keys to protect the message in accordance with the DLMS CH Profile [I].

The VWCH shall authenticate the VWP based on valid signing of a VWP certificate by the WAN Provider.

If a VWD is replaced by a subsequent, valid EnableVWD then it shall require a new key agreement between the VWCH and the VWP.



### **DEV.1.5.M505: (VW capability ONLY) WAN interface maintenance**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

*This mitigation is required to counter WAN message disruption*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** maintain the link used for the WAN interface according to the WAN Selection Arrangements.

After a valid EnableVWD has been accepted by the VWCH, at any subsequent point in time the VWCH shall determine whether the WAN Communications Link or the Virtual WAN Communications Link is active using the switching parameters and according to the WAN Selection Arrangements (see [m]).

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** preserve any pending actions when switching the active WAN link.

If any actions are pending (including alerts, events to log, and future-dated command execution) at the time the active WAN link is switched then these shall be preserved and executed after the switch.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** ignore all messages except link maintenance messages on the non-active link.

Link maintenance messages (i.e. messages that check the availability of the link for use as determined by the WAN Selection Arrangements) may be accepted on the non-active link, as specified in [GBCS, 10.9.3.2].

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** prevent unauthorised modification of the VWAN parameters.

VWAN parameters are attributes associated with the 'VWAN' DMM DLMS object as specified in [k, Annex 2]. Commands to update VWAN parameters shall only be accepted from the WANProvider and shall be signed by the WANProvider. The VWCH shall check that:

- a) the Business Target ID in the message is the VWCH itself
- b) the Business Originator ID is the wanProvider.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** discard any partially downloaded firmware images that are present when the active WAN link is switched.

The VWCH shall log an event and send an alert for any discarded image. (For clarity: this applies to images that are in the process of being downloaded to the VWCH, whether those images are intended to be applied to the VWCH itself or are for the VWCH to distribute subsequently to other Devices on the HAN. Any images that have been completely downloaded to the VWCH at the time of switching are unaffected (i.e. not discarded).)

### **DEV.1.5.M506: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH events and alerts**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** log an event and send an alert whenever the WAN interface link is changed.

The event and alert shall be generated when switching from WAN communications link to Virtual WAN Communications Link, or vice versa. The alert shall be sent to the Device Manager, over the newly activated WAN interface (i.e. after switching), and the event shall be recorded in the CHF Event Log (see [k, Annex 4]) and the alert shall be as specified in [k, 3.10].

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** log and send alerts for security events related to validation failures of the EnableVWD command and VWAN configuration update messages to the CHF Security Log.

Validation failure events shall include those arising from GBCS events that are relevant to the EnableVWD command (e.g. those arising from checking the MAC Header and Grouping Header) (cf. [k, Annex 4]), which shall use the appropriate GBCS event code and log. Alerts shall be sent to the appropriate recipients (based on [d] and [k]).



**DEV.1.5.M544: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH data validation on untrusted input**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to validate all Virtual WAN communications inputs before attempting to process them.**

The requirements of DEV.1.1.M44 are extended to include Virtual WAN communications relating to use of a tunnel associated with a ProtocolID of 0 (i.e. a tunnel that can be used as a virtual WAN communications link) and to DM messages including the EnableVWD command and the updating of VWAN parameters.

**DEV.2 - Development >> GPF****DEV.2.1 - Development >> GPF >> Interface Protection****DEV.2.1.M44: Data validation on untrusted input**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an additional interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to validate all inputs before attempting to process them.**

For example, malformed and random inputs must not cause insecure behaviour.

In normal operation, when a message specified in [d] is delivered via any interface, data validation, as specified by [d] for the type of message in question, must be applied.

When a message not specified in [d] is delivered via any interface (in particular on the additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'), data validation, as specified by the manufacturer for the type of message in question, must be applied. Where the device is capable of processing messages not specified in [d] the manufacturer must demonstrate the measures in place to ensure these cannot be used to undermine device security.

**DEV.2.1.M273: General resource management**

*This mitigation is required to counter flooding the device with messages from the HAN*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to protect against instability when processing incoming network traffic.**

The developer shall provide a rationale to show that large amounts of incoming network traffic do not cause the device to crash or suffer a general failure resulting in loss of functionality (apart from temporarily losing external communications).

**DEV.2.1.M847: Minimise interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an additional interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to ensure that only necessary protocols and services are available on the device.**

The developer shall provide a list of all types of interface ('operational', 'non-operational', and 'additional') present on the device. Where a device provides additional functionality, beyond that required to meet the functional requirements detailed in [b], [d] and [e], via additional protocols and services, the developer shall provide details of the functionality with an associated analysis that clearly indicates where security impacting functionality can occur. Where such additional functionality is present and has the potential to be security impacting, its unauthorised use shall be protected against using security mechanisms at least as strong as those in [d] that protect against unauthorised use of critical commands, using the same RBAC model. As a guide, "security impacting functionality" here is that functionality that would have the same material impact as a GBCS "critical command" (e.g. with the SME.C.C categorisation).

### **DEV.2.1.M873: Disable non-operational logical and physical interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to prevent unauthorised access to all physical and logical interfaces that are not required for normal operation.**

If the device has interfaces other than those supporting normal operation (and that are therefore not governed by the RBAC mechanism), then design information shall explain how these interfaces are either:

- a) disabled for normal operation, or
- b) cannot be used to undermine device security - developer provided rationale required.

It must not be possible to re-enable any disabled interfaces outside the tamper-protection boundary without first breaching the tamper-protection boundary and physically modifying the device in a way that would be detectable via subsequent inspection within the tamper-protection boundary.

Interfaces within the tamper-protection boundary must ensure that their use requires physical modification that would be visible to subsequent inspection within the tamper-protection boundary. This does not apply to bespoke or complex physical connectors although the developer provided rationale must include any such interfaces that are easily accessible.

Device design information shall specify any roles and associated interfaces that are supported in any stage of the device lifecycle (e.g. before installation or after decommissioning). The device design information shall include a complete definition of the logical and physical interfaces (such that the information could be used to create a test tool that will exercise all parts of the interface, with an ability to define expected results for any communication).

### **DEV.2.1.M950: Protect configuration**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to ensure that operational configuration changes cannot be made without using operational interfaces.**

Design information shall describe how the device prevents unauthorised changes to the configuration data. In particular it shall describe how configuration data is protected from unauthorised changes via any additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'.

## **DEV.2.2 - Development >> GPF >> Logging**

### **DEV.2.2.M940: Security alerts**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to send alerts for security-related events and error conditions.**

The device shall send the alerts identified in [d, 16] to the recipients specified in [d, 16].

**DEV.2.2.M941: Security logging**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to ensure Sensitive Events, security failures and other security events are recorded in the Security Log.**

The device shall record entries in the Security Log as identified in [d, 16]. Where the entry relates to a command, the command and outcome details shall be recorded in the entry. All entries shall include the UTC date and time of the event.

(For clarity it is noted that this requirement does not imply that all commands must be logged, only that relevant details must be included in all cases where a log entry is made).

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to prevent modification or deletion of entries in the Security Log.**

The device shall not allow entries in the Security Log to be modified, nor deleted other than by the normal overwriting action of the circular log buffer.

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to provide capacity for at least 100 entries in the Security Log.**

If the developer is logging events in the Security Log beyond those identified in [d, 16], they shall provide a rationale that the size of the Security Log is sufficient for normal operation, to reduce the risk of entries being overwritten before they have been retrieved.

**DEV.2.3 - Development >> GPF >> Message Protection****DEV.2.3.M134: State raw entropy requirements**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to a weak Entropy Source*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to have clearly defined entropy requirements for all operational random number generation.**

Device design information shall specify all cryptographic keys employed by the device (including any that are not required for normal operation), and their method of generation or installation.

The developer must state how much raw entropy is required from the product's entropy source (for example, which is used to reseed the PRNG), based on analysis of all security-related random numbers used in the device, including any generated keys. It shall be at least 128 bits as required by the elliptic curve-based asymmetric mechanisms using the P-256 curve, assuming no other security features of the device have significant entropy requirements.

**DEV.2.3.M140: Smooth output of Entropy Source with approved PRNG**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to insufficient raw entropy reaching the PRNG*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to ensure that all random data used originate from a PRNG that is seeded by an approved entropy source.**

The device design information shall include a description of how the output from all Entropy Sources and their associated PRNG can generate sufficient entropy for all keys and random numbers used in the product's regular operation including, where applicable, demonstrations of conformance to relevant standards such as the NIST SP800-90 series.

Note: The PRNG implementation may be based on standards other than the NIST SP800-90 series if it is believed they provide an equivalent level of security; if so, the rationale for this will need to have been agreed with the CPA Authority beforehand.

Device design information shall also describe how the entropy in PRNG's state will persist for any power-loss / device restart scenarios.

For more details about which key pairs need to be generated by the product, see [d, 4].

### **DEV.2.3.M141: Reseed PRNG as required**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to insufficient raw entropy reaching the PRNG*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to follow an approved reseeding methodology.**

For instance, if a SP 800-90 series compliant DRBG is being used, the product must implement the reseed mechanism recommended by the relevant SP 800-90 series document.

Reseeds of the PRNG should be performed at least once a month or immediately prior to generating a new random number (e.g. as part of generating a new key), provided, in the latter case, this does not significantly impact on the time taken to generate the random number.

### **DEV.2.3.M290: Employ an approved Entropy Source**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to a weak Entropy Source*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to generate random bits using an Entropy Source whose entropy generation capability is understood.**

The developer must provide a detailed description of the Entropy Source used, giving evidence that it can generate sufficient entropy for each use of random numbers in the device, including an estimate of entropy per bit. The Entropy Source should be implemented according to guidance in relevant standards such as the NIST SP800-90 series.

If a hardware noise source is used, then the manufacturer's name, the part numbers and details of how this source is integrated into the product must be supplied. If a software Entropy Source is employed, the API calls used must be provided. Where appropriate, details must be given of how the outputs of multiple Entropy Sources are combined.

The device design information shall include an analysis of each noise source used for generating cryptographic keys, detailing the amount of entropy believed to be obtained from this source. This analysis should be supported by relevant datasheets, API specifications and results from the developer testing, as appropriate.

