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SECMP0010 'Introduction of triage arrangements for Communication Hubs'

3rd June 2016

Meeting 2 Minutes

Attendees:

Working Group 4 Members	Organisation
Gerard Masterson	British Gas
David Lyons (SECMP0013 Proposer Representative)	EOn
Nick Jones (SECMP0012 Proposer)	Siemens
Adrian van den Heever	Geotogether
Elias Hanna	Landis Gyr
Chris Lawton	British Gas

Other Attendees:

Name	Representing
Eric Taylor	DCC
Adam Pearce	
Edward Mace	
Adam Lattimore (Chair)	SECAS
Urszula Thorpe(Technical Support)	
David Barber (Modifications Lead)	
Keith Phakoe (Meeting Secretary/Modifications Analyst)	
James Gorie	DECC

Apologies:

Working Group 4 Members	Organisation
Graham Wood (SECMP0010 Proposer)	British Gas

SECMP0010 - Introduction of triage arrangements for Communication Hubs

1 Introductions/Objectives

The Chair introduced the attendees and then laid out the objectives of the second Working Group meeting for this Modification. These were to:

- Discuss the Business Requirements document
- Review the Business process put forward to accompany the Requirements identified
- Answer any questions/points of clarification arising from the above discussions
- Agree a solution and a set of refined Business Requirements

Business Requirements

The Business Requirements identified from the first meeting were presented on a slide. Refined versions of these are available on a separate document. Discussion centred on each Business Requirement.

BR01 - In the case of unsuccessful CH installations, DCC to provide Suppliers with means of testing the device "health".

A Supplier said failures could be attributed to Hardware or Firmware. DCC pointed out that some defects can only be found in the field. The question should always be 'why has this installation failed?' and the need is to find out there and then. Therefore, this solution would need to be available in the field.

DECC asked if a Service Request (SR) might be a possible method of diagnosing the fault. DCC replied that SRs are only really appropriate if you know what you are looking for. The CH may not be the problem, or it may be a problem that has never been encountered before. Triage can reproduce the fault for diagnosis, which SRs may not be able to identify.

A Manufacturer wondered whether receiving and/or interpreting error responses from corresponding SRs in the field would present a problem. DCC replied that it is necessary to expose the information relevant to the issue from the CH. This is hard to do outside the test environment, although using a hand held device might be possible.

A Supplier pointed out meter operatives would need to be trained to interpret the output of triage, or any other solution that this Modification explores during the Refinement process. This would help with eliminating the return of the 80% of Hubs that are not defective (this is believed to be the number that get sent back unnecessarily). It was clarified that the scope of this Modification is limited to analysing the outputs of triage. Fixing faults in the field is not in scope.

The Supplier also added that the scope of this Modification does not extend to Devices other than the CH. Triage and installation of other Devices is being dealt with by SECMP0013, and this Modification only deals with CH installation, not asset management, and is to do with CH triage, not testing.

The scope of the Modification mentioned in these two points has subsequently been noted as something to be refined. The refined scope is part of the updated Business Requirements.

BR02 - In the case of unsuccessful CH installations, DCC to provide Suppliers with means of testing the presence/absence of private information.

A Supplier noted that there could be more than personal data on the CH. The Supplier asked that if that was the case, was it safe to reset the CH all the time to remove information (personal or otherwise) from it? DCC pointed out that rather than resetting the CH it is believed to be cheaper to clean out only the data you need to remove, since by applying a factory reset Organisational Certificates and CHF's Private Keys on the Communications Hub Function (CHF) would be removed. Such CHs would need to be returned to the DCC to populate the relevant Organisational Certificates on the CHF and regenerate CHF's Private Keys, which would increase the cost.

DCC further noted that the solution will mainly be used either on delivery of the CH to Suppliers and/or during the commissioning of the Smart Metering System at the site, or if a Device forming part of a Smart Metering System need to be replaced (meter exchange due to failure etc.)

DCC were asked why DCC cannot provide a full reset, and whether a factory reset should be done by Suppliers in the field. There was a suggestion of a 3 x 2 matrix where:

- **LOCATIONS would be:**
  1. In the field
  2. An asset centre
  3. A secure asset centre (with raised security standards)

- **STATUSES would be:**
  1. Can it be reused? (binary options)
  2. Can it be reset in the field/Asset centre/secure asset centre?

Actions/Possible new Business Requirements

A request was made to invite more Suppliers to the next meeting. However, it was noted that the WG4 members included other Suppliers. They are receiving the outputs from the WG meetings and have the opportunity to input, even though they may not be able to attend the actual meetings.

DCC was asked to feedback regarding what CH triage/diagnostics they can offer to Supplier if such triage/diagnosis is performed in an Asset Centre (secured or otherwise) and what diagnostics/triage can be offered to Suppliers on site. (the matrix mentioned in BR3 above). This will fall out from the DCC PA, and will be part of the request that is issued.

DCC/Suppliers to investigate what requirements surround the other elements of the status matrix.