Where devices or functions are used that are not dedicated noise sources (for instance, A-D converters), analysis will additionally need to demonstrate that the improvised device or function will reliably provide a stated level of entropy for the operational environments the product may be deployed in. Factors that should be considered vary on the type of improvised noise source but could for instance involve (a) differences in temperature and humidity between the test lab and operational environment, (b) how predictable any input sampled by the improvised device might be in practice.

Important: Entropy measurements are performed on the raw data sampled, i.e. before any subsequent processing of that data that could result in the sampled data being scrambled in a manner that distorts the measured entropy.

### **DEV.2.3.M349: Sanitise temporary variables**

*This mitigation is required to counter reading non-sanitised sensitive data from memory*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to sanitise temporary variables containing sensitive information as soon as no longer required.**

The sensitive information shall include private and secret keys, and the Shared Secret for key agreement. This applies to both volatile and non-volatile memory.

Sanitising a variable must consist of at least one complete overwrite.

**DEV.2.3.M853: Prevent unauthorised changes to future-dated actions**

*This mitigation is required to counter future-dated actions not being carried out at the specified time*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised addition, modification or removal of a future action*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to carry out relevant future-dated actions at the time specified.**

The device design information will describe why a future-dated command will execute at the future time, according to [d, 9], regardless of other events that the device is expected to encounter that could conceivably impact when a future-dated action may occur (such as the device rebooting or a clock change taking place).

When the device clock is updated it shall neither miss nor repeat actions previously stored for future action nor miss calendar-based events.

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to ensure that only authentic messages can cause a future-dated command to be added.**

The device shall ensure that a future-dated message can only be added by receipt of a message from a source that is authorised to send that message type.

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to ensure that only authentic messages can cause a future-dated command to be deleted, replaced or modified.**

The device shall ensure that a future-dated message can only be modified, replaced or cancelled by receipt of another message of the same type from a source that is authorised to send that message type, or on change of control of the device.

**DEV.2.3.M855: Receiver replay check**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and replay of messages*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to check that messages are not actioned more than once.**

The device shall protect against replayed messages causing the same action to be carried out more than once.

The mechanism for protection against replay is defined in [d, 4.3]. Only certain messages require the protection, as specified in the Use Cases in [d, 19], summarised in [d, Table 20]. However, a different anti-replay mechanism is used for Security Credential commands as defined in [d, 13], and for Pre-Payment Top-Ups as defined in [d, 14].

**DEV.2.3.M887: Encrypt sensitive data in messages prior to transmission**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception of messages on WAN*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to protect the confidentiality of sensitive data in commands, responses and alerts.**

Any command or response data that is sensitive shall be encrypted for the whole of its path to or from the device. Data to be encrypted is specified in [d, 19.3]. The encryption shall be as specified in [d, 8].

**DEV.2.3.M911: Self-test of RNG**

*This mitigation is required to counter prediction of randomly generated values due to a weak RNG*

**At Foundation Grade the product is required to carry out self-testing of RNG output.**

The developer shall provide a description of the self-testing performed by the random number generator and why they consider the implemented tests are adequate.

For clarity, the self-tests are expected to be applied to the output of the Entropy Source (checking the final RNG output shall be covered by Evaluation/Cryptocheck of the PRNG, under the VER requirements in this Security Characteristic).

Note: Where a NIST SP800-90 series compliant PRNG is used by the product, the self-tests required by these standards are expected to be implemented.

### **DEV.2.3.M913: Command, response and alert integrity protection**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and modification of commands, responses or alerts*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** protect authenticity of security credentials.

The device shall not allow unauthorised replacement or modification of stored security credentials.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** protect integrity of commands, responses and alerts.

Critical messages shall be protected by digital signature of the sender; critical and non-critical messages shall be protected by MAC using a key shared with the broker. If the MAC or signature on a message is not valid then that message shall be rejected by the recipient without executing the actions requested by the message, and without sending a response.

The device shall implement the detailed integrity protection requirements specified in [d, 4.3.3].

### **DEV.2.3.M914: Demonstrate authenticity of critical responses and alerts**

*This mitigation is required to counter creation of malicious response or alert messages*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** protect the authenticity of critical responses and alerts.

Critical responses and alerts sent by the device shall be signed by the device under its private signing key, as specified in [d].

### **DEV.2.3.M927: Check only valid messages accepted**

*This mitigation is required to counter circumventing message signature protection by entering messages via other interfaces*

*This mitigation is required to counter creation of unauthorised commands*

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of stored data in the device*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** verify that any message received on an additional interface is a valid message for that device from an authentic source that is authorised to perform the operation.

If there is any additional functionality provided in the device beyond that required to meet the functional requirements detailed in [b], [d] and [e], the developers must provide the evaluators with design documentation and a rationale to demonstrate that messages received are validated, authenticated and authorised using mechanism(s) that the evaluators determine to be suitably robust, and that the functionality available does not impact the security requirements in this Security Characteristic. In particular this shall address all additional interfaces identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'.

Any message that fails a validity check shall be discarded without execution.

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to** verify that any message received on an operational interface is a valid message for that device from an authentic source that is authorised to perform the operation.

The device shall not accept messages that do not conform to those defined for the device in the Use Cases listed in [d, 19.3] and shall ensure that all messages are subject to the cryptographic and other validity checks in [d, 6.2.4], [d, 6.3.4].

This requirement includes messages received from a Hand-Held Terminal.

Any message that fails a validity check shall be discarded without execution.

The device shall not provide alternative methods of carrying out operations that avoid the need to establish authorisation.



**DEV.2.3.M939: Enable update of security credentials**

*This mitigation is required to counter use of compromised security credentials*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to enable remote update of security credentials.**

The device shall provide the ability to update security credentials, and this shall be subject to the normal message security checks, and shall be confined to authorised roles/sources only.

Update of each security credential shall be atomic (it shall either complete successfully with complete replacement of all parts of the relevant credential or else shall retain the old credential).

**DEV.2.4 - Development >> GPF >> Sensitive Data Protection****DEV.2.4.M928: Restrict data on change of tenancy**

*This mitigation is required to counter reading previous tenants' information*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to prevent access to previous Personal Data.**

On receipt of a Restrict GPF Data command the device shall restrict provision to PPMID and Type 2 Devices of items of Personal Data stored in the GPF with a UTC date and time stamp prior to the date and time specified within the Command.

The specific items to which provision is restricted are identified in the Set Change of Tenancy date Use Case in [d, 19].

(For clarity: the data will still be available if the restriction date is changed, in response to an authorised command from the appropriate role.)

**DEV.2.4.M934: Unique security data per device**

*This mitigation is required to counter gaining access to security data in a single device (via either operational or non-operational interfaces)*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to contain no security data that enables compromise of a different device.**

Devices shall not contain data which if compromised would directly enable an attacker to compromise one or more other devices deployed in different premises (such as shared keys that would enable the attacker to masquerade as a different device, or a different core device). This requirement applies to all life-cycle stages of the product, following manufacture, and applies to all the interfaces, including any additional to those defined in [d] and all additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces', both external to and within the product's tamper boundary.

**DEV.3 - Development >> Firmware Protection****DEV.3.M863: Check authentic activation message required**

*This mitigation is required to counter causing unauthorised activation of authentic firmware*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to activate downloaded firmware only on receipt of an authentic activation command.**

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to activate only the version of the firmware identified in the activation command.**

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to record the version of its current executing firmware and of any firmware updates currently stored.**

**DEV.3.M866: Check firmware update signature**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised modification to a firmware update in transit*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to check a secure signature over downloaded firmware on receipt of the firmware update.**

If the signature check defined in [d, 11] fails then the firmware update shall be rejected. The failure shall be recorded in the Security Log as identified in [d, 16].



### **DEV.3.M902: Check firmware integrity before execution**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised modification to firmware in situ*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to check an integrity measure over the device firmware before execution.**

The device shall check the integrity of the firmware to be executed during power-on and during restart from failure (it is not necessary to perform the check when waking from a sleep state). The integrity check shall be at least as strong as a 32-bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC).

Where the device comprises more than one component with its own firmware, the firmware of each component shall be checked.

Where a failure of the integrity check occurs, the device shall record this in the Security Log as identified in [d, 16], and send an alert as identified in [d, 16] to the recipients specified in [d, 16].

## **DEV.4 - Development >> Physical Protection**

### **DEV.4.M849: Tamper response**

*This mitigation is required to counter access to structures inside the tamper-protection boundary of the device*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to send an alert and record a Security Log message on breach of tamper-protection boundary.**

Removing or opening any part of the tamper boundary that is designed to be separately removed or opened shall be detectable and cause the product to send an alert identified in [d, 16] to the recipients specified in [d, 16] and record an entry in the Security Log.

### **DEV.4.M897: Protection of security-related physical structure**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised physical access to security-critical data stored on the device*

At Foundation Grade the product **is required to ensure that physical access to processors and memory carrying sensitive data requires breach of the tamper-protection boundary.**

Device design information shall identify the 'tamper-protection boundary' that is protected against tampering, and the methods and mechanisms used to provide this protection. This boundary shall be clearly defined with respect to the physical boundary of the device, and with respect to the components that generate, process and store sensitive data, and that carry out cryptographic operations.

In this context, sensitive data is defined as cryptographic key material and the contents of the Data Store.

Device design information shall specify the physical ports and logical interfaces and all defined input and output paths that are available across the tamper-protection boundary.

Device design information shall specify all cryptographic keys employed by the device (including any that are not required for normal operation) and their storage locations, such that these can be identified as being inside the tamper-protection boundary.

## 3.2 Verification mitigations

### **VER.M846: Secure failure recovery**

*This mitigation is required to counter disruption of a device by electromagnetic interference*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** attempt to induce failures and observe correct recovery behaviour.

The evaluators shall verify by testing that all of a representative sample of the recognised error conditions are correctly handled. This sample shall include error conditions that do not arise directly as a result of input failures (examples of such a test might be a failure of the power-up firmware integrity verification check or other self-test, or corruption of internal state values; test equipment such as an emulator may therefore be used to enable these tests). The sample shall also include tests of the device's ability to recover from a communications overload (i.e. messages arriving at a rate that exceeds the device's ability to process them), and of the device's ability to resist and/or recover from electromagnetic interference (such as electrostatic discharge).

The evaluators shall provide a rationale that the sample is sufficiently representative, based on the design information relating to error handling.

The evaluator shall also seek evidence that the risk of potentially exploitable bugs in product code (in particular code handling remote incoming messages) will be robustly mitigated against, for instance by one or more product features detecting anomalous code behaviour and responding with a controlled restart.

The recovery action(s) shall be executed only using code that has passed the start-up integrity check for the current execution (since the last reset or power-on). Code that has failed the start-up integrity check shall not be run.

## VER.1 - Verify >> CHF

### VER.1.1 - Verify >> CHF >> Interface Protection

#### VER.1.1.M80: Protocol robustness testing

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an additional interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator will perform fuzz testing of the available interfaces.**

As per guidance in The CPA Policies and Procedures [a], structured fuzz testing is expected for all available interfaces, physical AND logical. Based on mandatory functional requirements in [d], the following two interfaces will always require fuzz testing: ZigBee and GBCS application layer messages.

For ZigBee, fuzz testing shall be performed on all the messages that can be received including those that are (a) unencrypted, (b) encrypted with the network key (and thus visible to all devices on the HAN) and (c) encrypted with an APS key set up to protect comms between the product and each other type of HAN device that is not required to be CPA-certified (at time of writing, PPMID, IHD and CAD).

When fuzz testing GBCS Application layer messages ('use cases'), mutations are expected to cover all parts of a message that the product will attempt to decode up to the point of authentication. The point of authentication for these messages (as relevant to [a], for smart metering equipment) is the point at which the protective crypt gets successfully validated (one or both of digital signature and MAC, dependent on the message type); any message decoding performed before this point (even just to check message well-formedness) will be in scope of GBCS Application layer fuzz testing. With this in mind, some message payload fuzz testing is expected (in addition to all the other sections of a GBCS Application layer message that can be present (i.e. GBT header, grouping header, signature field, etc), the amount of payload fuzz testing depending on how much of the message's payload gets decoded by the product before the point of authentication is reached. This minimum expectation is based on some GBCS application messages requiring content in the payload to be decoded and processed as part of the cryptographic validation process for the message type.

In addition to the ZigBee and GBCS application layer interfaces, it is possible that the device may have additional interfaces beyond those defined in [d] that might be accessible to an attacker and hence also require fuzz testing. In particular all additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces' require fuzz testing.

#### VER.1.1.M273: General resource management

*This mitigation is required to counter flooding the CHF with messages from the WAN*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator will verify that the device's behaviour is stable when processing incoming network traffic.**

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that large amounts of incoming network traffic do not cause the CHF to crash or suffer a general failure resulting in a denial of service (either through implementation weakness or simple resource exhaustion).

#### VER.1.1.M903: Verify disabled interfaces

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator will verify the state of each disabled interface.**

All disabled interfaces present in the operational state of the device (after installation) shall be identified and the disabled state of each shall be verified by visual inspection to verify that it is not possible to use the interface without breaching the tamper-boundary and making the required physical modifications.

The evaluator will ensure that justification has been provided for any interface that is not disabled.

**VER.1.1.M947: Mutual authentication on the WAN**

*This mitigation is required to counter connection to CHF with an incorrect WAN*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that connection to the WAN requires mutual authentication.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the CHF establishes the Communications Link to the WAN Service provider only after successfully completing mutual authentication using the provided security credentials.

**VER.1.1.M949: Secure Inter-PAN connection**

*This mitigation is required to counter sending commands on an unauthorised Inter-PAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that ZigBee Inter-PAN is only enabled temporarily on power-up and only allows authorised connections.

The evaluator shall verify that Inter-PAN joining is only enabled after power-up for the period defined in [e, 4.4.7].

The evaluator shall verify that only authorised devices are able to connect to the Inter-PAN as specified in [d, 10.5].

If the communications hub supports virtual WAN capability then the evaluator shall verify that joining of a VWD by Inter-PAN as in [d, 10.9] is supported. If the communications hub does not support virtual WAN capability then the evaluator shall verify that a device joining via Inter-PAN cannot proceed past establishment of 'HHT mode' as described in [d, 10.9.3.4].

**VER.1.2 - Verify >> CHF >> Logging****VER.1.2.M940: Security alerts**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm raising of alerts for security-related events and error conditions.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the device correctly raises the alerts defined in [d, 16] for security-related events and error conditions.

**VER.1.2.M941: Security logging**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm Security Log recording.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing the correct logging of each type of event that can be recorded in the Security Log as defined in [d, 16].

**VER.1.3 - Verify >> CHF >> Message Protection****VER.1.3.M4: Evaluation/Cryptocheck**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a cryptographic algorithm implementation error*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** ensure all cryptographic algorithms employed for security functionality have been validated as per the "Cryptography Review" section in the CPA Foundation Process document.

The evaluator shall include in this activity a confirmation (by reference to relevant CAVP or equivalent certificates, or by activities in the course of the CPA evaluation) that cryptographic algorithms used by the PRNG (such as DRBG) have been independently validated for correctness.

Where cryptographic algorithms claim certification under CAVP (or equivalent external certification), then the evaluator shall confirm that this certification has been achieved for the relevant hardware/firmware/software components of the product, at the relevant version for the component. For cryptographic algorithms that are not certified using an external process, the evaluator shall confirm the correctness of the implementation by means of known answer tests, as described in the CPA Policies and Procedures document, Reference [a].

The cryptographic primitives used by the device shall be only those specified in [d].

### **VER.1.3.M853: Prevent unauthorised changes to future-dated actions**

*This mitigation is required to counter future-dated actions not being carried out at the specified time  
This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised addition, modification or removal of a future action*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm device behaviour leading to cancellation of future-dated actions.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing:

- that when the device clock is updated it neither misses nor repeats actions previously stored for future action nor misses calendar-based events
- that a future-dated action can only be added, replaced, modified or cancelled by an authentic message from a source authorised to issue the command, and that a response is sent by the device, identifying the successful processing of the new command.

### **VER.1.3.M855: Receiver replay check**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and replay of messages*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that messages are not actioned more than once.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the device correctly rejects messages with unacceptable count values relative to its current state, and that the device correctly generates count values for which it is responsible. The testing shall cover both commands for immediate execution and future-dated commands (where applicable).

The mechanism for protection against replay is defined in [d, 4.3]. Only certain messages require the protection, as specified in the Use Cases in [d, 19], summarised in [d, Table 20]. However, a different anti-replay mechanism is used for Security Credential commands as defined in [d, 13], and for Pre-Payment Top-Ups as defined in [d, 14].

Notes:

- Evidence is required for ALL commands that incorporate replay protection.
- When testing the anti-replay protection for Pre-Payment Top-Ups (where applicable), the evaluator shall verify that Pre-Payment Top-Up messages are rejected if its UTRN counter value (a) matches any value in the device's UTRN counter cache or (b) is lower than the lowest value in the device's UTRN counter cache. These tests will also cover all the interfaces over which the device can receive a UTRN.

### **VER.1.3.M887: Encrypt sensitive data in messages prior to transmission**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception of messages on WAN*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify encryption of sensitive data in commands, responses and alerts.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the device correctly encrypts the sensitive data specified in [d, 19.3] in accordance with the encryption mechanisms specified in [d, 8].

### **VER.1.3.M904: Confirm standard protocol certification**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of incorrect protocol implementation*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm standard protocol certification of the device has been successfully completed.

The device shall be certified as specified in this document in section 1.6 Interoperability.

### **VER.1.3.M927: Check only valid messages accepted**

*This mitigation is required to counter creation of unauthorised commands*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that critical commands are not executed if the sender of the command cannot be successfully authenticated or is not authorised to send that command.

The evaluator will attempt to issue critical commands that should be rejected. This will include commands sent from an unauthorised sender, and a non-authentic sender, as well as commands that are not valid for the type of device under test, and commands that are intended for a different device.

**VER.1.3.M939: Enable update of security credentials**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploiting incomplete update of security credentials*

*This mitigation is required to counter installation of an invalid certificate*

*This mitigation is required to counter use of compromised security credentials*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that the update of a security credential is atomic.

The evaluator will test that the update of each security credential either finishes successfully with complete replacement of all parts of the relevant credential or else retains the old credential.

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that, in addition to the general critical message validation checks described elsewhere, certificate path validation (CPV) always successfully completes, where required to do so by [d], before the validated replacement remote party certificate is installed.

The specific type of CPV required by [d] will vary according to the type of certificate and the operation of each type of CPV will be verified by the evaluator.

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that, once validation checks have been successfully performed, the specified security credentials replacement will take place with subsequent product functionality confirming this.

The evaluator shall seek evidence to confirm that all the different types of remote party security credentials defined in [d, 4] (i.e. covering the different types of remote party role, keyUsage and cellUsage, appropriate for the product type) can be replaced, using all the different credentials replacement modes defined in [d].

Checks on subsequent product functionality should, as a minimum, confirm that the new credentials will be used for the associated cryptographic mechanisms, instead of the old ones. For instance, depending on the type of credential replaced, the following tests are suggested: (a) digital signature verification, (b) MAC authentication + generation, (c) certificate path validation and (d) encryption + decryption of sensitive data.

**VER.1.3.M948: Confirm ZigBee CBKE operation**

*This mitigation is required to counter observing inter-device HAN messages*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm ZigBee CBKE configuration and operation.

The evaluators will confirm that the device establishes the HAN with security as specified in [f, 5.4].

Specifically the evaluators shall check that the HAN is established in such a way that the required encryption and mutual authentication cannot be bypassed or disabled. If this is not the default configuration of the device there must be guidance to ensure that it is configured correctly on installation. If it is the default configuration of the device, but can be changed, there must be guidance to ensure that it is not changed.

### **VER.1.3.M951: Mutual authentication on the HAN**

*This mitigation is required to counter connecting an unauthorised device to the HAN*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that removal of the other device's entry from the product's Device Log will result in the encrypted link between the product and other HAN device being terminated (i.e. it will no longer be possible for application data to be exchanged between the two devices).

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the product authenticates a device on the HAN before securely exchanging information with it.

The evaluator shall confirm that:

- The product will only successfully join to another HAN device according to the different scenarios permitted for the join to occur in [d, 13.7].
- The product will not attempt to join to the other HAN device in other scenarios such as (a) the other device is of a type that the product is not permitted to communicate with, (b) the other device's details are not in the product's Device Log, (c) the other device's details are mismatched with details in the product's Device Log and (d) the other device's key pair is mismatched with the security credentials held for that device in the product's Device Log.
- Only once a successful join has occurred, will application data be exchanged between the product and the other HAN device, this data being encrypted using a symmetric key agreed by the two devices in accordance with [d, 13.7].

### **VER.1.3.M954: Verify security credential protection**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and modification of commands, responses or alerts*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify the authenticity protection of security credentials.

The evaluator shall attempt to modify or substitute (by circumventing the documented protection mechanisms) stored Device Security Credentials and Remote Party Security Credentials, without having authorised access to modify this data. The testing should include a search of interface documentation for methods other than normal operational messages.

## **VER.1.4 - Verify >> CHF >> Sensitive Data Protection**

### **VER.1.4.M917: Verify logical protection of security data**

*This mitigation is required to counter gaining access to security data in a single device (via either operational or non-operational interfaces)*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm the protection of security data, such as cryptographic key material.

The evaluator shall confirm that:

- no sensitive key material (private asymmetric keys and any symmetric keys) can be exfiltrated from the product, and
- the following security related data cannot be modified, except as a result of certain authentic messages defined in [d] intended for the purpose: device security credentials, remote party security credentials, including anti-replay counters and (where applicable) the device's UTRN counter cache.

Note: This confirmation shall also take into account any documented product interfaces additional to [d] that have the potential to exfiltrate sensitive key material or modify security related data, including all additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'.



## VER.1.5 - Verify >> CHF >> Virtual Wan

### VER.1.5.M501: VWD interface limitation

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that a non-VWCH product will reject any EnableVWD command and will not establish a Virtual WAN Device tunnel.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that any CH that does not support virtual WAN capability:

- will not accept an EnableVWD command on any interface (including Inter-PAN)
- will not accept WriteConfiguration commands that attempt to update VWAN parameters
- will not attempt to establish a tunnel associated with a ProtocolID of 0 after receiving an EnableVWD command that is otherwise valid for that target CH (i.e. the field contents are valid except in the regard that this Device does not support Virtual WAN).

No evaluator action is required for this mitigation in the case of a VWCH that is being evaluated against the VW capability variant mitigations.

### VER.1.5.M502: (VW capability ONLY) VWD joining

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH implements EnableVWD commands only for allowed Device types.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that the VWCH will only implement an EnableVWD command for a device that has been added to the CHF Device Log as an HHT or as a PPMID or Type 2 Device.

### VER.1.5.M503: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Mode activation

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH activates Virtual WAN Mode only after receipt of a valid EnableVWD command.

This confirmation is based on performing tests with valid and invalid EnableVWD commands according to each of the validation criteria and the design information. The evaluator will confirm that the VWCH only operates in Virtual WAN Mode and uses the Virtual WAN Communications Link after receiving an EnableVWD command which satisfies the validation checks.

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH correctly replaces VWD details on receipt of a subsequent valid EnableVWD command.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that if a subsequent, valid EnableVWD is received by the VWCH then it replaces the previous VWD details with the VWD details from the new command, and that the transition to the replacement VWD takes place according to the rules for graceful transition.

## **VER.1.5.M504: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Communications Link activation**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised access to messages exchanged with the VWP*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the Virtual WAN Communications Link is activated only after establishing keys with the Virtual WAN Provider.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that after an EnableVWD command has been received and validated then the VWCH accepts only key agreement messages over the Virtual WAN Communications Link until the VWCH has established cryptographic keys with the Virtual WAN Provider in accordance with the DLMS CH Profile [I]. The evaluator confirms that all subsequent messages use the keys to protect the message in accordance with the DLMS CH Profile [I].

The evaluator shall conform by testing that the VWCH will only accept messages from a VWP that has presented credentials signed by the wanProvider.

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that if a subsequent valid EnableVWD command is received then the VWCH will establish new keys with the Virtual WAN Provider before activating the new Virtual WAN Communications Link.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that if a VWD is replaced by a subsequent, valid EnableVWD then it requires a new key agreement between the VWCH and the VWP before the Virtual WAN Communications Link is used with the new VWD.

**VER.1.5.M505: (VW capability ONLY) WAN interface maintenance**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

*This mitigation is required to counter WAN message disruption*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH maintains the link used for the WAN interface according to the WAN Selection Arrangements.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that after a valid EnableVWD has been accepted by the VWCH, then the VWCH determines whether the WAN Communications Link or the Virtual WAN Communications Link is active using the switching parameters and according to the WAN Selection Arrangements (see [m]).

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH ignores all messages except link maintenance messages on the non-active link.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that only link maintenance messages (i.e. messages that check the availability of the link for use if determined by the WAN Selection Arrangements) are accepted on the non-active link, as specified in [GBCS, 10.9.3.2].

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH prevents unauthorised modification of the VWAN parameters.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that commands to update VWAN parameters are only accepted from the WANProvider and when signed by the WANProvider, and only accepted if:

- a) the Business Target ID in the message is the VWCH itself
- b) the Business Originator ID is the wanProvider.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the active WAN route, active VWD MAC ID and other Read-only attributes cannot be updated other than by the VWCH itself (e.g. that they cannot be updated using the WriteConfiguration command in [k]).

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH discards any partially downloaded firmware images that are present when the active WAN link is switched.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that images intended for the VWCH itself or for it to distribute to other Devices on the HAN are discarded when the active WAN link is switched. (For clarity: this applies to images that are in the process of being downloaded to the VWCH, whether those images are intended to be applied to the VWCH itself or are for the VWCH to distribute subsequently to other Devices on the HAN. Any images that have been completely downloaded to the VWCH at the time of switching are unaffected (i.e. not discarded).) The evaluator shall verify by testing that the VWCH logs an event and sends an alert for any discarded image.

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWD entry in the VWCH CHF Device Log for a VWD that initially joined by Inter-PAN is correctly affected by the Inter-PAN connection timer.

This relates to the timer described in [d, 10.5.3.4] that would normally cause an HHT to be removed from the CHF Device Log: if (but only if) the VWD has been enabled by the receipt of a valid EnableVWD command then the CHF Device Log entry is no longer subject to the timer. The evaluator shall verify this behaviour by testing (for both the cases of receiving and not receiving a valid Enable VWD).

### **VER.1.5.M506: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH events and alerts**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device  
This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised switching of a WAN connection*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH logs an event and sends an alert whenever the WAN interface link is changed.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that:

- an event and alert are generated when switching from WAN communications link to Virtual WAN Communications Link, or vice versa
- the alert is sent to the Device Manager, over the newly activated WAN interface (i.e. after switching), and has the form and content specified in [k, 3.10]
- the event is recorded in the CHF Event Log (see [k, Annex 4]).

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH logs and sends alerts for security events related to validation failures of the EnableVWD command and VWAN configuration update messages.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that the validation failure events include those arising from GBCS events that are relevant to the EnableVWD command (e.g. those arising from checking the MAC Header and Grouping Header) and those relevant to configuration update messages. The evaluator shall confirm that the events are recorded in the appropriate log (cf. [k, Annex 4]) and the alerts sent to the appropriate recipients (based on [d] and [k]).

### **VER.1.5.M580: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH protocol robustness testing**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** perform fuzz testing of the available interfaces.

The requirements of VER.1.1.M80 are extended to include Virtual WAN communications relating to use of a tunnel associated with a ProtocolID of 0 (i.e. a tunnel that can be used as a virtual WAN communications link) and to DM messages including the EnableVWD command (received via Inter-PAN and via the WAN interface).

The fuzz testing shall include attempts to perform WriteConfiguration on non-instantiated DMM attributes (cf. [k, Annex 2]).

The fuzz testing shall include malformed messages sent to the CH using valid cryptographic keys (e.g. using the correct keys to sign commands).

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH rejects WAN messages received over a tunnel with ProtocolID 6.

Tunnels associated with ProtocolID 6 are used for normal HAN messaging (cf. [d, 10.2.2]) and the VWCH therefore does not accept WAN messages received over these tunnels, with the exception of HHT communication as in [d, 10.5.3.4 & 10.9.3.4] or a VWD Device joined as an HHT prior (and only prior) to acceptance of a valid Enable VWD command. The evaluator shall confirm the rejection behaviour by testing.

(For clarity (see also [d, 10.9.3.4]): when a Type 2 device acting as a VWD joins via Inter-PAN then the VWCH uses a tunnel associated with ProtocolID 6 (during the joining) which is converted to a tunnel associated with ProtocolID 0 after successfully processing the EnableVWD command (i.e. the tunnel associated with ProtocolID 6 no longer exists) and that tunnel associated with ProtocolID 0 is thenceforth used for the Virtual WAN communications. By contrast when a PPMID acting as a VWD joins then, after successfully processing the EnableVWD command, it creates a *new* tunnel associated with ProtocolID 0 to use for the Virtual WAN communications and keeps the tunnel associated with ProtocolID 6 to use thenceforth for normal PPMID messages.)

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the VWCH rejects triage unlock messages received over the Virtual WAN interface.

If the VWCH supports Triage Use Case 005 (see [j, 4 & 5]) then the evaluator shall confirm that valid unlock messages (i.e. messages that unlock triage mode for Triage Use Case 005) are not accepted via the Virtual WAN interface.

## VER.2 - Verify >> GPF

### VER.2.1 - Verify >> GPF >> Interface Protection

#### VER.2.1.M80: Protocol robustness testing

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an additional interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator will perform fuzz testing of the available interfaces.**

As per guidance in the CPA Policies and Procedures [a], structured fuzz testing is expected for all available interfaces, physical AND logical. Based on mandatory functional requirements in [d], the following two interfaces will always require fuzz testing: ZigBee and GBCS application layer messages.

For ZigBee, fuzz testing shall be performed on all the messages that can be received including those that are (a) unencrypted, (b) encrypted with the network key (and thus visible to all devices on the HAN) and (c) encrypted with an APS key set up to protect comms between the product and each other type of HAN device that is not required to be CPA-certified (at time of writing, PPMID, IHD and CAD).

When fuzz testing GBCS Application layer messages ('use cases'), mutations are expected to cover all parts of a message that the product will attempt to decode up to the point of authentication. The point of authentication for these messages (as relevant to [a], for smart metering equipment) is the point at which the protective crypt gets successfully validated (one or both of digital signature and MAC, dependent on the message type); any message decoding performed before this point (even just to check message well-formedness) will be in scope of GBCS Application layer fuzz testing. With this in mind, some message payload fuzz testing is expected (in addition to all the other sections of a GBCS Application layer message that can be present (i.e. GBT header, grouping header, signature field, etc), the amount of payload fuzz testing depending on how much of the message's payload gets decoded by the product before the point of authentication is reached. This minimum expectation is based on some GBCS application messages requiring content in the payload to be decoded and processed as part of the cryptographic validation process for the message type.

In addition to the ZigBee and GBCS application layer interfaces, it is possible that the device may have additional interfaces beyond those defined in [d] that might be accessible to an attacker and hence also require fuzz testing. In particular all additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces' require fuzz testing.

#### VER.2.1.M903: Verify disabled interfaces

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator will verify the state of each disabled interface.**

All disabled interfaces present in the operational state of the device (after installation) shall be identified and the disabled state of each shall be verified by visual inspection to verify that it is not possible to use the interface without breaching the tamper-boundary and making the required physical modifications.

The evaluator will ensure that justification has been provided for any interface that is not disabled.

### VER.2.2 - Verify >> GPF >> Logging

#### VER.2.2.M940: Security alerts

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator will confirm raising of alerts for security-related events and error conditions.**

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the device correctly raises the alerts defined in [d, 16] for security-related events and error conditions.

### **VER.2.2.M941: Security logging**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator *will* confirm Security Log recording.**

The evaluator shall confirm by testing the correct logging of each type of event that can be recorded in the Security Log as defined in [d, 16].

### **VER.2.3 - Verify >> GPF >> Message Protection**

#### **VER.2.3.M4: Evaluation/Cryptocheck**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a cryptographic algorithm implementation error*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator *will* ensure all cryptographic algorithms employed for security functionality have been validated as per the "Cryptography Review" section in the CPA Foundation Process document.**

The evaluator shall include in this activity a confirmation (by reference to relevant CAVP or equivalent certificates, or by activities in the course of the CPA evaluation) that cryptographic algorithms used by the PRNG (such as DRBG) have been independently validated for correctness.

Where cryptographic algorithms claim certification under CAVP (or equivalent external certification), then the evaluator shall confirm that this certification has been achieved for the relevant hardware/firmware/software components of the product, at the relevant version for the component. For cryptographic algorithms that are not certified using an external process, the evaluator shall confirm the correctness of the implementation by means of known answer tests, as described in the CPA Policies and Procedures document, Reference [a].

The cryptographic primitives used by the device shall be only those specified in [d].

#### **VER.2.3.M853: Prevent unauthorised changes to future-dated actions**

*This mitigation is required to counter future-dated actions not being carried out at the specified time*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised addition, modification or removal of a future action*

**At Foundation Grade the evaluator *will* confirm device behaviour leading to cancellation of future-dated actions.**

The evaluator shall confirm by testing:

- that when the device clock is updated it neither misses nor repeats actions previously stored for future action nor misses calendar-based events
- that a future-dated action can only be added, replaced, modified or cancelled by an authentic message from a source authorised to issue the command, and that a response is sent by the device, identifying the successful processing of the new command.

**VER.2.3.M855: Receiver replay check**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and replay of messages*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that messages are not actioned more than once.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the device correctly rejects messages with unacceptable count values relative to its current state, and that the device correctly generates count values for which it is responsible. The testing shall cover both commands for immediate execution and future-dated commands (where applicable).

The mechanism for protection against replay is defined in [d, 4.3]. Only certain messages require the protection, as specified in the Use Cases in [d, 19], summarised in [d, Table 20]. However, a different anti-replay mechanism is used for Security Credential commands as defined in [d, 13], and for Pre-Payment Top-Ups as defined in [d, 14].

Notes:

- Evidence is required for ALL commands that incorporate replay protection.
- When testing the anti-replay protection for Pre-Payment Top-Ups (where applicable), the evaluator shall verify that Pre-Payment Top-Up messages are rejected if its UTRN counter value (a) matches any value in the device's UTRN counter cache or (b) is lower than the lowest value in the device's UTRN counter cache. These tests will also cover all the interfaces over which the device can receive a UTRN.

**VER.2.3.M887: Encrypt sensitive data in messages prior to transmission**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception of messages on WAN*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify encryption of sensitive data in commands, responses and alerts.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the device correctly encrypts the sensitive data specified in [d, 19.3] in accordance with the encryption mechanisms specified in [d, 8].

**VER.2.3.M904: Confirm standard protocol certification**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of incorrect protocol implementation*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm standard protocol certification of the device has been successfully completed.

The device shall be certified as specified in this document in section 1.6 Interoperability.

**VER.2.3.M927: Check only valid messages accepted**

*This mitigation is required to counter creation of unauthorised commands*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that critical commands are not executed if the sender of the command cannot be successfully authenticated or is not authorised to send that command.

The evaluator will attempt to issue critical commands that should be rejected. This will include commands sent from an unauthorised sender, and a non-authentic sender, as well as commands that are not valid for the type of device under test, and commands that are intended for a different device.



### **VER.2.3.M939: Enable update of security credentials**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploiting incomplete update of security credentials*

*This mitigation is required to counter installation of an invalid certificate*

*This mitigation is required to counter use of compromised security credentials*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that the update of a security credential is atomic.

The evaluator will test that the update of each security credential either finishes successfully with complete replacement of all parts of the relevant credential or else retains the old credential.

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that, in addition to the general critical message validation checks described elsewhere, certificate path validation (CPV) always successfully completes, where required to do so by [d], before the validated replacement remote party certificate is installed.

The specific type of CPV required by [d] will vary according to the type of certificate and the operation of each type of CPV will be verified by the evaluator.

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify that, once validation checks have been successfully performed, the specified security credentials replacement will take place with subsequent product functionality confirming this.

The evaluator shall seek evidence to confirm that all the different types of remote party security credentials defined in [d, 4] (i.e. covering the different types of remote party role, keyUsage and cellUsage, appropriate for the product type) can be replaced, using all the different credentials replacement modes defined in [d].

Checks on subsequent product functionality should, as a minimum, confirm that the new credentials will be used for the associated cryptographic mechanisms, instead of the old ones. For instance, depending on the type of credential replaced, the following tests are suggested: (a) digital signature verification, (b) MAC authentication + generation, (c) certificate path validation and (d) encryption + decryption of sensitive data.

### **VER.2.3.M951: Mutual authentication on the HAN**

*This mitigation is required to counter connecting an unauthorised device to the HAN*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that removal of the other device's entry from the product's Device Log will result in the encrypted link between the product and other HAN device being terminated (i.e. it will no longer be possible for application data to be exchanged between the two devices).

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm that the product authenticates a device on the HAN before securely exchanging information with it.

The evaluator shall confirm that:

- The product will only successfully join to another HAN device according to the different scenarios permitted for the join to occur in [d, 13.7].
- The product will not attempt to join to the other HAN device in other scenarios such as (a) the other device is of a type that the product is not permitted to communicate with, (b) the other device's details are not in the product's Device Log, (c) the other device's details are mismatched with details in the product's Device Log and (d) the other device's key pair is mismatched with the security credentials held for that device in the product's Device Log.
- Only once a successful join has occurred, will application data be exchanged between the product and the other HAN device, this data being encrypted using a symmetric key agreed by the two devices in accordance with [d, 13.7].

### **VER.2.3.M954: Verify security credential protection**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception and modification of commands, responses or alerts*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify the authenticity protection of security credentials.

The evaluator shall attempt to modify or substitute (by circumventing the documented protection mechanisms) stored Device Security Credentials and Remote Party Security Credentials, without having authorised access to modify this data. The testing should include a search of interface documentation for methods other than normal operational messages.

## VER.2.4 - Verify >> GPF >> Sensitive Data Protection

### VER.2.4.M917: Verify logical protection of security data

*This mitigation is required to counter gaining access to security data in a single device (via either operational or non-operational interfaces)*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm the protection of security data, such as cryptographic key material.

The evaluator shall confirm that:

- no sensitive key material (private asymmetric keys and any symmetric keys) can be exfiltrated from the product, and
- the following security related data cannot be modified, except as a result of certain authentic messages defined in [d] intended for the purpose: device security credentials, remote party security credentials, including anti-replay counters and (where applicable) the device's UTRN counter cache.

Note: This confirmation shall also take into account any documented product interfaces additional to [d] that have the potential to exfiltrate sensitive key material or modify security related data, including all additional interfaces as identified in DEV.\*.M847 'Minimise interfaces'.

### VER.2.4.M928: Restrict data on change of tenancy

*This mitigation is required to counter reading previous tenants' information*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** verify correct response after a Restrict GPF Data command.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the GPF correctly omits the restricted data from any data returned to PPMID and Type 2 Devices, according to the date of restriction.

The specific items to which provision is restricted are identified in the Set Change of Tenancy date Use Case in [d, 19].

## VER.3 - Verify >> Firmware Protection

### VER.3.M347: Verify update mechanism

*This mitigation is required to counter causing unauthorised activation of authentic firmware*

*This mitigation is required to counter inability to load firmware updates required to patch security weaknesses*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised modification to firmware in situ*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** validate the developer's assertions regarding the suitability and security of their update process.

The evaluator shall confirm the following:

- once a complete firmware update image has been received, its cryptographic protection will be validated and, if any checks fail, this will result in the image being rejected such that it cannot subsequently be activated (note: the checks will involve validation of the image's protective signature as per requirements in [d], along with any additional cryptographic checks performed on the image),
- a successfully received firmware update image, cryptographically validated as per the previous point, will not be activated if any of the cryptographic validations required by [d] on the associated Activate Firmware command fail - this for both immediate and future-dated firmware activation scenarios,
- similarly, a successfully received and cryptographically validated firmware update image will not be activated if the 'manufacturerImageHash' field in the Activate Firmware command does not match the hash in the firmware update image - this again for both immediate and future-dated firmware activation scenarios,
- attempting to action an Activate Firmware command (either when the command has been received with no 'executionDateTime' specified or when it is time for a previously-received, future-dated command to be executed) will fail when there is no successfully received complete firmware update image - or one has been received but one or more cryptographic checks on that image have failed - and
- where a partially received firmware image - or a full image over which cryptographic checks have not been successfully performed - has been stored, this will not get activated if a device reboot occurs.

In addition to the above checks (that focus on ensuring a firmware update does not occur when not appropriate), the evaluator shall also confirm:

- the design for receiving and activating a firmware update, via authentic Distribute Firmware and Activate Firmware commands, is clearly documented and tested against by the developer, confirming that there are no obvious areas of uncertainty that could result in an unexpected failure to update the firmware,
- where a product does not incorporate anti-replay protection on the Activate Firmware message, product security is not undermined by a subsequent replaying of a valid Activate Firmware message (when used for either immediate or future-dated firmware activation).

## VER.4 - Verify >> Physical Protection

### VER.4.M849: Tamper response

*This mitigation is required to counter access to structures inside the tamper-protection boundary of the device*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** validate the developer's assertions regarding tamper response.

The evaluator shall verify by testing that removing or opening any part of the tamper boundary that is designed to be separately removed or opened results in an entry being recorded in the Security Log and the sending of an alert.

**VER.4.M897: Protection of security-related physical structure**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised physical access to security-critical data stored on the device*

At Foundation Grade the evaluator **will** confirm the tamper-protection boundary.

The evaluator shall confirm that the outer casing of the device is a metal, hard plastic, or equivalent Production Grade enclosure. The device casing shall not allow inspection or visibility of the internal layout or components of the device, other than by breach of the tamper-protection boundary, and shall therefore be opaque within the visible spectrum (other than areas required to provide visibility of a user interface). This may be achieved by the case itself or by a lining applied to the case.

### 3.3 Deployment mitigations

**DEP.M340: Address Space Layout Randomisation**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error in the Communications Hub*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** enable ASLR in the host Operating System where available.

Note: ASLR may be disabled for specific aspects of the product, provided there is justification of why this is required.

**DEP.M906: Installation, initialisation and operation guidance**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of device with incorrect installation or configuration*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** state device manufacturer guidance on secure installation, initialisation and operation.

Guidance shall address any manufacturer required actions and recommendations for establishing and maintaining secure operation of the device.

(For clarity: this requirement is stated here explicitly, in addition to the implicit guideline in [a], to ensure attention is given to completeness of product-specific guidance, including any additional functionality, especially as the installation, initialisation and operation may be the responsibility of different parties in the GB Smart Metering operational environment.)

**DEP.M933: Protect devices after decommissioning**

*This mitigation is required to counter directly accessing structures and interfaces in a decommissioned device*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** implement procedures for secure recommissioning when previously-installed devices are re-installed.

The operating procedures shall include secure deletion of previous sensitive data before a device is re-installed, and secure disposal procedures for devices that are not to be re-installed (whether due to failure, age, or other reasons).

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** recover and ensure secure disposal of devices at the end of their life.

**DEP.1 - Deployment >> CHF****DEP.1.1 - Deployment >> CHF >> Interface Protection****DEP.1.1.M873: Disable non-operational logical and physical interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** include guidance on requirements to manage non-operational interfaces.

### **DEP.1.1.M947: Mutual authentication on the WAN**

*This mitigation is required to counter connection to CHF with an incorrect WAN*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** issue security credentials to enable mutual authentication with the WAN Provider.

The appropriate security credentials will be issued to the CHF to enable mutual authentication to take place between the CHF and the WAN Service Provider for the premises in which it is installed.

## **DEP.1.2 - Deployment >> CHF >> Logging**

### **DEP.1.2.M39: Audit log review**

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** regularly review the Security Log for unexpected entries.

The device is required to record security-significant events in the Security Log, in order to help prevent attacks from remaining undetected. The deployment should take appropriate steps to ensure all log entries are read from the device before being overwritten.

## **DEP.1.3 - Deployment >> CHF >> Message Protection**

### **DEP.1.3.M871: Data reconciliation**

*This mitigation is required to counter blocking of messages/responses*

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of stored data in the device*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** implement procedures for reconciliation of data read from the device with data expected to be present as a result of commands sent.

Reconciliation should address the potential for uncertainty over both the correct completion of device actions taken in response to messages, and confirmation of expected device state.

### **DEP.1.3.M876: Restrict ability for devices to join HAN**

*This mitigation is required to counter observing inter-device HAN messages*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** ensure that only appropriately authorised devices can join a smart metering related HAN.

'Appropriate authorisation' is obtained from the DCC or other relevant authority to enable the device to join the HAN according to [f, 5.4], as specified in [d, 4] and [d, 13].

## **DEP.1.4 - Deployment >> CHF >> Sensitive Data Protection**

### **DEP.1.4.M953: Initialisation of Security Credentials**

*This mitigation is required to counter gaining access to security data in a single device (via either operational or non-operational interfaces)*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** ensure new Security Credentials are generated by the device once it is installed.

Although there will already be Device Security Credentials on the device before installation, once an installed device becomes operational it should be sent commands to ensure that new Security Credentials are issued by the device to replace those already present.

## **DEP.2 - Deployment >> GPF**

## **DEP.2.1 - Deployment >> GPF >> Interface Protection**

### **DEP.2.1.M873: Disable non-operational logical and physical interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** include guidance on requirements to manage non-operational interfaces.

## DEP.2.2 - Deployment >> GPF >> Logging

### DEP.2.2.M39: Audit log review

*This mitigation is required to counter making attack actions that leave no trace on the device*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** regularly review the Security Log for unexpected entries.

The device is required to record security-significant events in the Security Log, in order to help prevent attacks from remaining undetected. The deployment should take appropriate steps to ensure all log entries are read from the device before being overwritten.

## DEP.2.3 - Deployment >> GPF >> Message Protection

### DEP.2.3.M871: Data reconciliation

*This mitigation is required to counter blocking of messages/responses*

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of stored data in the device*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** implement procedures for reconciliation of data read from the device with data expected to be present as a result of commands sent.

Reconciliation should address the potential for uncertainty over both the correct completion of device actions taken in response to messages, and confirmation of expected device state.

### DEP.2.3.M876: Restrict ability for devices to join HAN

*This mitigation is required to counter observing inter-device HAN messages*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** ensure that only appropriately authorised devices can join a smart metering related HAN.

'Appropriate authorisation' is obtained from the DCC or other relevant authority to enable the device to join the HAN according to [f, 5.4], as specified in [d, 4] and [d, 13].

## DEP.2.4 - Deployment >> GPF >> Sensitive Data Protection

### DEP.2.4.M928: Restrict data on change of tenancy

*This mitigation is required to counter reading previous tenants' information*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** ensure a Restrict GPF Data command is issued on change of tenant.

### DEP.2.4.M953: Initialisation of Security Credentials

*This mitigation is required to counter gaining access to security data in a single device (via either operational or non-operational interfaces)*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** ensure new Security Credentials are generated by the device once it is installed.

Although there will already be Device Security Credentials on the device before installation, once an installed device becomes operational it should be sent commands to ensure that new Security Credentials are issued by the device to replace those already present.

## DEP.3 - Deployment >> Physical Protection

### DEP.3.M925: Tamper evident seals on the perimeter

*This mitigation is required to counter access to structures inside the tamper-protection boundary of the device*

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** place tamper evident seals at access points on product.

Use tamper evidence seals (e.g. stickers) to make entry to system internals detectable by physical inspection. Tamper seals should be of restricted availability, or should require use of a special tool with restricted availability, to prevent an attacker successfully replacing one with a new, undamaged seal.

At Foundation Grade the deployment **is required to** provide advice on the tamper threat and tamper seal inspection.

Advice should include looking for possible damage to tamper evident seals.



# Appendix A References

This document references the following resources.

| Label | Title                                                                | Location                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Notes                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [a]   | CPA Policies and Procedures Part 1: Policy, Governance and Operation | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/commercial-product-assurance-cpa/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/commercial-product-assurance-cpa/</a><br>(Specific link, correct at time of writing, is:<br><a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/documents/security/cpa-policies-and-procedures-part-1-v1-1/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/documents/security/cpa-policies-and-procedures-part-1-v1-1/</a> .) | Latest                                                                                                                                                                    |
| [b]   | Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications (SMETS)            | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/</a><br>(Navigate to “Smart Energy Code”, then “SEC and Supporting Documents”, then “The Smart Energy Code”, then see under heading “SEC Documents”. Select “SEC Subsidiary Documents” tab and locate SEC Schedule 9.)                                                                                                                          | There will be at least one version of SMETS relevant to this Security Characteristic, that version (or versions) being defined in the TS Applicability Tables (TSAT) [h]. |
| [c]   |                                                                      | (Intentionally blank)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                           |
| [d]   | Great Britain Companion Specifications (GBCS)                        | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/</a><br>(Navigate to “Smart Energy Code”, then “SEC and Supporting Documents”, then “The Smart Energy Code”, then see under heading “SEC Documents”. Select “SEC Subsidiary Documents” tab and locate SEC Schedule 8.)                                                                                                                          | There will be at least one version of GBCS relevant to this Security Characteristic, that version (or versions) being defined in the TSAT [h].                            |
| [e]   | Communications Hub Technical Specifications (CHTS)                   | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/</a><br>(Navigate to “Smart Energy Code”, then “SEC and Supporting Documents”, then “The Smart Energy Code”, then see under heading “SEC Documents”. Select “SEC Subsidiary Documents” tab and locate SEC Schedule 10.)                                                                                                                         | There will be at least one version of CHTS relevant to this Security Characteristic, that version (or versions) being defined in the TSAT [h].                            |

| Label | Title                                                                                   | Location                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Notes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [f]   | ZigBee Smart Energy (ZSE) Profile Specification                                         | <a href="http://zigbeealliance.org/solution/smart-energy/">http://zigbeealliance.org/solution/smart-energy/</a>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Version(s) of the ZigBee documents used in the development of GBCS are stated in the relevant version of GBCS [d].                                                                                                                     |
| [g]   | Smart Energy Code                                                                       | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/</a><br>(Navigate to “Smart Energy Code”)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Latest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| [h]   | Technical Specification Applicability Tables (TSAT)                                     | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/</a><br>(Navigate to “Smart Energy Code”, then “SEC and Supporting Documents”, then “The Smart Energy Code”, then see under heading “SEC Documents”. Select “SEC Subsidiary Documents” tab and locate SEC Schedule 11.)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | The TSAT identifies the relevant version of the CPA SC’s to be used to ascertain compliance with requirements stated in the relevant version of GBCS associated with the version of SMETS that the product is being developed to meet. |
| [i]   | End to End Technical Architecture                                                       | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/</a><br>(Specific link, correct at time of writing, is: <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/technical-architecture-and-business-architecture/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/technical-architecture-and-business-architecture/</a> .)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Provides an entry point into a wider set of technical specifications that describe the requirements for the GB SMIP. This document is informative only and should be treated as such.                                                  |
| [j]   | Triage interface updates to GSME, ESME, SAPC & CH SCs and CPA Build Standard Extensions | <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/commercial-product-assurance-cpa-security-characteristics/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/commercial-product-assurance-cpa-security-characteristics/</a><br>(Specific link, correct at time of writing, is: <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/documents/security/cpa-security-characteristic-triage-interface-updates-to-gsme-esme-sapc-ch-scs-and-cpa-build-standard-extensions-v3-0/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/documents/security/cpa-security-characteristic-triage-interface-updates-to-gsme-esme-sapc-ch-scs-and-cpa-build-standard-extensions-v3-0/</a> .) | Latest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| [k]   | NEP DMM Protocol for 4G                                                                 | Available from the DCC to authorised parties                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Latest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| [l]   | CH-VWP DLMS Tunnel                                                                      | Available from the DCC to authorised parties                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | Latest                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

| Label | Title                      | Location                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Notes  |
|-------|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| [m]   | WAN Selection Arrangements | <a href="https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/our-smart-network/network-products-services/communications-hub/">https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/our-smart-network/network-products-services/communications-hub/</a><br>(Specific link, correct at time of writing, is:<br><a href="https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/media/m3gp1ftx/wan-selection-arrangments-v10.pdf">https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/media/m3gp1ftx/wan-selection-arrangments-v10.pdf</a> .) | Latest |

## Appendix B Glossary

The following definitions are used in this document.

| Term                                    | Definition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Additional interface                    | This term is used to denote an interface that is present on the product and required for its routine operation (it is therefore not a 'non-operational interface' as defined here), but that is not used to provide the functionality defined in [b] and [d] (it is therefore not an 'operational interface' as defined here). The interface between an Auxiliary Proportional Controller and the load that it controls would be an example of such an interface. |
| ALCS                                    | Auxiliary Load Control Switch. A switch controlling a load on the supply.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Alert                                   | A message generated by a device including in response to a problem or the risk of a potential problem.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Allow-list                              | The CHF Device Log acts as an allow-list for all devices that are allowed to communicate on the HAN. In this SC "allow-list" replaces "white-list" as described in section 13.7.1.1 of [d].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| API                                     | Application Programming Interface                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Auxiliary Controller                    | Auxiliary Controller as defined in [b].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Auxiliary Proportional Controller (APC) | Auxiliary Proportional Controller as defined in [b].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| CAD                                     | Consumer Access Device – a component that allows consumer devices to be connected to the HAN to retrieve certain information.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| CAVP                                    | Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Programme – a scheme administered by the US National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) for validation testing for Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) approved and NIST recommended cryptographic algorithms and components of algorithms.                                                                                                                                                               |
| CH                                      | Communications Hub as defined in [e]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| CHF                                     | Communications Hub Function                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| CBKE                                    | ZigBee Certificate Based Key Establishment – a mechanism for the secure exchange of cryptographic keys as defined by the ZigBee Key Establishment Cluster.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Command                                 | An instruction to perform a function, received or sent via any interface.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Communications Broker                   | Data Communications Company (DCC) serving as an intermediary between Service Users and Smart Metering Equipment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Communications Hub                      | A device or set of devices located at the consumer's premises which will have the capability to communicate with the SMHAN and the SMWAN.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |

| Term                              | Definition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Communications Link               | The exchange of Commands, Responses, Alerts and other information between a system or Device and another system or Device which is independent of the transport mechanism used.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Configuration Data                | Describes data that configures the operation of various functions of the Smart Metering Equipment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Constant Data                     | Describes data that remains constant and unchangeable at all times.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| CoS                               | Change of Supplier. The process initiated by a consumer resulting in a change of ownership with respect to their registered energy supplier.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| CPA                               | The Commercial Product Assurance Scheme in relation to Devices for the purposes of the SEC, being a scheme described in the CPA Policies and Procedures under which the security of those Devices is required to be assured by the application for and issuing of CPA Device Certificates and CPA Build Standard Certificates.                                                                                                        |
| Critical Commands                 | Those Commands which relate to supply being affected, financial fraud or the compromise of consumer premises equipment security.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Data Communications Company (DCC) | A company whose responsibilities are laid out in [g].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Data Store                        | An area of storage in the Device capable of storing data. In the Communications Hub, this contains Constant Data, Configuration Data and Operational Data.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Day                               | The period commencing 00:00:00 Local Time and ending at the next 00:00:00.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Device                            | A physically or logically distinct part of a system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Device Log                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the CHF's Device Log holds the list of currently allow-listed Devices on the HAN; and</li> <li>- the Device Log on an ESME, SAPC, GSME, GPF, HCALCS or PPMID Device holds the Entity Identifiers, Device Types and related Security Credentials of other Devices on the HAN to which the Device is currently Joined (and so Authorised to interact with at an application layer).</li> </ul> |
| Energy Supplier                   | An entity licensed to supply gas and/or electricity in GB.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Entropy Source                    | A source of unpredictable data. There is no assumption that the unpredictable data has a uniform distribution. The entropy source includes a noise source, such as thermal noise or hard drive seek times; a digitization process; an assessment process; an optional conditioning process and health tests.                                                                                                                          |
| ESME                              | Electricity Smart Metering Equipment as defined in [b].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Event Log                         | A log for storing UTC date-and-time-stamped entries of non-security related information for diagnosis and auditing.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |

| Term                      | Definition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Failure-related activity  | Security relevant activity for a communications hub when recovering from a failure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- power-on processing</li> <li>- storage of sensitive data</li> <li>- performing cryptographic processing</li> <li>- random number generation.</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Firmware                  | The embedded software programs and/or data structures that control electronic Devices.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Foundation Grade          | There is no longer a distinction between different 'grades' in CPA and this term simply describes the .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Gas Proxy Function        | A Device used to store GSME and related data.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| GPF                       | Gas Proxy Function                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| GSME                      | Gas Smart Metering Equipment as defined in [b].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| HAN                       | Smart Metering Home Area Network                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| HCALCS                    | HAN Connected Auxiliary Load Control Switch as defined in [b]. An ALCS with its own HAN interface.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| HHT                       | Handheld Terminal – an optional device used in the installation and maintenance of Smart Metering Equipment within the consumer's premises.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| IHD                       | In-Home Display as defined in [b].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Key Agreement             | A means to calculate a shared secret between two parties, without that shared secret being sent between the two parties.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Load Controller           | An entity that is allowed, under the SEC, to operate in the role of load controller.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Load Switch               | A component or combination of components that can close or open (including on receipt of a Command to that effect) to enable or disable the flow of electricity to and from the premises.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Local Time                | The UTC date and time adjusted for British Summer Time.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| MAC                       | Message Authentication Code                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Message                   | <p>A message, as defined in [d, 3.1], sent or received by a Device, which is one of a Command, a Response or an Alert. Messages are categorised as either Critical or Non-Critical.</p> <p>Messages sent by a Device on the HAN to another Device on the same HAN are classified as HAN Only Messages. Messages that are sent between a Device on the HAN and another entity external to the HAN (a Remote Party) routed through the Communications Hub and (usually) the WAN, are classified as Remote Party Messages.</p> |
| MISRA                     | Motor Industry Software Reliability Association                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Non-operational interface | Interface that is not required for normal operation of the device and that is not therefore governed by the requirements in reference [e].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Normal operation          | Steady State Operation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

| Term                    | Definition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Operational Data        | Describes data used by the functions of the Smart Metering Equipment for output of information.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Operational interface   | Interface that is required for normal operation of the device and that is governed by the requirements in reference [e].                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Personal Data           | Any information comprising Personal Data as such term is defined in the Data Protection Act 1998.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| PPMID                   | Prepayment Interface Device as defined in [b] – an optional device that replicates the prepayment user interface of a GSME and ESME.                                                                                                                                                                              |
| PRNG                    | Pseudo Random Number Generator – software for generating a sequence of numbers that approximates the properties of random numbers.                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Production Grade        | Designed to meet commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration, etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| RBAC                    | Role-Based Access Control. Smart Metering Equipment is capable of restricting Authorisation to execute Commands and of issuing Alerts according to Role permissions.                                                                                                                                              |
| Response                | A message sent on or received from, the User Interface or HAN Interface or any other interface, containing information in response to a Command.                                                                                                                                                                  |
| RNG                     | Random Number Generator – A component used to generate a sequence of numbers that can be interpreted as numbers, letters or symbols that lack any predictable pattern.                                                                                                                                            |
| SAPC                    | Standalone Auxiliary Proportional Controller.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| SC Map                  | Diagrammatic representation of a Security Characteristic (or part of one).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| SEC                     | The Smart Energy Code that is published on the SEC website <a href="https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/">https://smartenergycodecompany.co.uk/</a>                                                                                                                                                              |
| Security Characteristic | A standard which describes necessary mitigations which must be present in a completed product, its evaluation or usage, particular to a type of security product.                                                                                                                                                 |
| Security Credentials    | Information used to identify and/or authenticate a Device, individual or system.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Security-Critical Data  | Data that would enable an unauthorised person to defeat cryptographic or secret-based mechanisms. This therefore includes data such as cryptographic keys or PIN values.                                                                                                                                          |
| Security Log            | A log for storing UTC date-and-time-stamped entries of security related information for diagnosis and auditing.                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Security Strength       | A number associated with the amount of work (that is, the number of operations) that is required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system; a security strength is specified in bits and is a specific value from the set (112, 128, 192, 256). The amount of work needed is $2^{\text{security\_strength}}$ . |
| Security Sub-Committee  | The Sub-Committee established by the panel in accordance with Smart Energy Code Section 7.1                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |



| Term                                                   | Definition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sensitive Data                                         | Data which is defined as personal data under the Data Protection Act 1998, or which is considered to be Personal Data due to public perception of the system. This will include cryptographic key material, and the contents of the Data Store.                                                                                                                             |
| Sensitive Event                                        | Each of the following events: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a failed authentication or authorisation;</li> <li>• a change in the executing firmware version; and</li> <li>• the detection of unauthorised physical access or any other occurrence that has the potential to put Supply at risk and/or compromise the Integrity of the CHF or the GPF.</li> </ul> |
| Shared Secret                                          | A number which is established by two parties through the Key Agreement technique specified in reference [d] and which can be used as input to a Key Derivation Function (KDF).                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Smart Energy Code                                      | The regulatory code designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to the Data Communications Company (DCC) Licence, and subject to modification in accordance with the Secretary of State's statutory powers and the DCC Licence.                                                                                                                                           |
| Smart Metering Equipment                               | Equipment that meets the Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specification in reference [b]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Standalone Auxiliary Proportional Controller           | A device that securely controls auxiliary loads as defined in [b].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Steady State Operation                                 | The phase in a Device's lifecycle where it is (1) installed in a consumer's premises and (2) is configured so that it can perform the range of operational functions required by reference [e].                                                                                                                                                                             |
| TSAT                                                   | Technical Specification Applicability Tables, reference [h]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Type 2 Device                                          | A Device that is not required to have a Device Log with its [be] or [e] meaning.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| UTC                                                    | Coordinated Universal Time                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| Virtual WAN Communications Hub (Virtual WAN CH) (VWCH) | A Communications Hub that is capable of operating using a Virtual WAN Communications Link in Virtual WAN Mode.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Virtual WAN Communications Link                        | A component of a Communications Hub that is capable of sending and receiving information usually sent over the WAN Communications Link via a HAN-connected device. A Virtual WAN CH is capable of operating the Virtual WAN Communications Link in Virtual WAN Mode.                                                                                                        |
| Virtual WAN Device (VWD)                               | A PPMID or Type 2 Device that has Virtual WAN capability.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Virtual WAN Mode                                       | A mode of operation of a Virtual WAN CH that allows sending of Messages via the Virtual WAN Communications Link.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Virtual WAN Provider (VWP)                             | The organisation providing communications over a secure channel via the Virtual WAN Communications Link.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| WAN                                                    | Smart Metering Wide Area Network                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |

| Term                                        | Definition                                                                                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| WAN Selection Arrangements                  | a document of that name published by the DCC on its website that sets out the conditions used by VWCHs to determine the communications route to connect to the DCC. (see [m]). |
| Wide Area Network (WAN) Communications Link | A component of a Communications Hub that is capable of sending and receiving information via the Wide Area Network Provider.                                                   |
| Wide Area Network (WAN) Interface           | A component of a Communications Hub that is capable of sending and receiving information via the WAN Communications Link and the Virtual WAN Communications Link.              |

## Appendix C Message Protection

A message sent or received by a Device will be one of a Command, a Response or an Alert. A Response is the result of a Command, while an Alert may be triggered by other events.

Messages are categorised as either Critical or Non-Critical. All messages are required to have integrity and authenticity protection, while Critical messages must have non-repudiation protection, and some specific data content (such as personal data) must have confidentiality protection.

Messages sent by a Device on the HAN to another Device on the same HAN are classified as HAN Only Messages and the cryptographic protections applied to such messages are those provided by ZigBee, as detailed in [f, 5.4].

Messages that are sent between a Device on the HAN and another entity external to the HAN (a Remote Party) routed through the Communications Hub and (usually) the WAN, are classified as Remote Party Messages and are protected by an End-to-End security architecture, detailed in [d, 4], based upon asymmetric cryptography using certificates as Security Credentials, detailed in [d, 12]. See below for information about the cryptographic primitives.

Remote Parties include organisations such as Suppliers, Network Operators, the Access Control Broker (ACB) and WAN Providers. Each Remote Party has a Public-Private Key Pair, with a Security Credential to make its Public Key available, enabling messages from it to be authenticated by a Device. Note that Remote Parties have separate credentials for signing and key agreement, see [d, 4.3] for details.

Protection of Remote Party Messages, described in [d, 4], [d, 5] and [d, 6], is achieved as follows:

- A Command that is sent from a Remote Party to a Device is constructed by the Remote Party and sent to the ACB.  
The ACB adds integrity and authenticity protection to the message by applying a MAC.  
The message is sent to the Device which will validate and check the message, including verifying the ACB's MAC.  
If the checks are successful the Device will execute the Command.  
The Device will construct a Response and apply a MAC that can be verified by the Remote Party, then send the Response to the ACB.  
The ACB will pass the Response back to the Remote Party which will verify the MAC.
- If the Command is a Critical Command the Remote Party will sign the Command to provide non-repudiation, before sending it to the ACB.  
In this case the Device checks will include verifying the Remote Party's signature as well as the ACB's MAC.  
If the checks are successful the Device will execute the Command.  
The Device will construct a Response and sign it, then send the Response to the ACB.  
The ACB will pass the Response back to the Remote Party which will verify the signature.
- Similarly, an Alert that is sent by a Device has a MAC applied that can be verified by the Remote Party.  
If it is a Critical Alert, it will have a signature rather than a MAC.

Where data items require confidentiality protection within a message, the AES GCM primitives (see below) are used to encrypt the data as described in [d, 8].

Each Device on the HAN (apart from Type 2 Devices) has its own Public-Private Key Pair, and a Device Security Credential to make its Public Key available, enabling it to be identified and authenticated. It is capable of securely holding a set of Security Credentials for Remote Parties with which it will need to communicate. It also maintains a Device Log in which it holds the Device Security Credentials of other Devices on the HAN with which it is authorised to communicate.

To communicate on the HAN, a Device must establish a secure ZigBee connection with the Communications Hub. The Communications Hub Function maintains its own Device Log that acts as an allow-list for those Devices allowed to communicate on the HAN. Device Security Credentials are added to a Device's Device Log by a command from an appropriate Remote Party, see [d, 13] for details.

Some messages require anti-replay protection as described in [d, 4.3]. Some messages may be future-dated as described in [d, 9.2].

## C.1 Cryptographic primitives

Remote Party Messages are protected using:

- SHA-256, as specified in FIPS 180-4, as the Hash function;
- the AES-128 cipher, as specified in FIPS 197, as the block cipher primitive;
- the Galois Counter Mode (GCM) mode of operation as specified in NIST Special Publication 800-38D;
- the GMAC technique, based on the use of AES-128, for the calculation of Message Authentication Codes (MACs), as specified in NIST Special Publication 800-38D;
- the Digital Signature technique, ECDSA (as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4) in combination with the curve P-256 (as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4 at Section D.1.2.3) and SHA-256 as the Hash function; within messages, Signatures shall be in the Plain Format;
- calculation of a Shared Secret Z, using the Static Unified Model, C(0e, 2s, ECC CDH) Key Agreement technique (as specified in *NIST Special Publication 800-56Ar2* save for the requirement to zeroise the Shared Secret) with:
  - the Single-step Key Derivation Function (KDF) based on SHA-256, as specified in *NIST Special Publication 800-56Ar2*; and
  - the P-256 curve for the elliptic curve operations.

Resulting DerivedKeyingMaterial (with its meaning in *NIST Special Publication 800-56Ar2*) shall only ever be used in relation to one Message Instance. Any Shared Secret that is not 'zeroised' shall be stored and used with the same security protections as Private Keys.

A Random Number Generator with a suitable Entropy Source is used in the generation of the Public-Private Key Pair on the Device.

The ZigBee HAN encryption uses the AES-128 cipher in CCM\* mode with MMO as the hash function. Key establishment is achieved using Certificate-Based Key Establishment (CBKE), between a device and the Communications Hub which acts as a ZigBee Trust Center. Further details can be found in [f, 5.4] and [f, c.4].

# Appendix D Summary of changes to mitigations

SSC has updated the Smart Metering Communications Hub Security Characteristic v1.5 (previously version 1.4) for the following reasons.

- Updates to reflect change of CPA scheme ownership from NCSC to SSC, including removal of references to NCSC, [PPFGE] replaced by [P&P1] in Appendix A, and updates to definition of relevant terms in Appendix B
- Update of existing mitigations where necessary to deal with virtual WAN capability
- Addition of the VW capability variant.

This has resulted in the following changes to mitigations.

## D.1 Removed mitigations

No mitigations have been removed.

## D.2 Modified mitigations

The following mitigations have been modified.

- DEV.1.1.M949: Secure Inter-PAN connection
- VER.1.1.M949: Secure Inter-PAN connection.

## D.3 Renamed mitigations

No mitigations have been renamed.

## D.4 New mitigations

The following new mitigations have been added.

- DEV.1.5.M501: VWD interface limitation
- DEV.1.5.M502: (VW capability ONLY) VWD joining
- DEV.1.5.M503: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Mode activation
- DEV.1.5.M504: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Communications Link activation
- DEV.1.5.M505: (VW capability ONLY) WAN interface maintenance
- DEV.1.5.M506: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH events and alerts
- DEV.1.5.M544: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH data validation on untrusted input
- VER.1.5.M501: VWD interface limitation
- VER.1.5.M502: (VW capability ONLY) VWD joining
- VER.1.5.M503: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Mode activation
- VER.1.5.M504: (VW capability ONLY) Virtual WAN Communications Link activation
- VER.1.5.M505: (VW capability ONLY) WAN interface maintenance
- VER.1.5.M506: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH events and alerts
- VER.1.5.M580: (VW capability ONLY) VWCH protocol robustness testing.

# Appendix E Stack Protection Expectations

A sufficiently robust level of stack protection is expected by products complying with this Security Characteristic that provides the following features as a minimum (which are typically on a par with those provided via a stack protection compiler option):

- Detect corruption of a function return address before the function returns to that address. i.e. The corrupted return address will not be used, and appropriate remediation action will be performed instead, such as rebooting the product into a good known state.
- Be present in functions that have one or more arrays declared in the function's stack frame (this includes third party library code within the same runtime environment as the application code).
- If canaries are used to detect corruption, then:
  - The size of the canaries must be at least that of a memory pointer for the device's platform (e.g. canary size would need to be at least 32 bits for a 32-bit architectural).
  - The values used for the canaries must vary across different devices in a non-predictable manner (not necessarily reliant on the same RNG function used to generate cryptographic key material).
  - Additionally, the canary value should also change in a specific device each time the product (re)boots, though this is not mandatory.

Note: Although it would be desirable to detect overflow of one stack variable into another, this is not mandatory for products complying with this Security Characteristic.